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The Europeanisation of foreign and security policy and the re-production of state identities in Finland and Britain

The Europeanisation of Foreign and Security Policy and the Re-Production of State Identities in Finland and Britain

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Abstract

The Europeanisation of Foreign and Security Policy and the Re-Production of State Identities in Finland and Britain

The European Union activities in the field of foreign, security and defence policy have developed significantly during the past ten years. Accordingly, a distinct European system of foreign and security policy/ies with the European Union at its core has emerged. This poses challenges to the conventional understanding of foreign and security policy governance in Europe. The state-centric approaches conceptualising Europeanisation as cooperation between the European Union member states fail to account for the increasing governance on the European Union level. On the other hand, the accounts operating with a more integrationist conceptualisation of the Europeanisation tend to overlook the role of the member states.

Using Finland and Britain as case studies, this dissertation elucidates the relationship between the European Union and the state level foreign and security policy governance in contemporary Europe (an analytical question). I deploy a discourse analytic approach to investigate what difference, if any, the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy has made for the Finnish and British foreign policy discourses as well as these states' identities (an empirical question). The empirical findings suggest that the official foreign policy discourse in Finland changed from one of neutrality to one of alignment, whilst the official foreign policy discourse in Britain displayed continuity. Combined, these two findings generate a third finding: that the effects of EU policies have a differential impact on the foreign policy discourses and national identities of member states. The analytical findings implicitly comprise two elements: firstly, that comparative discourse methodology enables one to gain new insights into the process of Europeanisation; and secondly, that Europeanisation should be understood as both a top-down and a bottom-up process, in which state identities are both transformed by EU discourses (differentially depending on prior national identities), and also themselves shape the nature of EU discourses.

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Author's Declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the Regulations of the University of Bristol. The work is original, except where indicated by special reference in the text, and no part of the dissertation has been submitted for any other academic award. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

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List of Abbreviations

APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CoE	Council of Europe
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EC	European Community
ECP	European Political Cooperation
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Area
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ETA	European Trade Area
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
FCMA	Treaty of Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
G7/G8	Group of Seven/Group of Eight
GPD	Great Power Discourse
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
MERCOSUR	Common Market of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay)
MP	Member of Parliament
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
SDE	Strategic Defence Estimate
SDR	Strategic Defence Review
TEU	The Treaty on European Union
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Introduction

This dissertation elucidates the relationship between the European Union (EU) and its member states by analysing how the process of European integration in the field of foreign and security policy is shaping the state identities of two EU member states, Finland and Britain. Therefore, although the thesis focuses on Finland and Britain, the theoretical propositions underlying the argumentation have wider applicability. The dissertation grew out of my Bachelors Degree on international studies and political science in Birmingham. As a Finnish person studying in Britain, I found puzzling the variation of the political and academic argumentation related to the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in these two contexts. In Britain, some far-reaching generalisations argued that the CFSP was rhetoric instead of reality. As such, it played a marginal role in the political and scholarly debates. On the other hand, in Finland the CFSP became one of the buzzwords of the 1990s, and the key feature of the new and previously neutral EU member state's foreign and security policy discussions. Consequently, I became intrigued by two related questions: How to account for these differences? What do these differences tell us about the European foreign and security policy/ies?

European Union is now seen as a major force in world politics. The EU protagonists argue that it constitutes the largest and most prosperous market area and trading block in the world. It has been referred as the most powerful actor within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the largest contributor to the development aid. Due to the enlargement process, European Union now comprises most of the European states and it is argued to form a substantial regional and global political power. Its role for local,

regional and global cultures and identities has been also noted. Indeed, the very question of Europe and its boundaries is increasingly discussed in terms of the European Union.

The European Union's activities in the field of foreign, security and defence matters have developed significantly. The long process of European Political Cooperation (EPC) which aimed to increase foreign policy coordination amongst the member states was reformulated in Maastricht in 1992. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) established the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (CFSP) with the prospect of the common defence policy. The High Contracting Parties argued that member states 'shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity' ('Treaty on European Union' 1992). Further they suggested that member states 'shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations' ('Treaty on European Union' 1992). Although the European Union's ability to turn this bold rhetoric in reality has been refuted, significant institutional developments have followed. The EU decision-making has been re-formulated in several subsequent treaties and the office for High Representative of the CFSP established, for instance. In 1997 the common defence policy – European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – was launched and in 1999 the European Union agreed to develop independent military capability for crisis management operations. Currently, the European Union is engaged militarily in Europe and beyond.

The central assumption of this dissertation is that we have witnessed the emergence of a distinct European foreign and security policy system with the European Union at its core. This system is not based on traditional state-boundaries but on a progressively robust form of transnational governance cutting across member state and EU boundaries. Further, the suggested growth of this complex and multilayered European system pose a challenge to the conventional studies of foreign and security policy.

The theoretical framework of the thesis relates to two recent trends. On the one hand, an emphasis on globalisation (Clark 1999; Held 1999), regionalisation (Fawcett and Hurrell 1997), Europeanisation (Tonra 2001; Featherstone 2003; Radaelli 2004) and multilevel-governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001) has challenged the autonomy of the state and emphasised interdependency. The dissertation aims to contribute to the study of International Relations (IR) and the European studies. It discusses how to conceptualise and analyse the European foreign and security policy/ies in the context of increasing transnational interactions by examining the current developments and considering the importance of EU level governance – such as the CFSP and the ESDP – to the national contexts.

Despite the recent theoretical developments, state – conceptualised as an autonomous and unitary actor – has largely retained its significance in the United States dominated IR as well as in the dominant approaches to European integration which highlights the intergovernmental nature of the process. Accordingly, majority of the literature on European foreign and security policy/ies conceptualise the emerging EU governance as cooperation between states. Within these state-centric approaches the units emphasis)

The great power discourse, then, constructed the ESDP as an unfeasible d, and due to rapid development of the EU foreign and security policy, more integrationist theories have gained relevance also in the field of foreign and security policy. This study recognises the contribution of the integration theories and, in particular, the recent turn to comparative politics and Europeanisation.

I argue that there is nothing inherently wrong in analysing the European Union and its foreign and security policy in a cooperation frame or integration frame. However, I am interested in examining whether we could formulate a fuller picture of the foreign and security policy governance in contemporary Europe by utilising the concept of Europeanisation in a different way. Within European studies, Europeanisation has represented an analytical move from bottom-up to top-down analyses. That is, instead of seeking to explain the integration process and the European level institution

building from a bottom-up perspective, scholars have been progressively interested in explaining the effects of the integration and the EU institutions on member states in a top-down frame. Recently, the literature on Europeanisation has spilled over to the analyses of European foreign and security policy/ies. In this field, within which the centrality of the state in the field of foreign and security policy is conventionally taken as given, Europeanisation appears to offer intriguing analytical possibilities. Subsequently, this study aims to explore whether our understanding of the foreign and security policy governance in Europe can be improved by conceptualising Europeanisation as a top-down and a bottom-up process, in which states' political processes both shape, and are shaped by, the EU governance.

To address the reciprocal features of the relationship between the European Union and the member states, this dissertation turns towards social constructivism and poststructuralism. These approaches have tackled the complex social relationships within and amongst various levels of social interaction. Consequently, the concepts of identity and discourse have gained a central location within the analysis. In this study, the states' foreign and security policies are understood to be boundary-producing political practices. As such, they do not merely reflect state identities; rather, they are part of the re-production of those identities (Campbell 1998; Weber 1998; Weldes 2001). I deploy a discourse analytic approach (Doty 1993; Weldes 1996; Torfing 1999; Wæver 2002; Howarth 2005) to investigate what difference, if any, the EU foreign and security policy has made for the Finnish and British foreign policy discourses as well as these states' identities. The dissertation identifies and analyses the dominant foreign and security policy discourses in these two countries. Utilising concepts of articulation and interpellation (Weldes 1996), it examines how the EU foreign and security policy fed into the chosen national discourses and what role it had in the continuous process of re-producing these states' identities through foreign and security policy discourse. In order to elucidate the analytical question on how one should understand Europeanisation, the empirical findings are analysed in a comparative framework.

In terms of methodology, the dissertation engages in two contemporary debates. First, the study combines Europeanisation with the discourse analytic approach (Larsen 1997; Hansen 2002; Howarth 2005). In so doing, the dissertation explicates what poststructuralism can bring into to European studies (Diez 2001, Tonra and Christiansen 2005). I suggest that it enables us to resist the tendency to produce general and generalising comparative frameworks (Hix 1994; Manners and Whitman 2000). Second, the study embraces the recent tendency within discourse theory to adopt comparative frameworks and it attempts to further reflect on this issue (Howarth 2005). In so doing, the dissertation expounds what Europeanisation and comparative politics can bring into discourse analysis.

Comparisons between Finland and Britain address the differences between these states' identities, which highlight the need for context-specific (foreign policy) theory. In so doing, the dissertation – its assumptions and findings – reflects a turn away from the idea of a grand theory with given and fixed actors, such as a unitary state (cf. Wendt 1999), and focuses instead on constructions of the state through specific state discourses and practices (Wæver 2002). Highlighting similarities and differences between, and within, these two states, the dissertation aims to explicate the complexity of the foreign and security policy governance in contemporary Europe. Although intuition and commonsense have a role to play in research, the case selection of this dissertation is based on analytically interesting observations: whereas Finland represents a small and previously neutral state, which is a relatively new EU member, Britain stands for a major state and an internationally engaged security actor with a long term membership in the European Union.

In addition to these specific theoretical and methodological contributions, the research purpose is to add to the understanding of the Finnish and British foreign and security policies in an increasingly interdependent Europe. The empirical data and analysis has policy relevance beyond

academics. After all, increasing interaction calls for detailed context specific knowledge.

In sum, building on the context specific discourse analysis the two central research questions in the dissertation are: (i) what impact, if any, the European Union foreign and security policy has on state identities in Finland and Britain and how are these identities changing (an empirical question) and (ii) how should one understand the process of Europeanisation and the relation between EU and state level governance (an analytical question).

The focus of Chapter 1 is on a critical analysis of the dominant approaches to the European foreign and security policy/ies. I suggest that the literature can be divided in two distinct approaches labelled as cooperation approach and an integration approach. Whilst it is suggested that the cooperation approach is not a uniform school of thought, the theories under this label do share common assumptions. Even at their most subtle forms, when increasing interdependence is brought more clearly into the frame of analysis, as in neo-liberal institutionalism and regime theory, their focus on the state prevails. On the other hand, although the contribution of more integrationist theories has been lately increasing, this dissertation suggests that the questions of identity and foreign policy should be brought into explicit focus in the analysis of Europeanisation. Further, this analytical move enables us to conceptualise Europeanisation as a bottom-up and top-down process.

In Chapter 2, the contribution of literature tackling questions of identity and foreign and security policy is considered. Subsequently, a discourse analytic approach, highlighting the mutual constitution of social structures and political agency in various levels of governance, is developed. It is here that the questions of methodology, the comparative element and the material selection are addressed.

Chapters 3 and 4 provide a context specific analysis of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy discourses in Finland and Britain. The Finnish case study suggests that Europeanisation was central for the articulation of a radically different foreign and security policy discourse in the post-Cold War. That is, for the transformation of a Finnish neutrality identity to an alignment identity. On the other hand, given the increasing importance of the EU foreign and security policy in official foreign and security policy documentation and debates in Britain, the discourse displayed continuity. That is, EU foreign and security policy became a feature of the re-production of the conventional British great power identity.

Finally, Chapter 5 focuses on the relationship between the European Union and member state level foreign and security policy governance. Through comparison of the differences and similarities between the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy discourses in Finland and Britain, it is suggested that the constitutive effects of the process on the member state identities are different. Analytically, the utility of the context specific discourse analysis with a comparative element is demonstrated. Significantly, the findings also suggest that Europeanisation should be understood as both a top-down and a bottom-up process, in which state identities are both transformed by EU discourses (differentially depending on prior state identities), and also themselves shape the nature of EU discourses.

Chapter 1

Europeanisation of the Foreign and Security Policy: From Cooperation to Integration

Introduction

In recent years, scholars of both International Relations and European studies have paid increasing attention to the foreign, security and defence policy developments in Europe. In particular, they have focused on the emergence of a distinct European foreign policy system that is not based on traditional state boundaries but on a progressively robust form of transnational governance. The suggested growth of this complex and multilayered European system has been seen to pose a challenge to the conventional studies of foreign and security policy. Hence the question, how to conceptualise and analyse the European foreign policy/ies in the context of increasing transnational interactions cutting across member state and EU boundaries, has been progressively raised and addressed in the scholarly literature (see also, Hill 1993; White 2001: 40-41; Carlsnaes 2004).

Thus far the debate has centred around three interrelated dimensions of the developing European system. The first dimension, it is argued, relates to the traditional and distinguishable foreign and security policy activities of the European Union's member states, which have increased rather than

decreased. The second dimension deals with the European Union's foreign and security policy, referring to the increased EU level coordination of the EU member states' political and military relations with the outside world. This aspect is associated with the development of the CFSP and, more recently, with the ESDP. The third dimension reflects the European Union's external economic and development policies. In this field, the European Union is seen as an influential actor in the world politics.

Reflecting the traditionally narrow conceptualisation of foreign policy and the pre-eminence of the so-called 'high politics' issues such as diplomacy, war and peace, the debate on the emerging European foreign policy system has largely focused on the first and the second dimensions of the debate. On the other hand, the third dimension of the debate – European Union's trade relations and development policies – has featured in the research agendas of International Political Economy (IPE) and the Development Studies, for instance (Lister 1997; Hay and Rosamond 2002). Although, the contribution of these fields as well as the theoretical innovations underlining the increasing interdependence in world politics is notable, the focus of this chapter is largely on the conventional debates on European foreign, security and defence policies. This is because these debates have been predominant in the scholarly literature on the European foreign and security policy/ies.

This chapter suggests that two scholarly traditions are central in the analyses on European foreign and security policy/ies. I label these traditions as cooperation and integration approaches. The way in which these traditions approach the conceptual and empirical puzzles related to these three dimensions is rather different. Whereas the cooperation approach has focused on the first dimension of the foreign and security policies of the EU member states, the integration approach has centred on the second and third dimensions of the EU foreign and security policy. However, recently, some scholars have attempted to move beyond the cooperation and integration approaches. I suggest that the concept of Europeanisation is valuable in this regard.

This chapter first lays out the context in which the debates related to the EU foreign and security policy take place. Second, it discusses the literature on European foreign and security policy/ies in terms of the cooperation and integration approaches. Third, the chapter introduces the concept of Europeanisation. Drawing on the recent theoretical innovations of the scholarly literature, the chapter invites us to consider the Europeanisation of the EU member states' identities.

1.1. European Foreign, Security and Defence Policies: The CFSP and the ESDP

> Today virtually no major foreign policy issue goes unexamined by the EU, and cooperation is under serious consideration in related areas such as security and defence (Smith, M. E. 2004: 17)

It is argued that EU policies in the areas of foreign and security policy have developed significantly during the 1990s and 2000s. In Maastricht in 1992, the earlier attempts to coordinate member states external policies, known as European Political Cooperation (EPC), were renamed and reformulated. The second pillar of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) established the Common Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union (CFSP) 'including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence' ('Treaty on European Union' 1992). After developments towards the end of the 1990s, the defence aspect of the CFSP became known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Whereas the aim of the CFSP has been to create a common voice for the European Union in the world politics, the purpose of the ESDP has been to increase the Union's military capabilities to deal with security issues and threats.

Although the development of the CFSP and the ESDP has been widely acknowledged, a powerful set of arguments has highlighted the contradictions and problems of the CFSP and the ESDP. Initially, it was claimed that these policies were more rhetorical than real. That is, some

great expectations were created by the treaty texts but, in practice, the development of the CFSP and the ESDP was, at best, partial. The European Union was widely held to lack institutional structures enabling strong and decisive decision-making (Hill 1993) as well as military capabilities to back up its policies. Consequently, it was argued that the power in foreign and security policy-making in Europe still lies within the states.

The crisis related to the disintegration of Yugoslavia has been central for these arguments. In the immediate aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, violent conflicts among and within the former republics of Yugoslavia intensified. These unfortunate developments were broadly seen to require EU action. As such they constituted a test for the newly established CFSP. The widespread view is that the European Union failed to address the crisis in the Balkan. EU member states could not agree upon a common policy. Jacques Delors, a former president of the EC Commission, comments: 'I took part in all the Council of Ministers meetings during the Yugoslav crisis and can attest to the deep divisions, based upon history with the Balkans' (cited in Andretta 1997). Even if it has been noted that the European Union was neither politically nor militarily prepared for a crisis of such proportions (McCormick 1996: 281), the images of the bloody conflicts in Balkan and the European inability of action are still seen as failure of the European foreign and security policy.[1] Nevertheless, these representations of crisis punctuated institutional and political development.

After the Amsterdam Treaty was agreed in 1997, some instruments of the CFSP, such as common positions or joint actions arising from the common strategies, could be decided by qualified majority voting (Kendall 2002). In addition, the Treaty of Nice agreed in 2001 introduced a new policy making mechanism. 'Enhanced cooperation' can take place between several

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[1] According to a popular view, indecisiveness, incapacity and inaction were brought to an end by sound US diplomacy backed up by decisive military action in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1997 followed by NATO led peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the European failure was largely internalised by the European governments. For instance, deep sense of guilt was evident in the Dutch government's resignation in April 2002 in an emotional atonement for the inability of the country's troops to prevent the Srebrenica massacre of 1995 (Cramb 2002).

member states in the areas where the objectives of the European Union cannot be achieved by the member states as a whole (Cramb 2002). In the CFSP field, those member states which are in a position to do so can cooperate in the implementation of a joint action or a common position, arms or security and defence initiatives contributing to the acquisition of crisis management capabilities (Cramb 2002).

A brief overview of the recent developments in the field of CFSP and ESDP are illustrative of the scale and nature of the change.[2] On the eve of the Stockholm European Council meeting in March 2001, an EU delegation, including External Affair Commissioner Chris Patten, was due in Skopje to offer support to the Macedonian government and to appeal for a peaceful settlement to the conflict between the Albanian rebels and the Macedonian government. Two days before the former NATO's Secretary General, Javier Solana, who represented the recently established office of the European Union's High Representative of the CFSP, visited Macedonia and Kosovo with a similar message ('2334th Council Meeting' 2001).

The EU policy was supported by NATO's actions to secure the border of Macedonia and Kosovo through its international KFOR peacekeeping force in the region. Three hundred British, Swedish and Finnish soldiers were moved to the border. Their aim was to interdict any logistic support to the rebellious National Liberation Army in Macedonia. On 13 August 2001, after intense diplomatic negotiations led by the European Union and supported by the United States, the rival sides signed a peace accord ('Common Foreign and Security Policy Statement' 2001). Moreover, an

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[2] The following presentation is based on a diary I wrote throughout the research project. The diary is based on systematic media watch techniques and it is supplemented with official documentation. I found this method imperative, while writing the first draft of this chapter in 2001, due to contemporary and evolving nature of my research topic.

international NATO force of 3,500 troops led by the British 16th air assault brigade was sent to Macedonia to collect and destroy rebel arms ('Nato Press Release' 2001).

In March 2003, the European Union took over the Macedonian peacekeeping project from NATO. The short-term disarmament mission had turned into a longer-term peacekeeping mission. The rapid development of the ESDP enabled the transition of authority in Macedonia. At the Helsinki European Council meeting, in 1999, the member states decided that by 2003 the European Union would develop military and civil forces capable of acting independently under the EU command in peacekeeping and conflict management situations ('Presidency Conclusions' 1999). In November 2000 in Brussels, the EU governments agreed to create a Rapid Reaction Force of 100 000 troops, 400 combat aircraft, 100 ships and 100 buildings from which a force of 60 000 troops could be put together and supplied, depending on the requirements of a given mission ('Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration' 2001). In May 2003, the EU Council confirmed that the European Union now had 'operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls' and the European Union's commitment to overcoming these obstacles was restated ('Declaration on Eu Military Capabilities' 2003). Within two years, the European Union had launched seven ESDP operations of which five are ongoing and two have been ended.

Significantly, the CFSP and the ESDP, have not been merely concerned with the European Union's 'near abroad' in the early 2000s. Seeking to extend its reach globally, the European Union has mediated in the slow-moving peace process between North and South Korea filling the gap created by US disarray over policy towards the divided peninsula. In May 2001, the holder of the European Union's rotating presidency, the Swedish Prime Minister Göran Person, travelled to both Korean capitals. He was accompanied by Javier Solana –the High Representative of the CFSP – and the External Affairs Commissioner, Chris Patten ('Precidency Conclusions' 2001).

The European Union also took an active role in the international efforts to end the violence that had followed the collapse of the Middle East peace process. Solana intervened in the escalating conflict several times. In February 2002, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah, the de facto ruler of the kingdom, sought the European Union's support for his peace moves within the Arab League. The European Union's role was further highlighted in April 2002 when the United States joined the European Union, Russia and the United Nations (UN) in calling on Israel to withdraw 'immediately' from Palestinian cities. Significantly, the European Union member states spoke with one voice.[3]

In 2003, the European Union launched a military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in Africa. The operation, code-named ARTEMIS, was conducted in accordance with the European Council Joint Action adopted in the framework of the CFSP. The European Union had been involved in the efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo since 1996, for instance, through its Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region. For the European Union the military intervention represented 'further tangible evidence of the development of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) and of the European Union's contribution to the international community's efforts to promote stability and security' ('The Council of the European Union' 2003).

[3] The joint statement was delivered by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain representing the EU presidency and High Representative Solana took part in talks. The British Broadcasting Company's news said that the 'world's most powerful diplomats' call an Israel to halt its operations in Occupied Territories (Kendall 2002).

However, the residual doubts about the direction of the further development of the EU foreign and security policy have not disappeared. Prominent observers have argued that there is no evidence for convincing collective responses to successive stages of the multiple crisis such as '9.11', 'the war on terror' or 'the war against Iraq' (Smith, M. 2003: 557). In particular, the deep divisions between the EU member states were exposed in relation to the war on Iraq in 2003. As Smith points out, according to commentators, 'the cause for EU foreign and security policy was set back for years to come, if not permanently, and that the holy grail of unified European diplomacy – let alone defence activity – had become effectively unattainable' (Smith, M. 2003: 557). For some, the deep European and transatlantic divisions presaged the 'death of the West'; for others, it simply 'underlined the fundamental weakness at the core of the European Union's pretensions to international influence and identified the notion of EU foreign and security policy as the key are of self-deception' (Smith, M. 2003: 557).

Nevertheless, the foreign and security policy mediation in the EU level has increased, rather than decreased. Importantly, in combating terrorism a link between the EU foreign, security and defence policy as well as the Union's Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) – the third pillar of the TEU – has been emphasised. Tackling the threat of terrorism forms a key rationale of the first European Security Strategy, *a Secure Europe in a Better World*, formulated within the framework of the CFSP. In order to combat contemporary risks and threats to the Union and its member states and to enhance Union's influence in the world, the recently agreed Constitutional Treaty of the European Union also highlights the need for further development of the EU foreign and security policy ('Official Journal of the European Union' 2004).

Interestingly, the agreed further development of the institutional structures of the CFSP and the operational capabilities of the ESDP was one of the least debated issues in the Constitutional Treaty negotiations as well as in the ratification processes in those member states in which the ratification

process took place before the Treaty was turned down in the referendums in France and Netherlands and the ratification process was suspended.[4] Consensus on foreign, security and defence issues indicates that although crises –such as the disagreement among the EU member states over the direction of the policy towards the war on Iraq – are likely to expose divergence, they can lead to convergence. Moreover, although the extent and implications of these developments are debated among the policy makers and scholars, they are increasingly acknowledged as shaping the parameters of foreign and security policy-making in Europe. Accordingly, analysis of the European foreign and security policy/ies have been put under close scrutiny.

1.2 Analysing the European Foreign and Security Policy/ies: Cooperation or Integration?

After a brief introduction to some of the questions related to the development of EU foreign and security policy in the 1990s, I now turn to the scholarly literature focusing on those developments. I suggest that the literature falls under two broad and interrelated categories, which I label the cooperation and integration approaches. The cooperation approach, mainly reflecting state-centric approaches to the study of IR, foreign policy and European integration, has been the dominant approach. However, towards the end of the 1990s, the rapid developments have increased the amount of analysis operating within a more integrationist understanding of European politics. Accordingly, European foreign policy/ies have been increasingly approached in terms of Europeanisation. I consider the cooperation and integration approaches in turns. However, before doing so a conceptual discussion of the subject matter is needed to establish analytical clarity.

1.2.1 European Foreign and Security Policy/ies

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[4] Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, Greece, Slovakia, Austria, Germany, Latvia, Cyprus and Malta have already completed parliamentary ratification of the treaty. The European Parliament has also approved the treaty. Ten member states have announced their intention to hold a binding or consultative referendum on the subject. Four referenda have now taken place, resulting in Spain and Luxembourg ratifying the constitution, with the constitution being rejected in both France and the Netherlands. ('A Constitution for Europe')

At the outset, the terminology of the scholarly literature dealing with European foreign policy/ies appears to be confusing. The field is referred for example, as 'European foreign policy', 'Europe's foreign policy', 'EU foreign policy', 'foreign/security policy cooperation' and 'foreign policies of the European Union member states' (Smith, S. 1994; Hill 1996; Manners and Whitman 2000; Nuttall 2000; White 2001; Zielonka 2002; Smith, M. E. 2004; Tonra and Christiansen 2004). At times, these labels are used interchangeably.[5] Following White's call for conceptual reflection, I seek to clarify my choice of European foreign and security policy/ies.

As White argues, there is a qualitative difference between the usages of qualifying adjective of 'European' foreign policy instead of the 'European Union' or 'EU' foreign policy. The analytical rationale of this choice is based on the recognition that the foreign policy activity in Europe is not coterminous with the territorial and institutional boundaries of the European Union (White 2004: 12-13). For instance, Norway is not an EU member state, but its foreign policy has significantly been shaped by the CFSP and the ESDP (Sjursen 2003: 7-8). On the other hand, within the European Union, the member states have continued to pursue their own external policies and they are likely to do so in the near future. Moreover, other organisations such as NATO and OSCE are also significant in the making of European foreign policy. Therefore, the European foreign policy incorporates states' foreign policies and increased European governance. To avoid being misinterpreted as suggesting an all encompassing and Europe-wide EU foreign policy, I label the subject matter as European foreign *policy/ies*.[6]

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[5]For instance, in M. E. Smith's volume Europe's Foreign and Security Policy terms 'European foreign policy', 'EU foreign policy' and 'foreign/security policy cooperation' are used interchangeably (Smith, M. E. 2004).

[6] The focus of this dissertation is largely on the European Union and its member states level governance. This is because the European Union is explicitly argued to have supranational characteristics. This, in turn, has opened up a host of interesting foreign policy related research questions which address different levels of foreign policy governance in Europe and beyond. Although, other organisations do not feature high on the research agenda of this dissertation, the theoretical frame adopted is aimed to enable incorporation of various local, regional and global institutions and levels of governance.

In terms of the concept of foreign policy, this study recognises the broad scope of this policy area, and indeed, embraces the theoretical debates questioning the narrow definitions which highlight foreign policy's distinctiveness from the other policy fields. Nevertheless, instead of searching for a general theory of European foreign policy, applicable for all the aspects of foreign policy formulation in Europe, my purpose is to elucidate the relationship between the European Union level and the member state level governance in the area of traditional foreign and security policy. That is, the policy fields related to national security and defence. The rationale for this decision is further elucidated in Chapter 2.

However, here it is imperative to note that this is the policy area that is widely viewed to be immune to integration within the commonsense understanding of the state. As such, it forms an analytically interesting policy field. Due to the focus on foreign policy centring on the traditional question of state security and defence, the term European foreign and *security* policy/ies is applied throughout this dissertation. Whereas the European foreign and security policy/ies refers to the overall context in which the EU and state level foreign and security policy making takes place, the term Europeanisation of foreign and security policy relates to the process of ongoing transformation in this context. In other words, the Europeanisation is symptomatic for the emergence of a distinct European foreign policy system and the increasing importance of the European level foreign and security policy governance: namely, but not exclusively, the EU foreign and security policy.

1.2.2 The Cooperation Approach: Re-producing State-Centrism

Writing on the European foreign and security policy/ies in the light of the CFSP and the ESDP is predominately based on accounts that define these twin policies as examples of cooperation among the EU member states. These approaches draw on the commonsense understandings of realism and neo-liberal institutionalism underpinning the study of IR. Although these approaches differ in some of their basic assumptions and focus they share an

ontology: they assume an anarchic international system within which state is the prominent actor.[7]

According to realist assumptions, states are rational agents operating according to principles of self-help within the structure of anarchic international system or society (Morgenthau 1973; Bull 1977; Waltz 1979). Although, in theory, collaboration among states is possible, in practice it is seen to be restricted by the ubiquitous possibility of cheating. However, cooperation might emerge due to the presence of a dominant state (i.e. hegemon) or a common threat (Gilpin 1987; Walt 1987), for instance. In terms of the European foreign and security policies, the emergence of the common defence organisations such as the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO as well as the initial drive to European integration in the 1950s could reflect the dynamics of the Cold War rivalry, Soviet threat and the security guarantee provided by the United States (Smith, M. E. 2004).[8] However, the emergence of the distinct European system of foreign policy governance has been largely overlooked by the realists.

Williams suggests that whereas the end of the Cold War was widely seen to demonstrate realism's limitations, the emerging post-Cold War world of state fragmentation, globalisation and environmental degradation presented further challenges to realism which it was ill-equipped to address (Williams 2005: 1-2).[9] Indeed, the lack of analytical tools to address the CFSP and the

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[7] It is suggested that debate between contemporary mainstream approaches of IR, neo-realism and neo-liberalism, known as the neo-neo debate, is not between two polar world views. Rather these approaches focus on similar questions and agree on number of assumptions. As Lamy notes, both theories assume that states are value maximizers and that anarchy constrains the behaviour of states. However, a certain division of labour has been agreed between the contemporary realists and liberals. Whereas neo-realist have tended to focus on security and military issues, neo-liberals has concentrates on issues such as political economy, environment and human rights issues. (Lamy 2005: 215-218). Due to similarities and emerged consensus between these accounts some scholars have argued that instead of a 'neo-neo debate' we should talk about 'neo-neo synthesis' (Wæver 1996: 163-164).

[8] Further development of cooperation can be explained , for instance, by the 'alliance dependency' theories, where fear of abandonment or exclusion leads weaker members to support any cooperation advocated by stronger powers (Smith, M. E. 2004: 20, footnote 4).

[9] This is not to suggest that the realism would have been absent in the scholarly debates of the 1990s. Quite the reverse, realism has responded vigorously to criticism. As Williams suggests, significant theoretical developments have followed and in the early 2000s realism has re-gained its position as the dominant approach to the world politics. As Williams

ESDP and the general decline of realism in the early 1990s explains the relatively modest number of realist engagements with the increasing foreign and security cooperation in Europe. They have also shaped the outcomes of the realist analyses. In short, realists have tended to downplay the significance of the European Union led cooperation. They have rendered suspect the suggested supranational elements of the European foreign and security policy/ies and they have interpreted the agreed common policies as reconcilable with national interests of the member states (Pijpers 1991; Jakobsen 1997; Regelsberger, Schoutheete et al. 1997; Tank 1998). As Ojanen notes, the argued difficulties in the development of the CFSP and the ESDP have been used as evidence for the timeless wisdom of realist core assumptions (Ojanen 2002).

Lately, realism has been increasingly visible in political and academic debates of transatlantic divide in the United States and in Europe. Relatedly, and as I have elsewhere argued, the development of the European Union's foreign and security policy has been increasingly viewed as an emerging counter-power to the United States (Jokela 2002). However, some realists-inspired authors have refuted such claims. As Kagan argues:

> It is not that Europeans are teaming up against the American hegemon, as Huntington and many realist theorists would have it, by creating a countervailing power. After all, Europeans are not increasing their power. Their tactics, like their goal, are the tactics of the weak. They hope to constrain American power without wielding power themselves. In what may be the ultimate feat of subtlety and indirection, they want to control the behemoth by appealing to its conscience. (Kagan 2002)

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argues, it is difficult 'to avoid a sense that in the twenty-first century realism is resurgent' (Williams 2005: 2).

Nevertheless, as M. E. Smith suggests (Smith 2004) that realism's ontological assumptions resulting in a narrow conceptualisation of integration as cooperation among states have made it an ill-suited approach to analyse the recent developments in the European foreign and security policy/ies. He argues, for instance, that increasing cooperation cannot be explained with reference to the three dominant EU member state(s) France, Germany and Britain. Although they are important states, they have had a distinctly different foreign and security policy aims in the post-Cold War world. Moreover, the role of the smaller member states in enhancing the cooperation has been greater than realists would have expected (Smith 2004: 20). Also Arter notes the contribution of the small states (Arter 2000), and Joenniemi suggests that small states are becoming more influential because they are less likely to have any 'hang ups' in relation to the integration that the larger powers obsessed with questions of sovereignty may have (Joenniemi 1998).

Even if realism might offer some intriguing insights into the popular debate over current developments in the transatlantic relationship it, nonetheless, lacks the tools to address the changing foreign and security policy environment in Europe. Realism seems to be incapable and unwilling to address how the development of the European Union towards the countervailing power is arrived at. In doing so, it appears to be inadequate to address the questions related to the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy and re-production of state identity

On the contrary, analysis highlighting increasing interdependence in world politics since the 1970s seems to offer some interesting insights to my study. For instance, neo-liberal institutionalists have highlighted the possibility of policy formulation through increasingly institutionalised international cooperation (Keohane and Nye 1977).[10] They argue that an 'array of subnational, transnational and supranational actors challenge the dominance of the state across wide range of issues' (Smith, S. 1994: 4). The focus on the mixed actor system based on transnationalism and interdependence has led to theoretical innovations that highlight, for instance, the role of international regimes defined as a set of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, around which actors' expectations convergence in a given area of international relations (Krasner 1983: 2). Although the multi-perspectival nature of the European project (Ruggie 1993) has been used as an exemplar of regionalisation (Fawcett and Hurrell 1997) or the emergence of 'post-modern' or 'post-sovereign' foreign policy (Smith, M. 2003), the European Union's foreign and security policy has not occupied a central place in neo-liberal institutionalist literature.

However, in explaining European integration the form of neo-liberal institutionalism known as liberal intergovernmentalism, associated with

[10] For example, interdependence theories suggest that as security concerns diminish among the set of states, and issues become increasingly entangled with each other, then states are more likely to cooperate to manage the costs and benefits of those issues concerned (Keohane and Nye 1977; Smith, M. E. 2004: 21). As the following section suggest, this position share resemblance with European integration theories such as functionalism and Deutch idea of security communities.

Andrew Moravcsik, occupies a central role (Hansen 2002).[11] Moravcsik has challenged functionalist inspired accounts highlighting the role of an elite alliance between European Community (EC) officials and pan-European business interest groups in negotiating the Single European Act (1986). He suggested that the negotiating history is more consistent with the alternative explanation that European Community 'rested on interstate bargains between Britain, France and Germany' (Moravcsik 1991). However, Moravcsik pointed out that in the analysis of state interests, scholars must turn away from structural realist theories and toward domestic politics. He argued that the way forward was the liberal intergovernmental approach which drew on Keohane's neo-liberal institutionalism labelled as a 'modified structuralist realist' view of regime change, 'a view that stresses traditional conceptions of national interest and power, rather than supranational variants of neofunctionalist integration theory' (Moravcsik 1991: 219).

I suggest that Moravcsik's project is illustrative of the prevailing state-centrism of the many neo-liberal institutionalist accounts. Although, liberal intergovernmentalism represents a departure from some (structural) variants of realism, Moravcsik's desire to make his account conform to Keohane's neo-liberal institutionalism is indicative of the continuing salience of the state. As Michael E. Smith's notes, these theories generally adopt the realist assumptions of anarchy, state-centrism, and states' concerns in security and cheating, yet they also accept that institutions can serve as bargaining arenas to help states conclude agreements with each other, thus promoting cooperation (Smith, M. E. 2004: 23). Moreover, like realism, Moravcsik's intergovernmentalism also underlines the role of the major member states and downplays minor states' role in integration.

The intergovernmentalist focus on the domestic interest formation is shared with some of the conventional Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). The dominant

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[11] Intergovermentalism can be understood as the theoretical approach dealing with the problems of integration. In so doing, intergovernmentalism has been especially powerful during the periods of perceived low integration and in the areas of alleged non-integration. However, and increasingly, intergovernmentalism has provided powerful theoretical accounts able to deal with the areas of expanding increasing integration (Rosamond 2000).

view of FPA is that a state's foreign policy is comprised of many competing (national) bureaucracies. In so doing, the foreign policy is understood as a compromise between various organisations' views of the national interest in the context of international politics. This is the view of the so-called 'decision-making' model of foreign policy analysis (Snyder Richard, Bruck et al. 1962; Allision 1971) that can be further distinguished between 'organisational processes' model and 'bureaucratic politics' models (Manners and Whitman 2000: 5-6). Given state-centrism, resulting in the narrow conceptualisation of integration as cooperation between states, the FPA 'is overwhelmingly an American subject' (Smith, S. 1994: 11). Despite the presence of a robust and healthy European research community, (mainstream) European scholars have tended to follow the theoretical lead of the US research community. Steve Smith suggests that this is because the US approaches dominate the literature to such an extent that being part of the foreign policy research community means 'addressing US concepts and, more problematically, US policy concerns' (Smith, S. 1994: 11).

In terms of Europeanisation of foreign and security policy, this implies a particular state-centric view of international institutional developments and particular power related aims of foreign policy. This in turn raises concerns about FPA appropriateness to analyse recent developments in the European foreign and security policy/ies. However, in the late 1990s and early 2000s a distinctly European foreign policy analysis has emerged. The theoretical innovations of this approach will be addressed in the final section of this chapter.

In sum, the cooperation approach underpins a powerful set of arguments, which have highlighted contradictions and problems of the CFSP and the ESDP. Specifically, in the early and mid 1990s it was claimed that these policies were more rhetorical than real. This was manifested, for instance, in the argument of a 'capabilities-expectations gap'(Hill 1993). As introduced by Hill in 1993, some great expectations were created by the treaty texts but in practice, the development of the EU foreign and security policy was, at best, partial. Yet while Hill was mainly concerned about the European

Union's ability to formulate policy, other scholars highlighted the lack of military capabilities to implement policies. In doing so, the European Union was seen to lack institutional structures enabling strong and decisive decision-making as well as military capabilities to back up its policies. Consequently, it was argued that the power in foreign and security policy-making in Europe still lay within the states.

Given the IR community's longer-term interest in increasing transnationalism and interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977; Little 1996; Keohane and Nye 2000), as well as the more recent focus on regionalisation (Fawcett and Hurrell 1997; Hay, Watson et al. 1999; Wallace 2000) and globalisation (Held 1999; Hirst and Thompson 1999; Marsh and Hay 1999), the scholarly literature's tendency to overlook or downplay the significance of the CFSP and the ESDP is, indeed, puzzling. However, in the light of the growing empirical evidence of the increasing Europeanisation of foreign and security policy, the cooperation approach is increasingly put under scrutiny. Consequently, the types of analytical engagements with the CFSP and the ESDP have diversified.

1.2.3 The Integration Approach: From Functionalism to Top-Down Europeanisation

As suggested, towards the end of the 1990s, the activities of the European Union in the field of traditional foreign and security policy increased. The EU institutions and policy-making mechanism were re-formulated to deliver common positions and the Union started to build independent military capabilities for crisis management. Consequently, the number of studies focusing on the EU foreign and security policy as the object of study amplified. As a result, accounts operating within a more integrationist understanding of European politics have sought to contribute to explaining and understanding the European foreign and security policy/ies. They have highlighted the supranational elements in the European foreign and security policy/ies. On the other hand, the member state polices have been increasingly approached in terms of Europeanisation indicating change or

transformation in member state policy through participation in the process of integration.

Given the dominance of the cooperation approach, it is important to note that some alternative modes of thinking have been available for the analysis of the European foreign and security policy/ies throughout the post-war era. As Rosamond argues, the host of 'theoretical accounts that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s offered rival narratives of how closer cooperation in relatively narrow, technical, economic spheres of life could generate wider political integration among countries' (Rosamond 2000: 1). For instance, the early integration theory of functionalism was part of a broad movement that sought to theorise the conditions of the emerging human conflict in the turbulent political climate of 1940s. Considering the familiar question of avoidance of war, it attempted to produce a non-realist form IR scholarship (Rosamond 2000: 48-49).

Although recent integration theorists have highlighted the distinct features of their projects in comparison to IR scholarship and the links with comparative politics (Hix 1994), the dialogue among IR and European studies has been evident. Subsequently, some of the more integrationist theoretical innovations could have contributed to the analysis of the European foreign and security policy/ies. For instance, the work of David Mitrany on functionalism and Karl Deutch on transactionalism, are closely related to the debates within IR. As Rosamond suggest, functionalism, as articulated in the work of Mitrany, emerged in opposition to the dominant rationale of Morgenthau's realist state-centric word-view (Rosamond 2000: 31). As Taylor suggests, Mitrany can be read as 'an intellectual ancestor' of interdependence theory, world society approaches and regime theory (Taylor 1994: 125). Given that these approaches represented an attempt to move beyond the strict logic of state-centrism, the ontological assumption of conventional IR prevailed. Deutsch's theorisation serves as an exemplar. Deutsch argued that the level of communication (transactions) between states correlates with the sense of community among states. The more interaction there is between the states the greater the mutual relevance of the states to each other. The states are clearly

the most important actors in transactionalism. In short, they are constitutive of the 'community of states'.[12] Moreover, in terms of traditional foreign and security policy, Deutsch emphasised the continuing importance of the state by preferring the term cooperation rather than integration. Deutsch argued that security based on cooperation between states would be more likely to emerge in practise and that it would be more durable (Rosamond 2000: 43).

The integration theory that has most vigorously attempted to overcome state-centrism is neo-functionalism. The key figure of neo-functionalist thought, Ernst Haas, defined integration as the formation of a new political community in which national political actors were persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre and the institutions of the new centre possess authority over the states (Haas 1968; Ojanen 2002: 2). In their search for the non-state-centric theory of integration, neo-functionalists made an analytical move from 'high politics' to 'low politics'. That is, they considered the key issues of integration, not as those of war and peace, but matters of satisfaction of welfare and material needs. Neo-functionalists suggested that in these areas 'ideological boundaries' that used to block the cooperation between the states were breaking down and a 'supranational scheme of government' was emerging in the regional level (Rosamond 2000: 56-57). In light of the developments in the economic field of the European integration in 1980s and early 1990s, neo-functionalism developed to a dominant integration theory (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989: 195). However, it has not been incorporated in the analysis of the European foreign and security policy/ies until recently.

Towards the end of the 1990s, the neo-functionalism's key concept, the spill-over of integration from one area to another, seemed increasingly relevant in analysing the European foreign and security/developments. That is, the development of the CFSP and the ESDP indicated that economic integration

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[12] Deutsch identified two distinct sorts of security community. The first, amalgamated security community, involved formal merger of states in to a larger community through institutional development. This was symptomatic for the neo-functionalists conceptualisation of integration. The second, pluralistic security community, was defined as entities where the component states retain their separate identities. Integration, here, emerges without institutional fusion. (Rosamond 2000: 43)

was spilling over to the foreign and security policy fields (Ojanen 2002: 6-7). Accordingly, neo-functionalism inspired thinking underpinning integrationist theories of the so-called 'New Europe' (Rosamond 2000-128) have spilled over to the analysis of European foreign and security policy/ies (White 2004). Two analytical approaches are central for this expanding body of literature: (i) studies focusing on the European Union's Foreign policy, and (ii) analysis of Europeanisation of Foreign Policy.

Within the latter approach scholars have sought to demonstrate that the European Union has a foreign and security policy in terms of the broad and narrow definitions of the subject matter (Smith, H. 2002; Smith, K. E. 2003; Smith, M. 2003). In these accounts, the European Union is often assigned state-like features. Others have emphasised that even if the European Union constitutes an increasingly important element of the European foreign and security policy/ies, it cannot be fully accounted by comparing it to a state (Gingsberg 2003: 12). Hence the increasing interaction within the EU framework has been seen to represent a challenge to the conventional conceptualisation of foreign policy (Tonra 2001; White 2001; Smith, M. E. 2004; Tonra and Christiansen 2004; White 2004) and a distinct European Foreign Policy Analysis have emerged. Within this movement the scholars have tackled the question raised by Steve Smith et. al. in 1994: Can the established foreign policy theories help us to understand and explain the developments in Europe since the late 1980s? (Smith, S. 1994).[13] Accordingly, the traditional FPA analysis has been formulated (Manners and Whitman 2000: 3-4) and a degree of convergence between the IR and EU studies movement can also be observed (Christiansen, Jørgensen et al. 2001; Tonra and Christiansen 2004).

[13] Relatedly, M. Smith argues that the European order in 1990s is complex, fluid and multi-layered thus raising important questions about the sovereignty, autonomy and statehood (Smith, M. 1994: 23, 42). Consequently, any analysis of the European order, including foreign policy, should emphasise, first (i) the strategies adopted by the state authorities in order to respond to the change; second (ii), maintain a clear view of the ways in which the European order is changing because of the absence of consensus about the rules of the order clearly affecting to the foreign policy action and strategies; and third (iii) examine the crucial role played by the international institutions setting up limits of legitimate behaviour of by the states and other actors (Smith, M. 1994: 43)

Many of the recent engagements with the European system of foreign and security policy have underlined its distinctiveness. Whereas Manners and Whitman seek to formulate a comprehensive framework for comparative analysis able to capture the diversity and complexity in the EU member states foreign policy making (Manners and Whitman 2000), Tonra as well as White highlights the process of Europeanisation of foreign policy (Tonra 2001; White 2004). Significantly, both approaches appear to be better to capture the complex and multifaceted relationship between the European and state level governance than the conventional analysis reflecting the cooperation approach.

Top-Down Europeanisation and the Comparative turn

Europeanisation is an interdisciplinary term. It has been deployed in across several disciplines including sociology, economics, social anthropology, history and political sciences. Subsequently, term has gained a wide set of meanings depending on the disciplines and the specific questions of different research agendas (Featherstone 2003: 3; Liebert 2003: 14). Recently it has profiled as a key concept of a new comparative approach within European studies, political science and IR and the term is now widely deployed in the literature.[14] Some have suggested that this reflects the emergence of a new distinct field of inquiry (Börzel and Risse 2000; Featherstone 2003; Radaelli 2004).

While discussing Europeanisation it is helpful to distinguish between Europeanisation as 'a background concept and systematised concept' (Radaelli 2004: 4). As a background concept, Europeanisation refers to all the possible meanings we can think of. 'Thus, the historian may well look at the evolution of Europeanisation starting from Renaissance, and link it to the rise of trade and individualism in Europe.' (Radaelli 2004: 5) As a

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[14] The biblio-metric data collected by Featherstone is illustrative. In a survey of some 116 academic journal articles as listed in the Social Sciences Citation Index, in 1980s five articles (4%) referring to Europeanisation were published (four of these were concerned with foreign policy). By contrast, between 1990-1995 twenty-seven articles (23%) and between 1995-2003 1984 (73%) has been published (Featherstone 2003: 5-6).

systematised concept the scope of Europeanisation is more restricted. Within the community of scholars tackling questions related to European integration, Europeanisation reflects an increasing focus on the effects of process of integration, in particular, to domestic arrangements (Knill 2001: 10). As such, Europeanisation provides a shift of focus in relation to theories of European integration, theories of governance and classic themes of comparative politics (Radaelli 2004: 5).

Börzel and Risse has noted: for decades, 'European studies have mostly been concerned with explaining European integration and Europeanization processes themselves' (Börzel and Risse 2000).[15] Accordingly, the debates between the cooperation and integration approach – (liberal) intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, for instance – have centred on the question of how to account for the emerging European polity. In so doing, scholars have largely adopted a 'bottom up' approach: the key rationale of their analyses has been to explain the dynamics and the outcome of the European institution-building process (Börzel and Risse 2000).

The study of Europeanisation, however, adopts a 'top down' perspective. Europeanisation accepts that there is a process of European integration under way, and that European Union has developed its own institutions and policies over last fifty years or so (Radaelli 2004: 5). Consequently, Europeanisation studies are not pre-occupied with the questions related to the nature of the integration, i.e., 'why and how do member states produce integration, and whether the European Union is more inter-governmental or supra-national'(Radaelli 2004: 5). By contrast, the theoretical effort of Europeanisation, it is argued, is about bringing domestic politics back into our understanding of European integration (Radaelli 2004) by focusing on the impact of European integration on domestic political and social processes of the member states (Börzel and Risse 2000).[16] The concept of

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[15] Also Knill argues that traditionally the study of Europeanisation has been concerned with developments on the supranational level (Knill 2001).

[16] Within Europeanisation studies domestic politics is approached differently than within the cooperation approach. Whereas the cooperation approach largely assumes a particular kind of national interests with reflects the states locus within the international system,

Europeanisation thus seeks to capture the way in which the European dimension becomes an embedded feature framing policy, politics and polity within European states.[17] The issue is no longer whether Europe matters but how it matters, 'to what degree, in what direction, at what pace, and at what point of time' (Börzel and Risse 2000).

However, a central theoretical innovation of Europeanisation studies is that the domestic impact of Europeanisation is differential (Jupille and Caporaso 1999; Green Cowles, Caporaso et al. 2001; Knill 2001). Studies have demonstrated 'the importance of national context and the capacity of national administrative traditions to modify, accommodate, internalise and, perhaps, even neutralise European pressures' (Hix and Goetz 2000: 216). Hence, the processes of Europeanisation do not replace or reject national administrative structures, cultures, rules and norms (Jupille and Caporaso 1999; Green Cowles, Caporaso et al. 2001; Knill 2001). As such, Europeanisation has been defined as process of convergence towards shared policy frameworks (Liebert 2003: 14-15); or as a process of structural change, variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests (Featherstone 2003: 3). It does not, however, require assimilation, or indicate an erosion of the domestic level. (Börzel and Risse 2000; Caporaso and Jupille 2001). Instead, member state's internal processes are seen as crucial for the Europeanisation. Consequently, divergence is also a possibility.

Europeanisation assumes that European level institutions shape the domestic institutions and interest formation with the member states.

[17] Börzel and Risse distinguish three major dimensions along which the domestic impact of Europeanisation has been analyzed and processes of domestic change be traced (Börzel and Risse 2000). First, there are more and more policy areas that are affected by policy-making in Brussels (Radaelli 2000; Caporaso and Jupille 2001; Knill 2001). Second, if policies are increasingly made at the European level, this is likely to have consequences for domestic politics defined as processes of societal interest formation, aggregation, and representation. Studies have focused on how domestic actors strive to channel their interests into the European policy-making process (Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998; Tiilikainen and Raunio 2003) and how electoral and party politics is shaped in the face of integration (Aspinwall 2004). Finally, most works on the impact of Europeanisation focus on domestic institutions, both formal and informal. Scholars have analysed whether and to what extent European processes, policies, and institutions affect domestic systems of interest intermediation (Jupille and Caporaso 1999; Green Cowles, Caporaso et al. 2001; Knill 2001; Smith, M. E. 2004).

Recently, scholars have found the concept of Europeanisation useful to account for the domestic change in the new EU member states as well as in the candidate member states (Prange 2002). Therefore, Europeanisation is not restricted to the European Union and it does not end at the outer borders of the member states. Europeanisation scholars have also noted the link between European Studies and IR. As Börzel and Risse argues:

> This move toward studying 'top down' processes is desperately needed in order to fully capture how Europe and the European Union (EU) matter. It fits nicely with recent developments in international studies in general which increasingly study the domestic effects of international institutions and norms. (Börzel and Risse 2000)

Accordingly, Europeanisation can be approached as an exemplar of emerging systems of global governance (Held and McGrew 2002) related to the extensive political interconnectedness and institutionalisation of the key international policy-making forums. These include the United Nations (UN), G8, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organisation (WTO), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (ASEC), North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and MERCOSUR (the Southern Cone Common Market – in Latin America), for instance. Others have pointed out that within the international system, the relationship between Europeanisation and globalisation is often difficult to distinguish in case studies of domestic adaptation (Featherstone 2003: 4). Thus, although the European integration scholars have tended to emphasise the unique character of the European Union, the study of Europeanisation has broader applicability.[18]

There is, however, a relevant concern related to these analyses ontological assumption. As Christiansen et. al. (2000) argue, that the '"European construction" is often regarded as so advanced that many European integration scholars have turned to comparative political analyses. In their

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[18] An interesting example of a broader application of the Europeanisation themes is Hay and Rosamond's discussion on Globalization, European integration and the discursive construction of economic imperatives (Hay and Rosamond 2002). It connects the discourses of globalisation and Europeanisation in an interesting way and develop a new institutionalist and yet social constructivist understanding of the appeal to external economic constrains within in contemporary European public policy and political economy.

view, the European Union (EU) has arrived at a stage where the shape and type of polity are less interesting than explaining variation in policy and politics' (Christiansen et al. 2000: 1). Relatedly, Hurrell and Menon dispute the desirability of the separation of (European) 'politics' and 'integration' as articulated by Hix (Hix 1994; Hurrell and Menon 1996: 388-389). They suggest that studying these aspects of European politics separately sidelines the crucial question how the 'politics' feeds into the 'integration' and vice versa.[19] The 'top down' notion of Europeanisation tackles only one dimension of the reciprocal relationship between the EU and member state. Although any theoretical approach is likely to be partial, I suggest that our understanding of the relationship between the EU and member state levels of governance can benefit from a fuller conceptualisation of Europeanisation as a top down and bottom up process. Moreover, I suggest that the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy literature is useful entry point in this regard.

1.3. Beyond Cooperation and Integration Approaches: Europeanisation as a Top-Down and Bottom-Up Process

The issue of Europeanisation has also been raised in the field of foreign and security policy. Europeanisation has been connected to a process of incremental change which can be traced back to postwar years. Recently, scholars have found the concept useful to describe and analyse the increased interaction in European foreign and security policy-making and the concept has gained a particular prevalence in accounting for issues related to the EU foreign and security policy. This dissertation suggests that the concept has analytical value for the analysis of European foreign and security policy/ies (and beyond). It argues that Europeanisation enables us to capture the reciprocal features of the relationship between the EU and member state level of governance. To do that, Europeanisation should be conceptualised as a top down and bottom up process.

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[19] The separation of 'politics' and 'integration' also fails to engage with the question of the politics of the integration, central for Critical Theory and Poststructuralism in political analysis and IR.

Scholars who have deployed the concept of Europeanisation in this field have taken us all the way back to the late 1940s when the post-war European defence cooperation was agreed (White 2001: 4-10).[20] Some scholars have started from the 1950s when the attempts to establish the exclusively European Defence Community failed and the notion of 'civilian power Europe' begun to emerge (Smith, M. 2003: 559).[21] On the other hand, a number of authors have highlighted the European Political Cooperation (EPC) as a beginning of a process in which the European Community (EC) member states sought to consult one another on foreign policy issues and coordinate respective national positions (Tonra 2001: 1; Smith, M. E. 2004: 17; Tonra and Christiansen 2004). Common to all of these accounts is the notion of modest accretion of cooperation and institutional evolution. Consequently, the Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy is mostly understood as an accumulated effect of the longer-term process of the increasingly institutionalised cooperation.

The role of the EU foreign and security policy is often underlined in this process. As Featherstone argues, amongst the IR scholars 'the use of "Europeanisation" as a term has reflected the evolution of EU foreign policy coordination itself' (Featherstone 2003: 10). He notes that one of the first authors to refer to the Europeanisation of foreign policy in mid 1980s examined the reorientation of the national foreign policy as a consequence of EC entry.[22] However, such usages of the concept were rare partly because the EC competences in this field were seen as modest and faltering.

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[20] White notes that the process began almost immediately after the Second World War when the fears of resurgent Germany prompted the Dunkirk Treaty (1947) of mutual defence between Britain and France followed by the Brussels Treaty (1948) extending the collective defence in Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. In the face of increasing East-West tension manifested in the Berlin crisis in 1948 negotiations began to include the United States and Canada in European collective defence arrangements which resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) establishing the transatlantic defence arrangement. (White 2001: 4)

[21] 'Civilian power Europe' related to European diplomatic coordination carried out mainly in economic register, but not in the traditional field of security and defence (Smith, M. 2003: 559).

[22] Keatinge's (1983) analysis focused on Irish foreign policy and Saeter (1984) applied similar perspective to West Germany (both cited in, Featherstone 2003: 10). In terms of European security literature, the term Europeanisation was also applied within the NATO context. In this field, the term signified strengthening the 'European pillar'. That is, the

Scholars agree that the crisis of the European foreign and security policy in the post Cold War world which was manifested, for instance, in the events related to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, punctuated further Europeanisation (Smith, M. 2003: 561).[23] For many, the amazingly rapid development of the CFSP and ESDP both reflected and further enhanced increasing Europeanisation. Consequently, within the emerged literature of Europeanisation of foreign and security policy the EU has been given a central role. Drawing on the European studies, foreign and security policy scholars have noted that institutional developments related to these twin policies have made it sensible to examine the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy in the first place (Rosamond 2000; Christiansen, Jørgensen et al. 2001; Howorth 2001; Tonra 2001; White 2001; Hansen 2002; Smith, M. 2003; Tiilikainen and Raunio 2003; Smith, M. E. 2004; Tonra and Christiansen 2004; Rieker 2005). However, some important differences remain between the Europeanisation within European Studies and foreign and security policy analysis.

In terms of the subject matter, Featherstone notes that in the field of foreign policy the analysis of Europeanisation has been obliged to take into account the relative weakness of EU competences in this area, as compared to many aspects of market regulation (Featherstone 2003: 12). This may explain why the approach developed by the authors in this area has been wider in its scope than in other policy fields. Instead of focusing on the 'mechanisms' of Europeanisation in a quantitative manner, foreign and security policy scholars have approached Europeanisation in a more qualitative fashion as an elite socialisation or a cognitive process, for instance. Moreover, foreign

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increasing influence and responsibilities of the European states within the Alliance (Allen 1998).

[23] Considering punctuated evolution, Hay argues that the concept is useful to illustrate the interplay between the episodic and incremental political and institutional change. The concept refers to a discontinuous conception of political time in which periods of relatively modest institutional change are interrupted by more rapid and intense moments of transformation. However, the term also draws attention to the cumulative nature of often incremental change. According to Hay and Kerr, while it is important to emphasise the significance of punctuating moments such as crisis, it is equally imperative that this is not lead failure to acknowledge what goes on between punctuating moments (Kerr 2001; Hay 2002: 161-163).

policy scholars have emphasised the reciprocal nature of the relationship between the EU and member states.[24]

For instance, Tonra suggests that Europeanisation of foreign policy means a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalization of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making (Tonra 2000: 240). In so doing, Tonra contests the dominant cooperation approach to European foreign and security policy/ies. He also refutes the integration approach and argues that '*the relationship between national foreign policy formulation and European Foreign and Security Policy has been, and continues to be, reciprocal one*'(Tonra 2001: 279, emphasis in original). Similarly Michael E. Smith argues that participation at the EU level has increased the communication and consultation between states. He notes that the EU process has increasing impact on national foreign policy cultures. This reflects, and it is reflected in, elite socialisation, bureaucratic reorganisation, constitutional change, and the increase in public support for the ECP/CFSP. In Michael E. Smith's view domestic procedures and cultures, in turn, are conductive to the forging of common positions at the EU level (Smith, M. E. 2000: 617-628).

The conceptualisation of Europeanisation as a reciprocal process also relates to the broader theoretical debates within IR. As the section on cooperation approach suggested, the conventional approaches to foreign policy have emphasised the role of the state in international institution building and policy formulation. Hence one can understand the foreign policy scholars' willingness to see Europeanisation as a top-down and bottom-up process. On the other hand, Europeanisation can be seen to constitute a particularly interesting empirical and analytical puzzle which relates to the broader set

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[24] Although the focus on the relationship between the EU and domestic level of governance connects studies of Europeanisation in different fields (Goetz 2000: 222), the foreign policy scholars have been particularly keen on to theorize this relationship. However, other fields have also moved in this direction. For instance, largely EU-centric and top-down orientated comparative politics now also focus on the institution building at the European level (Featherstone 2003: 13).

of questions tackling international governance (Ruggie 1993) and complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye 2000). Within these debates, states are both shaping and shaped by the structures of international governance. Relatedly, Europeanisation literature also tackles the issues raised in the lively methodological debates on structure and agency and levels of analysis. As White argues, European foreign and security policy clearly operates at different levels, most obviously at both the European and state level. Thus we need an analytical approach able to explore the linkages between them. Given the problems in locating agency within the constantly evolving institutional structure of the European foreign and security policy, it would be unwise to either separate agent or structure for explanatory purposes ("bracketing off") or to privileged particular epistemological position with respect to them. (White 2004: 20)

Europeanisation, as means of bridging levels of analysis as well as structure and agency also has its critics. As White points out, some of its reviewers claim that it is a vague and widely applied concept that might describe the process of integration rather than explain how or why it occurs (White 2004: 21). In terms of the concepts vagueness and wide application, this chapter encourages scholars to define Europeanisation more precisely in the light of their specific research interests. In terms of describing rather that explaining the integration, this chapter argues that this appears to be a problem only within a rationalist accounts, seeking to explain rather than understand social phenomenon.[25] That is, it is a problem only for approaches which ask 'why question' rather than 'how possible' questions (Hollis and Smith 1990; Doty 1993; Weldes 1996; Campbell 1998; Weldes 2001).

Thus, in the light of the recent theoretical ferment which focuses on the epistemological assumptions of the IR, a problem of the Europeanisation literature might lie elsewhere. I suggest that in general the Europeanisation literature largely lacks the so-called post-positivists or reflectivist contribution. This is peculiar since, in spite of the dominance of

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[25] As White notes, certainly the Europeanisation debate with respect to European foreign policy/ies has tended to be located within a limited rationalist discourse (White 2004: 21).

conventional theorising, there has been a recent phase of theoretical reflexivity and innovation concerning European integration. This owes much to the spill over of creative thinking across political science and the social constructivist turn in IR (Larsen 1997; Diez 1999; Christiansen, Jørgensen et al. 2001; Diez 2001; Tonra and Christiansen 2004). Moreover, in thinking foreign policy more generally, 'critical', 'dissident' and 'social constructivist' approaches have been increasingly visible (Weber 1995; Doty 1996; Weldes 1996; Campbell 1998; Neumann 1998; Wæver 2002) in the discipline. Significantly, all of these approaches explicitly discuss the complex and mutually constitutive relationships among political communities located in various levels (of analysis).

In terms of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy, some of the above-mentioned analyses have explicitly focused on questions of ideas, norms and identity (Sjursen 2001; Tonra 2001; Browning 2003; Sjursen 2003; Tonra 2003). On the other hand, as Christiansen et. al. argue, the contribution of more radical positions remains yet to be seen (Christiansen, Jørgensen et al. 2001). The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to this gap in the literature.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sought to defend my choice of an Europeanisation of foreign and security policy approach. I argued that the developments in European foreign and security policy/ies poses a challenge for the conventional and dominant ways of analysis reflecting a state-centric cooperation approach in which the European foreign and security policy is largely, although not exclusively, the sum of the European states' foreign and security policies. Consequently, the subject matter is increasingly approached by scholars operating within an integrationist approach. However, these approaches appear to be highly limited to in their ability elucidate the relationship between the member states and the European Union. I have suggested that the concept of Europeanisation enables us to move beyond the strict logics of the cooperation and integration approaches. The chapter calls for a conceptualisation of Europeanisation as a bottom up

and top down process. However, many of the theoretical innovations which reflect 'critical', 'constructivist' and 'dissident' IR and explicitly deal with mutually constitutive relationships among several levels of analysis have been largely missing to date in the analysis of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy.

Chapter 2

Theoretical and Methodological Framework: Discourse Analytic Approach with a Comparative Element

Introduction

The emergence of a distinct European foreign and security policy/ies system has become one of the most salient issues in the scholarly literature in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It is generally assumed that the major EU powers were coordinating a common policy in the area of security and defence, although medium and minor EU states, some previously neutral, were also seen to be part of this process. Conventionally, therefore, the European foreign and security policy/ies has been addressed by agency-centred analysis. It has been predominantly theorised in terms of cooperation among the member states. Attempts to analyse the structural aspects of the relationship between the European Union and its member states – specifically, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Foreign and Security Policy (ESDP) impact on the member states – were largely missing.

However, and as the previous chapter sought to demonstrate, in the late 1990s it had become plausible to assume that the European foreign policy is increasingly based on the integration of, rather than cooperation among, the EU member states. Accordingly, the number of analyses operating within a

more integrationist ontology has increased. Even if the European Union is not determining the policies of the member states in the area of security and defence, it is seen to be shaping the environment in which these policies were formulated. In turn, the member state policies further shape the European Union. Hence, the relationship between the European Union and the member states is reciprocal.

The main objective of this chapter is to discuss how an approach which highlights the constitutive elements of the reciprocal relationship between the CFSP and the member states can be construed. By drawing on the Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy literature, this chapter seeks to contribute to the increasing interest in examining the Europeanisation of identities. In so doing, it lays out the theoretical and methodological framework of the study. First, I discuss some of the theoretical issues at stake in the question of structure and agency. Instead of solving the problem of structure and agency, present in the analysis of European integration and foreign policy, my purpose it to overcome it by deploying a concept of identity. Second, and in so doing, I outline a methodological framework based on discourse analysis. Third, I clarify the methods of the discourse analysis and present a comparative research design. My purpose is not to construct a conventional comparative model or framework for the analysis. Rather, I seek to explore some novel ways of thinking the relationship between the European and state level foreign and security policy governance.

2.1 Theoretical Framework: From the Question of Structure and Agency towards the Concept of Identity

The question of structure and agency has been central for the study of International Relations (IR) since the late 1980s. This reflects the developments within social theory (Bhaskar 1979; Giddens 1984; Layder 1994; Delanty 1999) and political science (Hay 1995; Hay 2002) as well as the emergence of the social constructivism(s) (Wendt 1987; Wendt 1992; Wendt 1999) within the discipline. Consequently, sthe question of structure

and agency has become one of the most debated methodological issues of the IR (Wendt 1987; Dessler 1989; Hollis and Smith 1990; Adler 1997; Doty 1997; Doty 1999; Doty 2000; Smith, S. 2000; Hay 2002). Essentially, what the analysts are concerned with here is the relationship between the political actors identified and the environment in which they are situated. In other words, the relation between conduct and context (Hay 2002: 89). Predictably, whereas in the political science literature the structure and agency question tends to deal with the question of how much intentional (and often individual) human agency mattered in social and political action, within IR it largely focuses on the collective (or corporate) agency of a state (Smith, S. 2000).

The structure and agency question is imperative for this study because it offers an empirically grounded entry point – the analytical puzzle – informing the theoretical and methodological discussion. Although the structure and agency question has recently spread to the analysis of the European integration (Hay 2002: 89, endnote 1), it has been only recently raised in the literature of the European foreign and security policy/ies.[26] For, as the previous chapter suggested, conventionally the relationship between the European Union and its member states level had been analysed by agency-centred accounts that understand the recent developments as cooperation between the member states.

The dominance of agency-centred approaches in IR of the 1990s and beyond is based on two commonsense understandings underpinning the study of International Relations (IR): that (i) states are rational *agents*;[27] and

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[26] Tonra's analysis of the Europeanisation of Dutch, Danish and Irish foreign policy starts with a similar analytical puzzle (Tonra 2001) although it ends up with a different theoretical and methodological framework more explicitly grounded in social constructivism. The social constructivist contribution to the structure and agency debate is also featuring in Sjursen's analysis of the CFSP (Sjursen 2001) and noted in White's European foreign policy analysis (White 2004).

[27] Although rational choice (theory) is regarded as an agency-centered perspective, it can be also viewed as a rather rigid form of structuralism. This paradox follows from the rational choice theory's assumption that individuals and their communities are egoistic and self-regarding utility-maximisers who behave rationally in pursuit of their preferences with almost complete knowledge of their environment. Moreover, in any particular situation there is only *one* rational course of action consistent with a specific preference set. Subsequently, we need to know nothing about the actor to predict the outcome of her behavior. (Hay 2002)

that they (ii) operate within the anarchic *structure* of the international system (Waltz 1979) or society (Bull 1977).[28] Accordingly, the aim of the foreign policy is to maximise a state's power in order to guarantee its security. In the previous chapter, I argued that given the important differences among the conventional approaches to the European foreign and security policy/ies, their insistence on the importance of the state has resulted in a narrow conceptualisation of integration as cooperation among states.[29]

This, in turn, reflects a particular solution to the structure and agency question that emphasises the political agency of state actors. Consequently, the examination of the structural aspects of the relationship between the European Union and state level governance has been raised only recently in the field of the European foreign and security policy/ies. In doing so, some approaches have focused on the question of the impact of the EU and its foreign and security policy on the member states. However, and given the nature of the recent institutional development in the field – namely the CFSP and the ESDP – the analyses have highlighted some structural aspects of the relationship rather than assuming supranational governance. Therefore, by utilising the concept of Europeanisation and comparative method, scholars have attempted to overcome the levels of analysis problem. Moreover, this problem is increasingly discussed in terms of methodological question of structure and agency, in particular, by the social constructivist scholars (Tonra 2001; White 2004).

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[28] These theories seek to account for regularities in observed patterns of behaviour, mostly the behaviour of states (such as foreign policy) within an international system by appeal to the operation of systemic logics. In so far as these logics are seen to operate independently of the actors themselves, these accounts are structuralist (Hay 2002). Within IR theory, neo- or structural realism (Waltz 1979) and world systems (Wallerstein 1989) theory can be regarded as systemic in this sense.

[29] Neo-liberal institutionalists suggest that the formulation of foreign policy also takes place through international cooperation and hence other international institutions and actors than states are important (Keohane 1989). Moreover, they point out that domestic considerations (i.e., actors within states) are significant too (Keohane and Nye 1987). However, also the neo-liberal institutionalist view that state as the most important actor within anarchic, rather than hierarchic, international system. Moreover, in explaining the European foreign and security policy/ies in 1990s both realism and liberal institutionalism have been manifested in intergovernmentalism which highlights the role of the state in the process of integration.

2.1.1 Beyond Structure versus Agency: Towards the Concept of Identity

Even if intentional accounts have dominated the analysis of political integration, and structural approaches have been mainly applied in the area of economic integration, alternative views to the question of structure and agency have emerged. The debate between the rationalist and constructivist approaches to IR reached the field of European integration studies (Diez 1999; Christiansen, Jørgensen et al. 2001; Diez 2001; Moravcsik 2001; Hansen 2002). This debate reflected a similarly vibrant discussion among and between constructivism(s) and poststructuralism(s) in IR (Katzenstein, P. 1996; Adler 1997; Campbell 1998; Hopf 1998; Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999; Wendt 1999; Doty 2000; Smith, S. 2000). Accordingly, the process of European integration has recently been approached by conceptualizing the relationship between structure and agency as mutually constitutive (Christiansen, Jørgensen et al. 2001; Sjursen 2001; Tonra 2001; Rieker 2005). That is, the existence of the social structures of integration, such as the CFSP, and the agency embedded in the agents of the process, like the EU member states, is relational. The agency is part of the reproduction of structure(s), but the structure(s) constrain and enable the agency.

The debate between (mainstream) constructivists and poststructuralists, however, suggests that the mutual constitution of structure and agency can be addressed rather differently depending on one's theoretical position. Whereas constructivists attempt to overcome the *problem* of structure and agency with Anthony Giddens' structuration theory, poststructuralists argue that the question of structure and agency is not a problem (requiring a solution) in the first place (Doty 2000; Hay 2002).[30] Instead, it is a (meta-)

[30] The structuration theory, as articulated by Anthony Giddens, is an ambitious theoretical attempt to transcend the dualism of structure and agency. Giddens prefers the idea of duality instead of dualism. Structure and agency are seen as the two sides of the same coin, analytically separable but ontologically interwoven (Giddens 1976: 197; Hay 1995). This methodological claim has led to a well-established method of temporarily 'bracketing off' the dimensions of agency or structure. This is clearly present in much of the IR theory of social constructivism, most notably on the work of Alexander Wendt (Wendt 1992; Wendt 1999) Moreover, this so-called 'bracketing off' is a well-established feature of the FPA and European foreign policy analysis. Basically, this methodological choice means isolation of structural or agential factors for the practical purposes of the research. In so doing, one can analyze the agential factors of, for example, national foreign policy-making, rather independently of the context (structural dimension). Alternatively, one can focus on the

theoretical assumption reflecting different ontologies about the social world. Therefore, the primary interest of poststructuralists is an examination of how structures of meaning constitute both agents and social structures (Weldes 1996). Accordingly, poststructuralists are interested in elucidating how subjects (agents) gain, or are given, a particular kind of identity which enables certain degree of agency and hence shapes the agents' (construction of possible) action. For instance, Doty's analysis of foreign policy as a social construction explicitly analyses the identity of different subjects and objects constructed in foreign policy texts (Doty 1993).

Therefore, in their endeavours to capture the mutually constitutive social and political relationship between structure and agency, both constructivists and poststructuralists have found useful the concept of identity. However, their difference in 'solving' or 'moving beyond' the structure and agency question has some significant methodological implications.

2.1.2 Social Constructivism and Identity

Because of the social constructivist turn in IR, the explanations highlighting identity (Wendt 1992; Adler 1997; Wendt 1999), often understood as based on a particular culture (Finnemore 1996; Katzenstein, P. J. 1996), have experienced a general revival in IR theory. The focus on identity and culture has spread to conventional rationalist accounts such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism.[31] Moreover, forms of 'critical' and 'dissident' thought in IR have dealt with the questions of identity and culture (Campbell 1998; Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999).

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context (structural) factors such as the CFSP and leave the agential factors aside. In the end, these analytical engagements should, however, be brought together

[31] Neo-realists have aimed at integrating sub-state conflicts between antagonistic ethnic and nationalist groups within a structural theory of international system. However, they have not 'revised the 'identity of constitutive unit' as being that of self-help'. Hence, in theorizing nationalism, neo-realism is unable to account for the construction and reconstruction of national identities (Wæver 2002: 21). On the other hand, neo-liberals have emphasized that the self help identity can be viewed as a starting point of the analysis, but the cooperation beyond the realist predictions is possible (Keohane and Nye 1977). Moreover, neo-liberals have recently argued for the importance of ideas and norms shaping the (national) interests. However, these are viewed as causal factors intervening the policy outcomes based on self-help, not factors constituting the (national) identity and interests (Laffey and Weldes 1997). Consequently, these two 'neos' do not seem to offer a compelling starting point for a development of a framework of how particular state identities are constructed, re-produced and modified in the face of the evolving European integration (Wæver 2002: 21).

In searching for a theory that unites structure and agency through the concept of identity (mainstream) constructivism is a tempting option. This is because Wendt' s work, which has set up the terms of debate of much recent IR theory, explicitly addresses the 'structure and agency problematique'. Moreover, his work is identity-related. Wendt's constructivism, however, operates at the level of the international system. The relationship between structure and agency, here, is between the international system and the state (Doty 2000; Smith, S. 2000). In terms of identity, Wendt is interested in general meanings of 'state', 'sovereignty' and 'anarchy'(Wendt 1992). As a consequence, the ability of Wendtian constructivism to deal with the meanings generated from within the state – how each state, nation or unit creates its own identity – is limited (Smith, S. 2000: 161-162).[32]

Katzenstein's (1996) collection of essays tries to address this shortcoming by focusing on the construction of national identity in particular cases. A particular national identity based on deeper cultural factors explains, for instance, Germany's and Japan's relatively low political profile in the international arena (Berger 1996), China's foreign policy (Johnston 1996) or the collective identity of NATO (Risse-Kappen 1996). The concept of identity, here, is not determined by the international structure but by national culture(s). However, and as Waever notes, it is difficult for the conception of identity in many of the essays in Katzenstein's volume 'to explain in a systematic way –beyond historical narrative- why the same cultural and historical background (of a state) can sustain highly contradictory foreign policies' (Wæver 2002: 22). That is, the concept of identity appears to reflect a common sense (western) understanding of particular cultures, rather than the examination of the identity construction within the state(s) in question.

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[32] More broadly this reflects the so-called 'levels of analysis problem' in IR drawing on the separation of domestic and international spheres of politics. Whereas in political science a state can be viewed to constitute some of the structures of a given society, in IR the states are pre-dominantly seen as the agents (reflecting different degrees of agency) operating in the anarchical system often understood as the structure (Waltz 1979; Wendt 1992). Therefore, in the IR the state is often approached as a unitary actor. That is, a 'pre-social' and 'exogenously given' political entity with a coherent identity. (Smith, S. 2000: 160-162)

2.1.3 Poststructuralism and Identity

There is no shortage of poststructuralist approaches within the study of IR. Moreover, the issues of the European foreign and security policy/ies (Wæver 1993; Neumann and Waever 1996; Larsen 1997; Diez 2001; Fierke and Wiener 2001; Joenniemi 2001; Wæver 2002; Howorth 2004) and some aspects of European integration (Rosamond 2001; Howarth and Torfing 2005) have been approached by these scholars. However, the majority of the poststructuralist writing in IR (Campbell 1993; Doty 1993; Weber 1995; Doty 1996; Weldes 1996; Campbell 1998; Weldes 2001) has been predominantly focused on the US foreign policy (Christiansen, Jørgensen et al. 2001). It is crucial to note that even if all of these approaches operate from poststructuralist premises, some significant differences remain. Indeed, poststructuralists themselves disagree on many issues. These discussions and debates have, however, been largely invisible under the mainstream analysts' fierce critique of poststructuralism often reduced to a particularly selective reading(s) of some postmodern texts reflecting relativist epistemology.

This has clearly been puzzling (and annoying) the poststructural theorists beyond the boundaries of IR. For instance, Mouffe, in her analysis of postmodernism and essentialism in feminism, argues that the critique of universalism, humanism, and rationalism has come from many different locations and it cannot be limited to the authors called 'poststructuralists' or 'postmodernists'' (Mouffe 1995: 315). Relatedly, the critique of a specific thesis propelling utmost relativism has led to generalizing conclusions about postmodernism, which then includes all the authors loosely connected with poststructuralism. As Mouffe argues, this 'type of amalgamation is completely unhelpful when not clearly disingenuous' (Mouffe 1995: 316). Therefore, it is important 'to recognize that there is no such a thing as 'postmodernism' understood as a coherent theoretical approach and that the frequent assimilation between poststructuralism and postmodernism can only lead to confusion' (Butler 1991; Mouffe 1995: 316).

Once the diversity of postmodernisms and poststructuralisms has been acknowledged, some space is created for the discussions of the different poststructuralist approaches. An interesting controversy has surrounded the question of political agency in poststructuralist foreign policy theories. For example, Weldes' approach to foreign policy and her empirical case study of Cuban Missile Crisis (Weldes 1996) points out that alternative constructions of missiles in Cuba were possible and that these constructions were not acted upon by the US foreign policy makers. In so doing, Weldes retains and highlights the political agency possessed by foreign policy makers. As Weldes argues:

> Drawing on a wide array of already available cultural and linguistic resources, state officials create representations which serve, first, to populate the world with a variety of objects, including both the self (i.e. state in question) and others. (Weldes 1996: 281)

This is consequential with Weldes' aspiration to develop a post-Marxist foreign policy analysis by applying and developing Althusser's concepts of articulation and interpellation. In this sense, Weldes has some empathy for structural analysis, but the reputed determinism embedded in Althusser is re-thought.

David Campbell's critique of critical social constructivism - a position further articulated in Weldes et al. volume *Cultures of Insecurity: States Communities and the Production of Danger* (1999) – argues that the focus of the approach on foreign policy-makers and the state level is problematic. Campbell suggest that this can lead to a 'high politics' focus of the conventional IR FPA and hence miss out some other crucial cites for the (re-) production of the state identity through foreign policy (Campbell 1998: 224).

In turn, the critical social constructivists argue that Campbell's account obscures the crucial role played by the foreign policy-makers and the institutions they are embedded in for the formulation of foreign policy. In short, it is argued that political agency is missing in Campbell's approach. As Mark Laffey notes, 'despite occasional reference to various institutions

and apparatuses, they are not integrated into Campbell's analysis in any systematic way' (Laffey 2000: 441). In so doing, Campbell's account seen ill-suited to elucidate the 'ways in which particular subjects are differentially empowered in relation to one and another' (Laffey 2000: 441). Tuathail share similar concern. He notes that a general avenue of scepticism in Campbell's account concerns the relative evisceration of agency resulting from 'neglect of intention and agency brought about by the retreat from "material causes"' (Tuathail 1996: 651).

This debate is most helpful for the purposes of this chapter in order to define what I mean by the mutual constitution of structure and agency. Most certainly intentional agency can be identified and located in the process of foreign policy-making. Moreover, some agents have more influence over foreign policy outcomes than do others. It follows that the focus on the officials and institutions of a state is relevant. However, political agency is always located within the political process itself – it is a constitutive element of foreign policy; and the process itself is a constitutive element of political agency.

Moreover, this is exactly how I read the performative identity construction as articulated by Butler (1990) and applied to the analysis of foreign policy and state action by Campbell (1998) and Weber (1995), for example. What these scholars seek to do with the notion of performative identity, are to tie together discourses – understood as structures of meaning – and subjects with agency. Importantly, identity, then, does not indicate a fixed status of being, instead it is understood in terms of doing (practice) (Weber 1995; Campbell 1998; Weber 1998). However, and as Weber notes performative identity should not be read to imply a voluntary performance or freedom of choice (Weber 1998: 81). Conversely, performativity highlights that the re-production of identities is constrained with dominant discourses. However, due to agency embedded in the subjects in the processes of identity formation, the subject's identity is not merely determined by discursive context(s). Rather, the very identity of the agent is (re-)produced by the

'reiterative and citational practice by which the discourse produces the effects it names' (Butler 1990: 2).

2.1.4 Foreign and Policy and Re-Production of State Identity

In moving from a somewhat fixed conceptualization of identity, which is taken as given and is determined by either an international structure or cultural and historical factors to a contingent conceptualisation, the discussion easily turns toward poststructuralism. Here the question of structure and agency is predominantly dissolved in an understanding that (a state's) identity is continuously re-produced (by agents operating within social structures). Accordingly, the focus of the analysis shifts from the grand narratives of culture and history towards political processes within which the identity of a state is continuously being re-constituted. Moreover, critical IR scholars have demonstrated that foreign and security policy is central for the re-production of the state identity (Doty 1996; Campbell 1998; Neumann 1998).

Campbell's reasoning on foreign policy is helpful in order to lay out the conceptualisation of foreign policy deployed in this study. As he argues:

> Foreign policy (conventionally understood as the external orientation of preestablished states with secure identities) is thus to be retheorized as one of the boundary-producing practices central to the production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates. (Campbell 1998: 68)

Campbell also reminds us that foreign policy relates to the identity of a certain kind of political community. That is, the modern state which emerged in the late eighteen or early nineteenth centuries when the certain state practices associated with a policy field of 'foreign' or 'external' were consolidated (Campbell 1998: 68).[33] Whereas in conventional analysis state is treated as a natural fact, here, we move towards a conceptualisation of state as a human-made political entity. In this process of 'making' and 're-

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[33] Campbell notes that it was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when these state practices took the form of large bureaucracies with global scope. For instance, British Foreign Office can be dated back to 1780s. By the 1853 it had a staff of thirty, and this was to increase by only additional ten in the subsequent fifty years. (Campbell 1998: 68, endnote 64). Moreover, the discipline of international relations and the study of foreign policy as a distinct from studies of government and politics is often dated back to the early twentieth century when the first chair of international politics was founded at Aberystwyth, Wales.

making' of the state, the foreign and security policy is given a central role. Significantly, the foreign and security policy resonates with statehood. It distinguishes the state from other kinds of political communities such as ethnic communities or international organisations.

However, the production and re-production of state identity is not to be reduced to foreign policy. Rather it overlaps with the other central dimension of a state identity such as nationhood.[34] In this sense, Campbell distinguishes between 'foreign policy' and 'Foreign Policy'. The former relates to *all* practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion of a given political community, and the latter to the conventional understandings of foreign policy as a particular state-led political practice. In constituting an identity, then, 'foreign policy' applies to various sites such as ethnicity, race, class, gender, sexuality or geography in which the self is constructed in relation to other(s). On the other hand, 'Foreign Policy' is understood as a state-based practice through which a particular state identity is re-produced (Campbell 1998-69). As Campbell indicates, the second view is thus 'not as equally implicated in the *constitution* of identity as the first understanding. Rather, 'Foreign Policy' serves to *reproduce* the constitution of identity made possible by 'foreign policy'…' (Campbell 1998: 69, emphasis in original). [35]

This does not imply, however, that foreign policy understood as state-based practice would be a less important site of analysis. Conversely, the relationship of the foreign policy of a state with its political identity should not be underestimated. Foreign policy constitutes a powerful discourse which is significant for the interpretations of the pre-eminent dangers to our society and ourselves (Wæver 1995; Campbell 1998: 69-70; Weldes, Laffey

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[34] Anderson argues that nationalist discourses produce 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1991) ostensibly unified by blood, language and culture. However, and as Weldes et. al. notes, 'these imagined communities are not always wells synchronized with state boundaries – as in the case of contemporary Kurds or Basques, for example' (Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999: 15).

[35] To establish some analytical clarity, terms constitution and re- constitution are used in conjunction of this broader understanding of foreign policy constitutive of state identity. On the other hand, terms production and re-production are applied in relation to foreign policy as state-based practice which re-produces aspects of state (external) identity.

et al. 1999).[36] Here, the development of a modern (Westphalian) state and the articulation of its insecurities are central. The foreign and security policy, in historical terms, is 'the field where states threaten each others, challenge each other's sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their independence, and so on' (Wæver 1995: 50). It is in and through this struggle for recognition that states establish their identity as states (Wæver 1995: 54) in the field of foreign and security policy.[37]

In sum, the identity approach of this dissertation suggests that the state has 'no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality' (see also, Butler 1990: 173; Campbell 1998: 10; Weber 1998). The foreign and security policy forms an important 'set of acts' (i.e. practice) for the formulation of a state's identity. When applied to the European foreign policy making and, in particular, to the relationship between the European Union and the member states, the identity approach opens up an analytical horizon within which the assumed constitutive aspects of the relationship between the two levels can be registered and analyzed. That is, the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy is, then, constituted by the political process of interacting member states and the interaction is increasingly shaped by the EU institutions. However, this interaction in not merely based on cooperation in which the identities of the cooperative units largely remain untouched (as the majority of conventional approaches assume). The increasing Europeanisation suggests that EU level political practices are increasingly contributing to the construction of identities of the member states. Moreover, there is clearly a political agency at work within this frame of state identity. Moreover, it is imperative to examine how each state constructs their identity in the field of foreign and security policy.

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[36] The privileged status of foreign policy is related to the conventional (Westphalian) understanding of the state where sovereignty is guaranteed in the policy areas of security and defence reflected in 'high politics' and 'low politics' distinction. Whereas policies related to states security and defence are mostly seen as matters of first priority (high politics), other policy areas such as welfare and health come second (low politics).

[37] This does not mean that a narrow understanding of security would be sufficient to secure the state or other political community. As critics point out, policy-makers and academics have seen it imperative to broaden the scope of security and critical analysis have asked a question whose security is valued over others. Weldes et. al. notes that the security of many political groups and individuals is often antithetical to those of the state(s) in which they live (Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999: 15).

However, the states do not operate outside, behind or beyond the political process of integration.

2.2 The Methodological Framework: Discourse Analysis with a Comparative Element

In analysing identity/ies poststructural scholars have turned to the concept of discourse. Indeed, the concept of discourse appears to be integral for the development of the poststructural scholarly tradition. In short, poststructuralists have attempted to move beyond the deterministic character of structuralism associated (more or less correctly) with the concept of ideology (Purvis and Hunt 1993; Torfing 2005: 10-11). That is, the identity of a subject of a social inquiry is not determined by a dominant ideology (reflecting the material world) rather it is constructed in a discursive field.[38]

The concept of discourse is suggestive of a particular research method(s) and design. However, in IR there has been very little discussion of the appropriate methods and criteria for the discourse analytical approach (Milliken 1999: 226). This is hardly due to the limited amount of discourse research undertaken. As suggested above, the amount of poststructuralist research is substantial. Rather the refusal to define a fixed methodology is indicative of discourse analysis theoretical commitments and disciplinary politics. As Milliken argues, there is no common understanding of how to study discourse (Milliken 1999: 226). This, in turn, reflects both the theoretical differences among discourse scholars and their desire to challenge the 'scientism' embraced by the mainstream IR. Namely, the search for scientific theories and laws in terms of quantitative method as the key rationale of a quality research (Hollis and Smith 1990).[39]

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[38] Hunt and Purvis argue that these two terms reflect distinct theoretical traditions which, while they can be separated, they can both be made good use of. In so doing, they indicate that the rupture between discourse and ideology is not the only analytical move available for the analysts dealing with problems of structuralism. They favor a Gramscian position espoused by Stuart Hall that retains the concept of ideology while benefiting from the advances secured by discourse theory (Purvis and Hunt 1993).

[39] For an exemplar, see a well cited volume by King, Keohane and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (King, Keohane et al. 1994).

However, the argument developed here is that discourse approaches operate through highly sophisticated methodologies and that discourse scholars share some common commitments.[40] Moreover, methodological plurality is sensible because many discourse scholars reject the search for the ultimate method or the most adequate methodology (Torfing 1999). On the other hand, scholars have highlighted the flexibility of discourse analysis as an analytical strength in examining complex social phenomena and processes (Milliken 1999). I suggest that it can deepen our understanding of the foreign and security policy governance in contemporary Europe. The purpose of this section is to elucidate the methodology of the discourse analytic approach deployed in this study, and to discuss how it relates to the comparative element of the study.

2.2.1 Genealogical Frame: Discursive and Discourse(s)

This study operates within the genealogical frame of theory (Squires 1999: 87). Within this frame, meaning is not a simple reflection of ideas or things: the meaning of words does not correspond in a transparent fashion to something external; it is acquired through specific, mutable social processes (Squires 1999: 87). Following an anti-essentialist ontology and anti-foundationalist epistemology (Laclau and Mouffe 1987: 80; Hacking 1999; Torfing 2005: 13), the study assumes that the European foreign and security policy/ies exists through human agreement and social interaction, and not independently of our knowledge and conceptions of it. In other words, the meaning given to suggested Europeanisation of the foreign and security

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[40] Milliken sums up these commitments arguing that scholars tend to focus upon discourses, first as *systems of signification*, second as being *productive* and third as constituting *the play of practice*. Discourses as a system of signification draws researchers towards the analysis of language practices. Derrida's suggestion that 'there is nothing outside of text' is understood broadly. The reality is mediated through systems of significations (i.e. language, symbols etc.). Focus on discourse *productivity* makes it important to explain how discourse (re)produces the reality. How the process of production is selective and privileges some discourses over others. This aspect of discourse analysis also has a clear political and ethical significance. It enables the critical stance of discourse approaches by analysing, for example, the production of naturalised 'common sense(s)'. Discourses as the play of practice emphasise the open-endness and instability of discourses –the reality needs to be produced and re-produced. Crucially, it is within the process if (re-)production where the change and continuity occur. It is significant to note that many of the methods employed in discourse approaches are often combined and they overlap. Moreover, they are based on empirical analysis and evidence. (Milliken 1999)

policy is relational to the established system(s) of meaning manifested within the discursive field of the European foreign and security policy/ies).

However, a discourse analytic approach does not imply scepticism about the existence of the 'reality'. The 'reality/ies' certainly exists, but not independently of our knowledge of it. Laclau and Mouffe's reasoning is illustrative. They argue:

> The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of 'God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied in not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence. (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 108)

In this sense, this study agrees that, while the world exists out there, truth does not. This means that the institutional and material social conditions and practices interrelate with discursive practices. Further, it is their meaning, not existence, what is at stake in this study. Whilst the relationship between discursive action and political and institutional structures and policies is reciprocal, this study focuses on the level of discourse constitutive of state identities.[41]

Nevertheless, the reciprocal relationship between discourse(s) and institutionalised political practices is important for the research design of this study. Namely, it underpins the focus on official documentation and policy-makers. I suggest that some institutionalised practices are more important in processes of the re-articulation of foreign and security policy discourses. In other words, they constitute a privilege site of re-articulation. In the field of foreign and security policy, state agencies and officials

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[41] I acknowledge the importance of the aim of some discourse approaches to make the relationship between discourses and institution and political practices transparent(Wodak 1999: 4, 9). In terns of Europeanisation, the discourse analytic approach can therefore contribute, for instance, to the explanations of institutional change in EU member states. However, this is not the key question addressed in this study. Hence, the analysis stays on the level of discourse(s), which is seen as constitutive of state identities.

occupy a central place in generating meaningful articulations. However, and as Weldes argues, this position does not lay outside the discursive context, rather it is discursively constructed (Weldes 1996).

Four key arguments are central for the discourse analytic approach of this study. First, the methodology applied in this dissertation builds on Foucault's definition of discourse(s) as those 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak' (Foucault 1972: 49). As such, discourse(s) are understood as 'concrete systems of social relations and practices' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 4); they reflect and re-produce structure(s) of meaning (Weldes 1996; Torfing 1999; Wæver 2002) constitutive of particular identities. While discourses organise knowledge systematically, they also set up the 'boundaries' or 'terms' of the debate(s). Discourses define what can be intelligibly said and what not (Wæver 2002: 29). In other words, they set up the rules governing sensible (foreign and security policy) statements in a certain juncture of time.

Second, the discourse and identity formation is relational and contextual (Torfing 2005: 14). That is, identities do not occur independently of other meaningful subjects and object is constructed in the discourse(s). Rather, their existence is relational, and thus context specific (rather than universal). Moreover, the formative order of a discourse is not a stable self-re-producing structure, but a precarious system, which is constantly subjected to political attempts to undermine and/or re-structure the discursive context (Torfing 2005: 14). Accordingly, the examination of the re-production of state identities accounts and analyses the change and the continuity of these relationships.

Third, and relatedly, an identity is re-produced in and through hegemonic struggles in the discursive field. The discourse analytic approach argues, with Derrida, that there is no pre-given, self-determining essence that is capable of determining and ultimately fixing all other identities within a stable and totalizing structure (Torfing 2005: 13). In this study this means that there is no essence of statehood reflecting ideas of sovereignty or

security and resulting in an anarchic system. Because of its contingent nature, the discourse(s) needs to be continuously re-articulated. In this process, some articulations gain dominance and some are marginalised. A discourse can gain a hegemonic status when it manages 'to provide a credible principle upon which read the past, present, and the future events, and capture people's hearts and minds…' (Torfing 2005: 15). In so doing, hegemonic discourse(s) establishes common senses and, at times, naturalised truths. As Squires points out, within a genealogical frame of theory, 'while all meaning is a contextual construction, some meanings gain the status of objective truths' (Squires 1999: 97).

The (re-) articulation of a foreign and security policy discourse and the re-production of state identity, are intrinsically linked to the construction of social antagonisms, which involves the exclusion of a series of identities and meanings (other subjects) that are articulated in terms of equivalence and difference. In the discourse analysis, social antagonisms are manifested in and through the production of political frontiers, which often invoke stereotyped representations of friends and enemies, for instance (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000; Torfing 2005: 15-16). Moreover, the struggle over what and who are included and excluded from the hegemonic discourse is a significant political act and in the focus of the discourse analytical approach.

Finally, we are left with the question of dislocation of a hegemonic discourse. Most discourses are flexible and capable of integrating new elements, which reflect political developments, to their existing structure of meaning and symbolic order. A hegemonic discourse is dislocated when it fails to explain, represent, or in other ways to domesticate new events (Torfing 2005: 16). That is, the rules structuring the meaning are disturbed. When dislocation of a hegemonic discourse occurs, a new terrain for political struggles is opened up. The participants of the debate are assigned different degrees of authority depending on their discursively constructed position in the system. Over time, the debate is likely to lead to emergence of consensus, that is, a new hegemonic discourse. Because the purpose of

this study is to examine the re-production of the state identity through the re-articulation of hegemonic national foreign and security discourses in the face of increasing Europeanisation of foreign and security policy, it also deals with the question of whether the national discourses have been dislocated in this process.

2.2.2 Discourse Analytic Methods

After discussing the theoretical and methodological framework in a rather abstract meta-theoretical fashion, I will now turn to its practical impact on the research design and methods employed. I first outline the tools (i.e., methods) to be used in the discourse analysis. Second, I map out the overall research design and clarify the comparative elements of it.

Discourse analysis forms the core of the empirical analysis conducted in this study. My aim here is to analyse what impact, if any, the increasing Europeanisation of foreign and security policy has had on state identities in Finland and Britain. Given the theoretical frame of this dissertation, I do so by focusing on the developments in the official foreign and security policy discourse. The most important and general method of discourse analytical approach applied, *interpretation*, is mostly taken for granted. In so doing, it is not often discussed in terms of methodology. However, I suggest that it is analytically imperative to clarify what kind of interpretation any particular analysis is based on.

In this study, the analysis of the relationship between the European Union and the Finnish and British foreign and security policies is based on an interpretative document analysis. This study is not purely a 'mechanical' analysis of discourses, for instance, in terms of their frequency, function and shape in the selected material. Yet this will form a part of the research. What is at stake in this study is the interpretation of discourses based on *a dialogue between the analyst and the selected empirical material* (documents). For this reason, the context within which the interpretation takes place is of key importance not only in terms of the (re)production of discourses but also in terms of situated analysts.

The analysis of discourses in Finland and Britain takes place within the framework illustrated in figure 2.1. Because discourses are understood to be open-ended and changeable, the concepts of *articulation* and *interpellation* will highlight the continuous need for reproduction (Weldes 1996; Weldes 1999; Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999). With the concept of articulation, the study addresses the contingent and contextually specific representations of the world that produces meanings that come to seem natural and accurate descriptions of reality. That is, for instance, the call for for the CFSP and the ESDP in, or the problematic nature of these twin policies for, Finland and Britain. The need for re-articulation also enables the contestation, transformation or dislocation of the foreign and security policy discourse. Hence, the study will also examine whether the (re-) articulations of the discourse(s) *interpellate* the state officials and the publics and become accepted as natural and accurate. In other words, whether the discourse become hegemonic. The practical analysis is based on two major phases.



Figure 2.1.: Re-Production of state identity in the field of foreign and security policy

Articulation

Official foreign and security policy discourse(s) in Finland and Britain are approached by focusing on the process of (re-) articulation of the discourse outlined in figure 2.2. The purpose of the analysis of articulation is to generate a portrait of the discourse in question. In methodological terms, the analysis is based on the retroduction of a discourse through the empirical analysis of its realization in political and social practices (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 28). That is, the analysis reasons backward to establish the discourse from its empirical manifestations such as the representations generated in the official documents. The process of (re-) articulation is illustrated in Figure 2.2.

The analysis begins by examining the representation *articulated* in the discourse (discursive construction as noun) and then the *process of articulation* in which the representations are re-produced, transformed or dismantled (discursive construction as a verb). To do so, I utilise the methods of *predication*, *presupposition* and *subject positioning*. Whereas predication relates the examination of the articulated representations, the presupposition and subject positioning relate to the process of articulation. Although these tools are analytically separable, in practice they are interrelated. The purpose of analysing them in turns reflects the aim to break down the common sense representation generated in the discourse and to examine how they are arrived at.

Predication is used for two purposes. To identify the subjects and objects constructed and to examine the representation of these subjects and objects in the discourse. The latter is arrived at through the analysis of the usage of predicates, adverbs and adjectives in conjunction with particular subjects and objects (Doty 1993; Weldes 1996). In so doing, predication enables analysis of the kind of subject constructed in the discourse, as well as what is included in, and excluded from, the discourse.

On the other hand, *presupposition* is used to analyse the background knowledge of the discourse. That is, in order to explain the past, present

and future developments in the Finnish and British foreign and security policy a certain world is assumed, and in so doing, constructed in the discourse. The construction of knowledge through presupposition operates through implicitly and explicitly articulated binary oppositions. Binary oppositions structure the meaning given to the subjects and objects and simultaneously position them vis-à-vis each other. In the light of the centrality of social antagonism for a discourse, the relationships among the subjects and objects are largely constructed in terms of similarity, complementary and difference (Doty 1993: 306-308; Torfing 2005: 14).

Finally, subjects are assigned with various degrees of agency. This is achieved by constructing certain subject positions available for the subjects. Predication and presupposition, in turn, structure the availability of a particular subject position for a certain subject (Doty 1993) and the subject position available for the central subject in the discourse – that is, the state in question – is relational to the other subjects positioned in the discourse. The break down of the discourse, manifested in the representation generated in the official foreign and security policy discourse, enables the analysis of change and continuity in the discourse in the light of the increasing Europeanisation of foreign and security policy.



Figure 2.2: Representation(s), the Process of (Re-) Articulation and Discourse(s)

Interpellation

To examine whether a (re-) articulation of the traditional foreign and security policy discourse or the articulation of a novel discourse become hegemonic, I draw on the concept of interpellation. That is, I examine whether the decision-makers were interpellated, or hailed into the discourse (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 28). Interpellation suggests that, first, specific identities are created through social interaction and the articulation and re-articulation of discourses. Second, in a successful interpellation individuals such as decision-makers come to identify themselves with the subject positions entailed by the discourse. As a result, the political struggle, such as the articulation of competing views that reflects alternative discourses or different re-articulations of the official discourse, fades away. As a result, the representations generated in the hegemonic discourse appear commonsensial and to reflect the way the world really is (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 28) The analysis of interpellation deployed here systematically examines the representations that are generated by the decisions-makers in the official documents and, for instance, in debates over these documents. In so doing, it seeks to account to the change and continuity in the re-production of state identity.

2.2.3 The Comparative Element

Interestingly, in the late 1990s Britain and Finland have both taken a more constructive role in the development of the CFSP. The joint Anglo-French declaration in St. Malo (1998) launched a strong initiative aimed at building (common) European security and defence. This is often viewed as a change in the British policy, which enabled European Union's decision to develop independent military capabilities. The decision was made under the coordination and support of the Finnish EU presidency in 1999. This is often perceived as a change in the Finnish foreign and security policy.

In constructing a framework for the comparison, several routes are possible. A comparison can be based on the 'most similar system design' that seeks to compare those political systems that share several similar features in an effort to neutralize some differences while highlighting others (Van Evera

1997; Landman 2000: 27). Drawing on J. S. Mill's 'method of difference' presented in 1843, the purpose of this design is to identify the key features that are different among similar states and which account for the observed political outcome(s). This research design is argued to be well suited especially for area studies (Landman 2000). Indeed, the intellectual and theoretical justification for area studies is that there is something inherently similar about the countries that make up a particular geographical region of the world, such as Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America (Landman 2000: 28). The assumed similarities, in turn, make the comparison sensible.

In terms of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policies in Britain and Finland, a comparative framework, then, could be constructed around the 'fact' that the foreign policy system's of the both states share similar features: democratic control over the foreign policy actors and bureaucracies resulting in, if not identical, at least comparable foreign policy decision-making systems. Moreover, Britain and Finland have increasingly comparable foreign and security policy agendas which addresses the so-called 'new security' threats in the post Cold War Europe such as the ethnic conflicts, transnational crime, mass migration and environmental issues. The interest of both counties in the process of European integration has increased. On the other hand, Britain and Finland are both, in a sense, peripheral in terms of their geographical location in the rim of Europe.

As a consequence, the possible variation in the policy outcomes of these states might be explained by variables that differentiate these states. For instance, Britain and Finland are unequal in terms of their resources and capabilities. Britain has a more independent role in the international politics. It is a founding member of NATO, whereas Finland's defense policy is based on independent defense and the policy of military nonalignment (previously neutrality). Britain has a long-term membership in the EU (since 1973), while Finland is one of the most recent members (since 1995). And even though both member-states are in a sense peripheral, Finland's

geopolitical location in the North, between the cultural spheres of the 'East' and the 'West', is different from that of Britain.[42]

However, in terms of social scientific methodology, the low number of countries compared in this study causes some problems for the comparative framework. In short, the number of 'variables' or 'inferences' accounting for the political outcome(s) can turn out to be greater than countries or observations.[43] More generally, it can be asked whether a comparison between two very different member states is sensible in the first place (Groom cited in Manners and Whitman 2000: 6).

The research strategy of this study will not proceed by generating testable hypothesis or by the isolation of 'variables' in the manner of conventional social scientific epistemology and methodology. The research addresses a different set of questions than the more conventional theories of foreign policy. The purpose is not to ask 'why questions' in order to discover the causes for certain political outcomes, such as the Finnish and British policy in the EU context. The purpose of this research is to examine how the Europeanisation is discursively constructed in two preferably different states; and to explicate what the comparison of the findings generated in answering this 'how possible' question (Doty 1993; Weldes 1996) tells us about the relationship between the European Union and member state foreign and security policies.

Accordingly, the similarities and differences of Britain and Finland are not to be taken as given facts, nor do they simply reflect the 'reality' on which

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[42] Because of the differences, a comparative framework could also be based on the 'method of agreement' (Landman 2000). The comparison, then, would be designed around the 'most different system design', highlighting that Britain and Finland do not share similar features in the field of security and defense apart from the particular policy outcome to be explained.

[43] The 'problem' that there are too many variables and not enough countries based on the principle that the number of inferences must be less than the number of observations (King, Keohane et al. 1994) can be, however, 'solved' by raising the number of observations to allow greater variation of the key factors of the study. This does not necessarily mean increasing the number of case studies. For instance, this study will compare the CFSP discourses in Britain and Finland also over time. Hence the number of observations is substantial. The number of factors influencing policy outcomes, then, is less that the observations (King, Keohane et al. 1994: 119-122; Landman 2000: 37-41).

the research design is construed. What is at stake in this study is how these 'facts' are socially constructed. Hence, the convergences and divergences of Finland and Britain are part of the research outcomes and not the point of departure of the study. The research will also move away from any notion of inherent similarities and differences between the British and Finnish states. In this study the key concepts from IR theory like 'national interest' are understood as to be a point of contestation rather than given prior to discursive and political processes (Weldes 1996). In so doing, the study will not compare the British and Finnish states as such. Instead the comparison will deal with the political debates surrounding the CFSP in Britain and Finland. Moreover, these debates are not seen to draw on any given interests in these states. Rather, the states themselves are partly constituted by these debates dealing with their existence in Europe and beyond.

To summarise, the chosen comparative approach is based on strong theoretical justifications. The number of cases is limited in order to produce a comprehensive study of the research topic that is rich and complex (Titscher 2000: 43). The study has two comparative elements. First, in order to examine the impact of the Europeanisation on the foreign and security policies of Britain and Finland, the study will examine the re-articulation of foreign and security policy discourses in these states *over time*. Second, in order to elucidate the relationship between the European Union and the member states' foreign and security policies, the research compares the findings of the discourse analyses *over space*.

2.3 Data Collection and Analysis: Primary and Secondary Sources

This section introduces the process of data selection for the actual discourse analysis. My purpose here is to elucidate how my thinking of the methodology developed while undertaking the empirical analysis. In so doing, this section discusses the selected materials and what the chosen material could tell us about the Finnish and British foreign and security policies in the face of increasing foreign policy integration. The aim is to make the research practice more visible for others. I first discuss the purpose

of this section, I then focus on the selection of the secondary and primary material.

2.3.1 The Process of Material Selection

As my research question suggests, I focus on the way in which state officials[44] made the European foreign and security policy meaningful in Finland and Britain in 1990s. In short, I examine how they (re-) articulate the official foreign and security policy discourse in the light of increasing integration in this area. As the methodological discussion indicates, the discourse is approached by examining the representations generated in the official documents and/or used by the decision-makers when they write and talk about the foreign and security policy. [45] In doing so, my aim is to elucidate the discourse(s) constitutive of a state identity that these representations constructed.

The central qualitative criterion that I use in selecting the empirical material for the case studies is its relevance in answering these research aims. I considered different sources of the Finnish and British foreign, security and defence policies well as the European policies in the 1990s. Due to analytical reasons I focused on material available in the public domain. The archives including policy-making documents of the Finnish and British foreign policies in 1990s are largely closed for years to come. Although history writing will shed new light to the British and Finnish foreign policy in 1990s, this is not a major concern for this study because the aim of this research is not to discover hidden policy agendas or concealed preferences of the decision makers. The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse the impact of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy on the *official* and *publicly* articulated discourses in Finland and Britain. Moreover, the public availability of the empirical material is important in terms of the

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[44] As my theoretical framework suggests, state officials occupy a central place in constructing a state's identity. In short, they create representations of the world which establish the state in relation to other actors and guide its actions.

[45] However, I must emphasise that my purpose is not to examine what the state officials really' think, for instance, about the EU's foreign and security policy. Rather, I am interested in knowing *how* they talk and write about it on official occasions; and what impact their statements have on the re-articulation of the Finnish and British foreign and security policy discourse.

quality of this research in terms of the accessibility of this material for other researchers in this way enabling evaluation and critique.

Secondary sources

Secondary sources that address the case studies are used in several stages of the study. However, most of them were read *after* I had familiarised myself with the empirical material. Rather than framing the analysis in terms of what other researchers had found significant, I wanted to let the empirical material guide me and find out what issues and questions emerge from it (Kantola 2002). This, however, does not reflect any empiricist or objectivist desire.[46]

Moreover, the secondary material is not seen as factual historical sources. Rather it is approached as interpretations of the actual events (Wodak 1999; Hay 2002; Kantola 2002). It is used as supportive material to elucidate the Finnish and British historical contexts in which the EU' foreign and security policy was made meaningful in 1990s and early 2000s. The secondary material is helpful in analysing how the foreign and security policy was discussed in Finland and Britain: what issue areas were attached to it and what kind of political debates it generated (Kantola 2002) Whether the secondary sources are 'correct' interpretations of the foreign and security policy in Finland and Britain is not a central question in my research. Rather, I am interested in knowing how the assumed Europeanisation was addressed and framed in Finland and Britain in 1990s and early 2000s.

Primary Material

In searching for suitable primary material, I focused first on the recorded *public statements* of the foreign and security policies. I contacted governmental agencies in Finland and Britain in order to obtain foreign and security policy documentation such as public reports, memos and white papers. I found out that the empirical material available was substantial and interesting. It clearly established the Finnish and British states' as certain

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[46] On empiricism see (Hay 2002). For further discussion, see the section on primary material below.

kinds of political entities with particular kinds of interests. The subjects and objects articulated in these texts 'hang together' in a certain way and the relationships among them appeared logical and uncontroversial. These documents constructed a particular kind of foreign and security policy 'reality' within which the state action appeared 'sensible'. Moreover, several of them addressed a topical issue of the European Union's developing security dimension, the CFSP, the ESDP, or the EU foreign and security policy. As such, these documents proved to be suitable as the core material for the analysis. They made it possible to investigate the discourse that was manifested in the state officials' representations.

However, and as my theoretical framework suggests, I am also interested in knowing how these particular representations were arrive at. Rather than explicitly or implicitly assuming that the representations reflect given and unquestioned interests – that is conceptualising state interests as a given prior to discursive and political processes – I approach them as potential points of contestation (Weldes 1996; Hansen 2002). Consequently, the empirical material of the study should enable analysis of alternative and competing representations.

I first considered undertaking interviews in order to find out whether any competing representations of the issues I am interested in existed. However, the interviews proved to be difficult for two reasons. First, they were problematic in terms of the comparative element of my research. While in Finland the policy makers could be approached and interviewed, in Britain, they were largely unavailable for interviews. As such, the British data would not have been parallel with the Finnish data. Second, I learnt that the interviews were problematic due to the temporal aspect. The data collected in early 2000 would have formed a collection of policy makers' *memoirs* of the issues and events in the 1990s (Kantola 2002). As such, interviews would not generate a kind of 'raw material' I was searching for.

Second, I considered the media coverage of the Finnish and British foreign policy as a possible source. In particular, I looked for the competing

articulations of the EU foreign and security policy. I utilised different media search engines in the World Wide Web as well as library and information centre catalogues, and I found out that the amount of this kind of material was substantial. Decision makers were quoted and referred to in news, reports, columns, editorials etc. The state officials' statements were put under a close scrutiny, and competing views of the CFSP and the ESDP were publicly articulated. However, after my initial analysis some problems occurred. Crucially, I found it difficult to distinguish between the state officials' texts and journalistic text. The official statements and documents were edited and formulated by the editorial staff. Even direct quotations, which could be regarded as policy makers' 'own words', were inserted into edited journalistic texts and hence mediated through the journalists (Kantola 2002). Even if these texts formed a highly interesting set of empirical material which could have been used for analysis, I wanted to stick with the actual statements of the policy makers. This is because my main focus lay within the decision makers' representations of the EU foreign and security policy. As suggested, they are the most central actors in the process of (re-) articulation of a particular foreign and security policy discourse.[47]

After this I turned towards parliamentary debates. In both cases, the material available was substantial and it appeared appropriate for my research. In the minutes I looked at, the foreign policy leaderships' articulations were discussed, debated and challenged. The MPs agreed or disagreed with the government's proposals and they also searched for compromises and consensus. Accordingly, competing views of EU foreign and security policy was articulated at a state level. In addition, the parliamentary debates supplemented the official foreign policy articulations. In defending its policy, the government ministers provided deeper and more detailed insights into the official foreign policy articulations.

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[47] This is not to suggest that analysis focusing on, for instance, media coverage would not be valuable. On the contrary, I suggest that they can deepen our understanding of state identity and foreign and security policy. However, in the light of the research questions of this dissertation the focus on state officials is justified. The documents and statements generated by the state officials form a substantial and manageable set of empirical material in the light of the discourse analysis and comparison of this study.

However, while reading through the material, the need for some further qualifications became apparent. The number of texts relating to the European Union, the CFSP, the ESDP and the Finnish and British foreign, security and defence policies were simply too extensive for a detailed documentary analysis. To overcome this problem, I decided to limit my focus on the key debates. That is, to the debates in which change and continuity of the foreign and security policy in the face of Europeanisation was clearly present. In Finland, the key debates were the 1995 debate over the Government's foreign and security policy report and the subsequent debates in 1997 and 2001 over the Government's report on security and defence policy. In Britain these were the debates related to the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in 1998, the Defence White Paper in 1999 and the Policy Paper on European Defence in 2001.

Importantly, the parliamentary debates in Finland and Britain also formed a material that could be compared and contrasted. Notwithstanding some important differences, such as different electoral systems that reflect distinct political traditions resulting in different political systems, the similarities in the field of foreign policy-making were striking. In both cases, the governments constructed policy documents which were then given to the parliament to be debated. Further, in Finnish and British cases the real constitutional power of the parliaments over the foreign and security policy of the governments was significantly limited. Yet the parliaments had a particular political significance in terms of the political legitimacy of these governments.

Conclusion

This chapter suggests that poststructuralist theories utilising the concept of discourse can be helpful in understanding the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy. I have suggested that the methodological move in which the question of structure and agency is dissolved rather than solved has particular value for the analysis of the complex relationships among the different levels of policy-making. Accordingly, it is plausible to examine the Europeanisation of state identities in the field of foreign and security policy.

To do so, this dissertation deploys methods associated with the discourse analytic approach with a comparative element.

Chapter 3

The Europeanisation of Finnish Foreign and Security Policy Discourse: From Neutrality to Alignment

Introduction

For almost half of the century Finland adopted a unique position within European politics. Although in the context of the Cold War confrontation between the East and the West Finland claimed a neutral status since the late 1950s, Finland was the only neutral country that had a security arrangement with the Soviet Union.[48] In this context, the policy of neutrality was seen as of key importance for Finland. It set up limits for the Soviet Union's involvement in the Finnish politics. Notably, neutrality denoted no further military co-operation with the Soviet Union (Arter 1996: 614). On the other hand, and significantly for this study, it also limited Finland's participation in western European integration. Closer involvement in the western economic and political organisations was widely construed to undermine the neutrality and good neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union. In Finland, neutrality, then, was construed as a pragmatic policy aimed to mediate between the East and the West.

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[48] The arrangement was based on the 1948 Treaty for Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet Union which specified that 'in the event of Finland, or the Soviet Union through Finland, becoming the object of an armed attack by Germany, or any other state allied with the latter, Finland will... fight to repel the attack independently or with assistance provided by the Soviet Union' ('Sopimus Ystävyydestä, Yhteistoiminnasta Ja Keskinäisestä Avunannosta' 1948, my translation).

A major shift in Finnish foreign and security policy took place when Finland, in 1992, applied, and, in 1995, joined, the European Union. During this process the security arrangements with the Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation, were dissolved and Finland joined the European Union as a previously neutral 'militarily non-aligned' state which had 'credible independent defence capability' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 59). Moreover, Finland argued that the development of the CFSP and prospect of the ESDP would not constitute a problem for previously neutral Finland. Instead, the foreign policy leadership argued that 'membership of the European Union will reinforce the foundations of Finnish security …'(Report by the Council of State 1995: 5).

This case study considers the role of the EU foreign and security policy in the process of re-producing the Finnish state identity in the post Cold War Europe. To do this, I concentrate on the official Finnish foreign and security policy discourse(s). I analyse the key foreign and security policy documents generated in the 1990s and early 2000s as well as associated parliamentary debates. The findings suggest that in mid 1990s a significant turn took place in the official Finnish discourse. Drawing on historical discourses of the Finnish nation and state, and contemporary discourses of the post-Cold War Europe and the developing foreign and security policy of the European Union, a new radically different foreign and security policy discourse was articulated. Instead of neutrality, this discourse was symptomatic of alignment. Further, and although initially resisted, this discourse became hegemonic by the early 2000s. The study suggests that the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy was central for the re-production of state identity in Finland.

This chapter is divided into three main parts. In the first part I focus on the traditional neutrality discourse. I situate the discourse with a brief review of literature on neutrality policies and I then analyse the articulation of the discourse within a discourse analytic frame. In the second section I situate the suggested alignment discourse in relation to Finland's foreign and security

policy in the light of the post-Cold War world. I then examine the articulation of the new discourse. Finally, I analyse whether the alignment discourse became hegemonic via a systematic investigation of the representation generated in the key documents and the associated parliamentary debates.

3.1 Finnish Neutrality Discourse: Limited Participation with the West and the East

This section maps out the key discourse(s) that structured the representations of Finnish state identity re-articulated in the realm of the foreign and security policy, that is, the discursive context, in which the EU foreign and security policy was first raised. I suggest that in the early 1990s a hegemonic foreign and security policy discourse existed in Finland. I label this discourse 'neutrality' discourse. The main signifying elements of the neutrality discourse were the construction of Finland as a small state, which was located in a geopolitically challenging environment. Within this understanding of Finland's place in the world a particular kind of identity emerged. Three factors were central for the Finnish neutrality identity: (i) Finland was a relatively powerless actor; (ii) Finland had to adapt to the external environment; and (iii) Finland was not in a position to address moral questions in international politics.

To explicate this discourse I first situate the discourse in terms of the Cold War neutrality literature. I examine the articulation and the re-articulation of the neutrality discourse. Finally, I discuss the hegemony of the neutrality discourse. The detailed analysis of the neutrality discourse enables the consequent analysis of change and continuity in the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse in the light of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy.

3.1.1 Situating Neutrality Discourse: Cold War, European Security and Finland

The initial survey of the empirical material suggested that the dominant theme in the Finnish foreign and security policy debates prior to the EU

membership in 1995 and beyond was Finland's neutrality.[49] The documents I looked at highlighted Finland's aspirations to retain its neutral status in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. Although the analysis of the primary material forms the core of the subsequent sections of this case study, the purpose of this section is to situate the discourse(s) by reviewing the scholarly literature. Still, the empirical survey guided the examination of these secondary sources.

The concept of neutrality has been widely used in the scholarly literature of IR. The term is closely related to modern states and the relations among them and the concept draws on centuries of European military and political affairs history (Goetschel 1999: 118).[50] Legal codes of neutrality are usually traced back to the Hague Conventions of 1907 (Ojanen, Herolf et al. 2000: 11). In these conventions on sea and land war, neutrality was defined mainly in military terms. The code suggests that neutral states cannot participate in wars directly or indirectly. Neither should they support or favour war parties militarily or make their territory available for them, supply them with weapons or credits, or restrict private weapon exports in a one-sided way. Neutrals were also required to defend themselves against violations of their neutrality.

Although the term neutrality and the idea of neutral states feature in the historical accounts of western diplomacy and the major wars, the scholarly understandings of the concept in the study of IR mainly relate to the Cold

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[49] The empirical material included Parliamentary Defence Policy Committee's Estimate on developments on European Security (Parlamentaarinen Puolustuspoliittinen Neuvottelukunta 1990); Report by the Council of State to the Parliament on Foreign and Security Policy (Report by the Council of State 1995); two Reports by the Council of State to the Parliament on Security and Defence Policy (Report by the Council of State 1997; Report by the Council of State 2001); and the Parliamentary debates over these policy documents ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Palautekeskustelu' 1995; 'Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Lähetekeskustelu' 1995; 'Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Lähetekeskustelu' 1997; Macleod 1997; 'Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Lähetekeskustelu' 2001,; 'Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Palautekeskustelu' 2001,)

[50] Although the concept of neutrality is likely to have been present ever since relations among political communities were established in human history, its scholarly meaning refers to the emergence of states. The concept, as we know it, relates to sovereignty and dates back to the late medieval times when the authority of the Church began to fade. The development of the modern states and international law codified neutrality in legal terms (Goetschel 1999: 119).

War. That is, the concept of neutrality was an intrinsic part of the policy makers and IR scholars' security discourse(s) in the East and the West. As such, neutrality was understood as a neutral position towards the two superpowers and their alliances. In the Cold War discourses of foreign and security policy, neutrality was closely related to military and defence issues. Yet, the concept had a clear political and economic dimension as well.

In Finland, it was only after mid 1950s that the foreign policy leadership articulated Finnish foreign and security policy in terms of neutrality. According to the prominent foreign policy observers and policy makers, the immediate post-war years were characterised by appeasement of the Soviet Union (Kalela and Turtola 1975; Apunen 1977; Möttölä 1993: 67-69). The result of building mutual trust, it was suggested, consolidated Finland's status as an independent state.[51] This, in turn, enabled the initial articulation of the Finnish position in terms of 'a particular kind of neutrality' (Jakobson 1968) or 'coloured neutrality' (Apunen 1977, my translation) during the deterioration of the East-West relations.[52]

Interestingly, in the light of the above mentioned legal codes of the Hague Conventions neutrality and its Cold War connotations, Finland's neutrality appears to be rather spurious. As Häikiö argues, Finland had been neutral only for a five months period of its post war history. Finland's neutrality lasted from January 1992, when the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet Union including military articles lapsed, to June 1992 when Finland became an

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[51] After President Paasikivi's retirement Kekkonen was elected President in 1955. He stayed in office for twenty-six years. Whereas Paasikivi is often cited as the President who laid down the foundations of the Finnish post-war foreign and security policy (Kekkonen 1957; Apunen 1977), neutrality is seen as Kekkonen's life long vocation (Lipponen 1990). Paasikivi's policy, it is argued, was based on appeasement with the Soviet Union and establishment of good neighbour relations. Kekkonen, in turn, is predominantly viewed as the safe guardian of these good relations, and the President who promoted, consolidated and then institutionalised Finnish neutrality. The Finnish post-war foreign and security policy is therefore labelled the 'Paasikivi-Kekkonen line' (Apunen 1977, my translation).

[52] The terms 'particular kind of neutrality' and 'coloured neutrality' suggested that Finnish neutrality was spurious. That is, the most important aim of Finnish foreign policy was to prevent Soviet military and political interventions rather than acquire a neutral position in world politics.

associate member of the NATO led North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) (Häikiö cited in Arter 1996: 615).[53]

Nevertheless, the concept of neutrality is central for the Finnish post-war foreign and security policy discourse. Indeed, the Finns themselves suggest that both the Cold War division of Europe and the concept of neutrality were consolidated in Finland at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975. As Fierke and Wiener (2001) point out, prior to the period of *détente* in Europe there was some hope that the two Germanys could be reunified. However, the Helsinki Final Act, signed by the states both from the East and the West, established the common principles for the peaceful co-existence of the East and the West in Europe. In doing so, it consolidated the division of Europe. That is, the West recognised the communist regimes of the East and granted them legitimacy they had not previously enjoyed (Fierke and Wiener 2001: 126-127). Significantly, the status of the European neutral states was also recognised and legitimised in Helsinki in 1975. As Nolan notes, the three main parties of the Final Act were *the NATO states*, *the Neutral and Non-Aligned states*, and *the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (or the Soviet bloc) states* (Nolan 2001: 300).

The neutral and non-aligned states, however, adopted neutrality in a different way. For instance, Switzerland followed a strict non-participatory policy and enhanced neutrality in a pure sense of not taking part in the world politics. On the other hand, Sweden adopted a highly constructive neutrality policy and actively engaged in world politics (Wahlbäck 1982-25; Carlsnaes 1993: 71, 77). In Finland, it is argued, neutrality proved beneficial to mediate in the geopolitically challenging location between the East and the West. As Arter suggests:

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[53] The FCMA treaty constituted the basis of the Finnish post-war foreign policy (Kekkonen 1982; Väyrynen 1993). It included a security article and established a collective security guarantee between Finland and the Soviet Union. The treaty stated that if Finland was invaded and/or its territory was to be used to attack the Soviet Union, Finland would defend its territory with all means available, if needed, with Soviet assistance or together with the Soviet Union ('Sopimus Ystävyydestä, Yhteistoiminnasta Ja Keskinäisestä Avunannosta' 1948).

> It [Finnish neutrality] was a Cold War phenomenon of the strictly functional variety. Indeed, where as for Sweden neutrality became synonymous with welfare and prosperity, and Austrian neutrality represented a guarantee to the Soviet Union of no future *Anschluss* with Germany, for Finland, in the aftermath of the Second World War, neutrality denoted no military co-operation with Russia… it was a code word for independence (Arter 1996: 614, emphasis in original).
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> As such neutrality had a pragmatic or instrumental value for Finland. Further, the concept strongly connoted with independence, a central concept for Finnish state identity. (Möttölä 1990: 134; see also, Ojanen, Herolf et al. 2000: 89)

To establish conceptual clarity, some scholars have found it useful to distinguish between permanent and temporary neutrality, also referred to as *de jure* and *de facto* neutrality (Ojanen, Herolf et al. 2000: 12). Whereas the permanent or *de jure* neutrality is based on binding law or treaty as in the cases of Austria or Switzerland, the temporary or *de facto* neutrality refers to the political practices of countries such as Ireland, Finland and Sweden (see also, Luif 1995; Cramér 1998; Ojanen, Herolf et al. 2000: 12). These states have claimed or sought a neutral status. The assumption underpinning this distinction is that within the permanently neutral states, neutrality is often extended to other areas of (foreign) policy beyond military and defence (Ojanen, Herolf et al. 2000: 11-12), such as participation in inclusive and non-military international organisations.

However, in practice this distinction has proven problematic. For instance, and against the logic of permanent and temporary neutrality, both the *de jure* neutral Finland's, and *de facto* neutral Austria's, general foreign policy has been equated with 'an "activist" neutral policy' (Carlsnaes 1993: 77). That is, a broad policy aimed at maintaining or changing the given structural and operational principles of the larger regional or world system in order to lessen international tension (Carlsnaes 1993: 77). Moreover, and even if this dichotomous conceptualisation of neutrality would indicate opposite, the permanently neutral Austria has participated in the Western economic organisations, such as the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) prior to the end of East-West confrontation and the temporarily neutral Finland has

adopted a very cautious policy towards the western European economic integration.[54]

Because of the elusive nature of neutrality, some scholars have noted that there are as many 'neutralities' as there are states claiming neutral status and that any adequate understanding of neutrality must be able to account 'variations of the theme' in different national contexts (Ojanen, Herolf et al. 2000: 10). Neutrality has also been linked to context specific political analysis and the meaning of language has been emphasised. As Väyrynen argues:

> Defining neutrality is often a linguistic matter: A state is viewed as neutral, because it says that it is neutral. It is not an easy task to find a general and independent criterion for the neutrality because neutrality is rarely an abstract issue. Rather, it gains its meaning within certain political context. (Väyrynen 1990: 13, my translation)

To elucidate the meaning given to neutrality – the central concept underpinning Finnish state identity in the realm of foreign and security policy in the early 1990s when the issue of the CFSP and the ESDP were first raised in Finland – I now move on to discourse analytic analysis.[55]

3.1.2 Re-articulating Neutrality Discourse in Finland

I have suggested that Finnish neutrality made sense broadly within the Cold War understanding of a divided Europe. I now analyse the initial articulation and the continuous re-articulation of the neutrality discourse in the official foreign and security policy documents during the Cold War and its immediate aftermaths. Through examination of the representations generated in policy papers, speeches and memoirs, I seek to produce a

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[54] Finland's international activity is often highlighted in the foreign policy discourse. However, since 1950s the foreign policy leadership have indicated that Finland could not take part in Western European economic integration due to Soviet pressure. More recent and critical literature, however, has suggested that Finnish policy makers were highly self-conscious and self-restricting. On the other hand, Finland put forward two major international security initiatives during the Cold War. The first one was the CSCE and the other one the nuclear weapons free zone in the Northern Europe. Whereas the CSCE has been widely viewed as the greatest achievement of the post war Finnish foreign policy, the nuclear free zone proved to be difficult for the Nordic countries who were NATO members.

[55] Although, the CFSP, the ESDP or European Political Cooperation, the predecessor of these policies, do not feature in the texts I examine, it is imperative to establish the discursive context within which these policies were first addressed in 1990s.

portrait of the Finnish neutrality discourse constitutive of Finnish state identity. A discourse analytic frame of predication, presupposition and subject positioning is applied.

Predication

I begun the analysis by identifying the main subjects and objects of the texts I looked at.[56] I then investigated the qualities attached (i.e. predication) to the key subjects. These are listed in table 3.1. The numbers in the brackets refer to the source document. These documents are listed in Appendix 1.

Two significant findings are based on the research presented in the above table (Table 3.1). First, there exists a dominant discourse. While the numerous representations of each subject are not identical across the columns, there is evidence of certain coherence among them. That is, the predicates, adverbs and adjectives (i.e. predication) linked to particular subjects and objects in the texts 'hang together' in a certain way (Doty 1993: 310). None of the representations generated seem radically out of place, rather there exists a 'family resemblance' (Doty 1993: 310). For example, representations of Finland as 'a small state', 'a relatively powerless country' and 'a builder of international understanding' (Table 3.1.), are arrived at by articulating nouns such as 'state' and 'country', adjectives like 'small' and 'powerless', attributes such as 'relatively' and adverbs like 'builder' in a certain meaningful way. The aim of the discourse analysis is to map out the certain structure governing the articulation of these contextually specific representations (Weldes 1996: 280). Second, particular kind of subjects and objects were constructed within this discourse. Apart from Finland itself, the important ones for my research were the Soviet Union and the other eastern European states, the Nordic countries, the western European states, Europe and some international organisations such as the CSCE and the United Nations (Table 3.1.).

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[56] These included President Kekkonen's major foreign and security policy speeches from 1943 to 1969 (Kekkonen 1970), his major monograph laying out the Finnish policy of neutrality (Kekkonen 1982) and a Report by especially appointed Parliamentary Defence Policy Committee (Parlamentaarinen Puolustuspoliittinen Neuvottelukunta 1990). Whereas Kekkonen's speeches and his volume were translated and published in English, the report was only available in Finnish.

Finland	The East	The West	The North	Other
A small state [1, 2, 5, 7, 13]	**The Soviet Union:**	**The EC and EFTA:**	**Nordic Community/ Nordic Countries:**	**Europe:**
An independent state [1, 2, 12, 13]	A great power [1]	Has economic importance [13]	Are a special and privileged group of states [13]	Is divided [13]
A democratic state [3, 13]	Has allies [11]	Has networks and relations with Finland [13]	Are small countries [4]	Is more than the European Economic Community [13]
A Nordic state (part of Nordic Community) [4]	Have substantial military power [11, 13]	Supports Finland's neutrality [13]	Are European states [13]	Is more than Western European countries [13]
Inseparable part of the Western culture of Europe [9]	Has a different cultural heritage and social system [2, 7]	Is not synonym for Europe [13]	Has a strong sense of kinship with Finland [13]	Includes states form the East and the West [13]
A market economy [3, 13]	Was the hereditary enemy [2, 13]	**Britain:**	Has shared memories, customs, traditions [13]	Reaches from Atlantic to Urals [13]
Relatively powerless state[1, 2, 9, 13]	Is a suspicious state [2]	Home of Western democracy [10]	Are Strategically important are for superpowers [13]	Has disputes [13]
Has to adapt to international changes [1, 2, 9, 13]	Has not forced Finland to adopt communist system [7]	Home of parliamentarism [3]	Are mainly objects of international politics [4]	**The UN:**
Practices a cautious foreign policy [13]	Pursues a friendly and understanding policy towards Finland [2]	Model of the Finnish Parliament [10]	Have different basic arrangements for security [13]	Is a corner stone of common shared rules in international politics [8, 13]
A geographically peripheral state [1, 13]	A European power [13]	Understands, accept and tolerate differences between peoples and nations (40)	**Sweden:**	Is a security organisation [8]
Is important for the Soviet Union [2, 5, 7, 9, 12]	**The Warsaw Pact:**	Has been in War with Finland [10]	Is a neutral country [13]	Can work for world peace [8]
Has also links with Occidental cultural circles [13]	Is a military alliance [11]	A European country [10]	**Norway, Denmark and Iceland:**	**The CSCE:**
Is a builder of international understanding [8, 13]	Has automatic defence guarantees [11]	**The US:**	Are NATO members [13]	Can ease the East West tension [13]
Understands, accepts and tolerates differences between peoples and nations [13]	**The FCMA Treaty:**	Is a democracy [9]		Is an inclusive organisation, includes eastern and western states [13]
Has good neighbour relations [13]	Is for building friendship and mutual trust[6, 13]	Has nuclear weapons [9]		Has an important role in European security [1, 13]
A relatively secure state [1, 13]	Is for security [6, 13]	**NATO:**		Is the main achievement of Finnish foreign policy [13]
Has some influence in international politics [13]	Has had a major impact [6, 13]	Is a military alliance [11]		**Developing World:**
	Is different from military pact in that it does not contain an automatic mechanism [11]	Has automatic defence guarantees [11]		Has illiterate and hungry people [13]
	Is in line with the policy of neutrality [13]			Has over population [13]
				Has human rights problems [13]

Table 3.1: Predication of the neutrality discourse

Through predication, Finland was construed as a small state with a geopolitically challenging location in the rim of Europe. Finland had limited resources and, as a small state, it was a relatively powerless subject. As such it had to take into account the political and security interests of the great powers. Several other representations of Finland were generated in the texts. Finland was a 'democracy' and it had 'market economy' (Table 3.1). Finland was also a 'northern' and 'western European country', yet it had some ties with the eastern cultures as well (Table 3.1). Finland was also attached qualities of an 'international broker' and 'builder of mutual understanding' which could reduce tension between the East and the West (Table 3.1). This, in turn, was constructed to enhanced Finnish security and its international position.

The Nordic countries were assigned largely the same textual qualifiers as those attributed to Finland. The predication of the discourse also construed them as 'small states', 'democratic states' and 'strategically important for the superpowers' (Table 3.1). A quote taken from President Kekkonen's memoirs is illustrative. He wrote:

> Social scientists speak of the reference groups to which the individual belongs and to which, indeed, he must belong. Peoples also have their reference groups. To us, the Nordic countries are one such group.
>
> Being Nordic is more than a matter of will to us: it is an inseparable part of our history, our background, our culture, our social and economic system, our customs, our laws and our religion. It used to be customary to say that we Finns were linked to the other Nordic countries by our shared conception of freedom. Now I understand that the ties that bind us are stronger than that.
>
> It is a question of the whole profound nature of being. (Kekkonen 1982: 82)

However, a representation that marked a difference among the Nordic countries was their 'basic arrangement for security'. Whereas Finland and Sweden adopted neutrality, Denmark, Iceland and Norway joined NATO. In neutrality discourse, however, their difference in the field of foreign and security policy was explicable. It related to the small state character of these states and their different geopolitical locations in the bi-polar world.

The representations of the West shared significant similarities and dissimilarities with Finland. The similar aspect included predication of the western powers as 'democratic' states 'with a political tradition based on parliamentarism' and 'market economy' (Table 3.1.). On the other hand, the differences related to the construction of the key western powers such as the United States and Britain as 'great powers' (Table 3.1) with significant military might. These subjects and objects were made more meaningful by presupposing certain kind of knowledge about the world out there elucidated below. However, and interestingly the major Western subject, the United States, is rather seldom explicitly addressed in the texts I looked at and NATO was straightforwardly constructed as the western 'military alliance' with 'automatic defence guarantees' (Table 3.1). As such, Finland's relationship with it was constructed in terms of opposition. Neither the western organisations, such as the European Community and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) occupy a central place in the texts. The predication assigned them economic importance, and Finland's loose relations with the Community and membership in EFTA were constructed to 'support the neutrality policy' (Table 3.1.). However, the full membership in the European Community was constructed as impossible and unfeasible.

While the main subject within the East, the Soviet Union, shared the great power representation with the key Western powers, several other representations highlighted the difference of the eastern subjects with the West, the North and Finland. The predication of the eastern subjects constructed them to have 'a different cultural heritage and social system' than the western states (Table 3.1). Moreover, predication generated representations of the Soviet Union as a 'suspicious' subject which could use coercive measures and its 'military might' in its search for security in bi-polar world. In so doing, the representation of gaining the Soviet 'trust' was central in constructing Finland's relationship with the East. The East had political and security interests in Finland but, as a result of the trust and good neighbour relations, Finland was not forced to adopt the communist system. Rather, the Soviet Union pursued 'a friendly and understanding policy towards Finland' (Table 3.1.). The predication of Finland as having

links with 'Occidental cultures' was important for the construction of the Soviet trust. Although Finland was constructed as a different kind of subject, it had the ability to understand the Eastern concerns and mentality. The FCMA Treaty, which represented friendship and mutual trust with the East, was the symbol of the Soviet trust in the field of foreign and security policy.

Presupposition(s)

The foreign and security policy texts and statements rarely speak for themselves. Rather, they are loaded with different kind of presuppositions. One way of examining the assumptions made within a discourse is to concentrate on binary oppositions (Doty 1993: 312; Torfing 2005). The core opposition that structures the construction of subjects/objects in the neutrality discourse in 1995 and thus establishes background knowledge is *minor-/great powers.* Several other binaries, such as *periphery/centre, steadfastness/feebleness and clever/stupid* can be subsumed under this core opposition. The background knowledge and the binary oppositions establish a certain geopolitical understanding within which the representations of Finland, the East and the West, created by the neutrality discourse, appear logical and true.

Minor/great powers. The neutrality discourse presupposes certain kind of subjects in the world politics, straightforwardly, minor- and great powers. This presupposition is manifested, for instance, in the representations of the Finnish wars and the events leading to these wars.[57] These representations, in turn, are central for the neutrality discourse because the discourse emerged after the war in conjunction with the appeasement of the Soviet Union. This great-/minor opposition is clearly present, for instance, in Prime Minister Cajander's speech in 1939. He said:

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[57] In November 1939 the Soviet Union invaded Finland. This led to the so called Winter War which ended in a truce after three and half months. As a result Finland had to cede 10% of its territory. In 1941, Finland supported by Germany, invaded the Soviet Union. This so-called Continuation War ended in June, 1944. As a result, the 1940 borders were restored. Further, Finland lost its land link to the Barents Sea and it agreed a Soviet military base next to Helsinki. Finland also agreed to force out the remaining German troops, which led to the third Finnish war, the so-called War in Lapland against Germany in 1944. (Brady n.d.)

> It is hardly a wrong conclusion if one, trying to interpret the present flow of events around the world, sees it as an expansionist tendency of the great powers, a constant and understandable phenomenon in world history irrespective of whether you consider it justified or not (Cajander 1939)

On the other hand, Finland's smallness is explicitly noted, for instance, in the letter sent by President Mannerheim to Hitler in August 1944 when Finland – supported by Germany – sought to withdraw from Second World War. 'Germany is such a mighty nation, Mannerheim wrote, that it shall live on even if it loses the war. Finland, however, is such a small nation that it could be evicted from its dwelling place and destroyed.' (Mannerheim cited in Jakobson 1968, my translation). Accordingly, the minor-/great power opposition establishes particular kind of subjects in a certain kind of international system. In this system, order is achieved through mechanisms of power defined as resources and capabilities. In this Realist view of world politics, Finland is construed as a small state which is subject to great power politics.

In the neutrality discourse the Soviet aggression against Finland in 1939 is explicitly articulated in relation to the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939. In the Pact the Soviet Union and Germany ensured that neither would attack the other. However, its secret protocols, which were published after the war, divided Europe into Soviet and German spheres of influence. Finland, alongside with Estonia and Latvia, for instance, was left in the Soviet realm. Poland, in turn, was divided between Germany and the Soviet Union (Jakobson 1968; Vihavainen 2001). In so doing, Finland was construed to be 'trapped between two superpowers', Germany and the Soviet Union (Jakobson 1968).

During the Cold War this representation was re-articulated in terms of the bi-polar world order. As the 1990 security and defence paper notes: 'after the Second World War the international system has been characterized by superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as military alliance, the NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe, confrontation and power political rivalry' (Parlamentaarinen Puolustuspoliittinen

Neuvottelukunta 1990: 5, my translation). Accordingly, during the Cold War Finland was trapped between the superpowers of the Soviet Union and the United States. The common sensibility of this representation is clearly present in the neutrality discourse. In 1982 Kekkonen wrote:

> During his term as Prime Minister after the war, Paasikivi had to endure a speech in which a certain Member of Parliament sharply criticized the Government's foreign policy. When Paasikivi managed to get a word in, he urged the deputy to go home, take out a map and look where Finland was situated. That advice remains useful to one and all this very day.
>
> The characteristic feature of our county throughout the ages has been its location on the borderline between the Eastern and Western cultural spheres. (Kekkonen 1982: 16-17)

As the analysis of predication in the neutrality discourse suggests, the cultural differences of the West and the East do not occupy a central place in the discourse. Indeed, allowing cultural or ideological difference, namely communist-socialist or liberal-capitalist during the Cold War, to influence foreign and security policy is seen dangerous. In 1980 Kekkonen argued:

> Since the task of a foreign policy should be to cherish and promote, by all means available, the interests of the country in question, there is no justification for allowing ideological likes or dislikes to influence the general guidelines which this foreign policy follows – nor can this be afforded. A small country, in particular, must observe this rule, because the stances it takes and their reflection in the country's foreign policy will assuredly not count for very much in world history, stamped as it is by the major nations' struggle for power. By contrast, inestimable harm could be caused… (Kekkonen 1982: 20-21)

Notwithstanding the importance of culture for the state identity, the key to understanding how Finland is positioned in the neutrality discourse is a certain geopolitical wisdom. In this geopolitical world, inhabited by minor and great powers, Finland's position is structured by the *periphery/centre* opposition. That is, the presupposition of different kind of geopolitical spaces is not based on communism or capitalism. Rather, it reflects the periphery and centre opposition. Further, in the bi-polar world there are two centres by definition. As several of the above extracts indicate, in the neutrality discourse Finland is located and 'trapped' in between these centres. That is, Finland is presupposed to be located in the north-eastern peripheral corner of Europe.

However, and in military terms, the periphery/centre opposition constructed Finland as more important for the East than the West. Here, the knowledge established in the re-articulations of the Soviet aggression against Finland in 1939 is imperative. First, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pacts secret protocols indicated Finland's greater importance for the Soviet Union in the East than for the Germany in the West. This construction was further consolidated in 1939 when the Soviet Union invaded Finland and the other western powers did not intervene in the conflict. As Jutikkala argues:

> Help for Finland in the Winter War came in the form of a few foreign volunteers, a slightly greater number of weapons, of which the artillery and the air force in particular suffered shortages, and a profusion of sympathy. How many divisions does the Pope have, was Stalin's now-famous retort to western officials who had referred to the feelings of the Vatican. Sympathy strengthened fighting morale but it was no substitute for divisions. (Jutikkala 2001)

The representation of 'being left alone' during the Winter War undermined the western lack of interest and eastern interests in Finland. The catchphrases of the foreign policy leadership, typical for the neutrality discourse, such as 'there is nothing we can do about our geographical location' and 'we must accept the realities' presupposed a certain kind of geopolitical world view within which Finland could only rely on to self-help. As the 1990 security and defence review concluded: 'To guarantee Finland's security and to be able to defend the whole country, adequate defence capability must be maintained'(Parlamentaarinen Puolustuspoliittinen Neuvottelukunta 1990: 23, my translation). Moreover, any discussion of defence guarantees, based on a membership in military alliances, remained outside the boundaries of this discourse.

Steadfastness/feebleness and clever/stupid. Standing alone in the geopolitically challenging environment presupposed a certain kind of Finnish statehood and nationhood. The experienced insecurity and difficulties of the war and the reconstruction constructed the nation and the state in terms of steadfastness. As Kekkonen argued in 1952:

> When the war was over, there were many who lost courage and did not believe in our ability to live under the new conditions. They were wrong. The Finnish people

> did not stand to look back. They set their hands to the plough to draw a new furrow in a new strip of land. (Kekkonen 1952: 58)

The representation of steadfast Finland in the discourse was arrived at by re-articulating the perseverance of the Finnish people in building their nation and state – to turn the northern marshlands into fields – in opposition to feebleness. On the other hand, the opposition of clever/stupid established a knowledge which highlighted the enlighten character of a small state and its political leaders. As Kekkonen suggested: '… in order to save its position a small people must be able to produce clever initiatives to ward off dangers before they become too great' (Kekkonen 1982: 20). In the neutrality discourse the representation of the consolidation of the Finnish independency and its international position in the deteriorating East-West relations is constructed by presupposing a steadfast and strong Finnish statehood and cleverness.

Subject Positioning

The predication and the presupposition, discussed above simultaneously established particular subject-positions. The availability of a subject position for a particular subject or object reflects the degree of agency assigned to them in the hierarchical arrangement(s) of the discourse. In the neutrality discourse this arrangement is the bi-polar world order. Two subject positions are of particular importance for this study. These include: (i) small and relatively powerless peripheral state(s) (in the North); and (ii) powerful and central power(s) (in the West and the East).

The central subject position created in any foreign and security policy discourse is that of the relevant state itself (Weldes 1996: 287). As the above analysis of predication and presupposition suggests, this specific subject-position was arrived at by positioning Finland in relation to other major subjects made meaningful within the neutrality discourse. In the discourse, the Soviet Union and the major western powers were endowed with significant degrees of agency. The representations of the East and the West constructed them as subjects with significant security interests. They

had political will and capabilities to influence the world politics, and to interfere it also militarily if needed.

On the other hand, the subject-position available for Finland – that of a small and relatively powerless peripheral state – assigned it a significantly limited degree of agency. As Kekkonen writes:

> One of the lessons which history teaches us is that a small people like the Finns can not coerce its neighbours into the kind of settlements which it would like. Our own resources are not adequate for that and relying on outside support would mean throwing oneself on the mercy of the unknown as well as sowing the seeds of discord. (Kekkonen 1982: 17-18).

Due to its limited capabilities Finland was subject to great power politics and because of its peripheral location it could only trust on self-help. In so doing, Finland had to adapt to the external environment and follow a cautious foreign and security policy. As Kekkonen continued: 'caution has been and will always be the essence of the Finnish foreign policy' (Kekkonen 1982: 19). Relatedly, neutrality discourse suggested that Finland was not in a position to address normative questions or follow a value-based foreign policy. Kekkonen argued:

> if we look around us, we can see in every quarter things which ought to be protested at in the name of humanity. But we do not do it… Here, too, our conduct is dictated by our policy of neutrality. There is a great difference between it and a policy of protest. (Kekkonen 1982: 20-21)

In the Cold War world's ideological confrontation between the East and the West, Finland took a neutral position. Here the 'physician or judge' metaphor is illustrative. Kekkonen argued in 1961: 'We see ourselves as physicians rather than judges; it is not for us to pass judgement nor to condemn, it is rather to diagnose and to try to cure' (Kekkonen 1961: 94). The hierarchical arrangement of the bi-polar world granted Finland a significantly limited degree of agency in international affairs. Hence, self-help, even when it might have been morally wrong in terms of western values of the Finnish state, was a justified line of action. Indeed, letting moral judgements affect the foreign and security policy was constructed as a privilege of the great powers and the more secure states. For Finland it could cause serious damage.

However, and importantly, Finland was not constructed merely as the bearer of international structures. It had some statutory rights based on its status as a sovereign state and the high international status associated with the Nordic countries. The official discourse highlighted neutrality as sensible and even 'natural' option for, rather than a policy imposed upon Finland. Kekkonen argued in a speech given at the National Press Club in Washington in 1961:

> I have heard it said that neutrality has been imposed upon us. This is not so. It is a way of solving our problem of security that has its roots in our history, and it reflects, I believe, a realistic appraisal of our national interests and possibilities and a true understanding of our position in the world today. (Kekkonen 1961: 87)

Importantly, the construction of Finland's need to adapt to the international environment indicates, by definition, a degree of agency. This, in turn, implied a complex state identity. For instance, in the judge-physician metaphor, illustrative of neutrality discourse, Finland emerges as a potential initiator of action, a formulator of policies, and an assessor of situations. Specifically, it could build mutual trust among the superpowers. However, Finland's subject position in the neutrality discourse also constituted boundaries for what could be intelligibly said about Finnish foreign policy and well as limits for state action. As Kekkonen wrote:

> As far as I remember, a certain philosopher of history has pointed out that any given moment each state has only one best line of action… In our case, what has crystallized into this optimal line in the course of the years in our policy of neutrality, which has sprung from Finnish soil and is based on purely Finnish solutions. (Kekkonen 1982: 13)

Accordingly, and as suggested a membership in the military alliance was not an option in the neutrality discourse. Significantly for this study, when the question of the EC membership, which signified participation in the developing European Community's foreign and security policy, was first raised after the end of the Cold War, the foreign policy leadership constructed the membership as completely incompatible with the Finnish state identity based on neutrality.

3.1.3 Hegemony of the Neutrality Discourse, End of the Cold War and the European Integration

I suggest that in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the representations of the world created by the Finnish foreign and security policy makers were largely accepted as adequate reflections of the 'real' world. That is, key foreign and security policy-makers identified themselves and their state with the subject-position(s) entailed by the neutrality discourse.[58] In so doing, they were largely 'hailed into' or, interpellated by, the discourse. Although identities are always open-ended and complete interpellation is merely a theoretical possibility, in Finland, neutrality discourse temporarily fixed the state identity (in the realm of Finnish foreign and security policy).

The neutrality discourse was structuring the Finnish foreign policy leadership's and scholars' responses to the ongoing transformations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For instance, amid the changing external environment, the security and defence policy white paper published in 1990 emphasised several continuities in the Finnish security environment and policy. The paper concluded:

> Finland' security policy position is stable. Through independent foreign policy, systematically adopted neutrality policy and active participation, for instance, Finland's participation in the CSCE has had a positive influence to the security environment in the North as well as more broadly in Europe. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance have had, and it continues to have, a positive impact on the stability in the North.
>
> …the neutrality of Finland and Sweden and the credible independent defence capability of these states has been widely seen to enhance stability in the North. … It is important that in the changing international environment Finland's defence policy remains predictable. (Parlamentaarinen Puolustuspoliittinen Neuvottelukunta 1990: 24, my translation)

Given the end of the Cold War, the (discursive) responses to the ongoing economic, political and military changes in Europe created representations of Finland, security and the European Community compatible with the bi-polar world. In so doing, the neutrality discourse was clearly structuring of the meaning of the official representations of the economic and political integration in western Europe. Prime Minister Harri Holkeri's argumentation

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[58] The analysis also suggests that Finnish neutrality serves as a school book example of the articulation of a radically new discourse in the aftermath of the Second Word War which over time interpellated the policymakers and became hegemonic.

is illustrative. In 1990 he said: 'Finland's neutrality constitutes the corner stone in the protection of our living, our independence, our sovereignty and our national existence' (cited in Joenniemi 2001: 183). He continued: 'Submitting to the EC's foreign policy and giving in to the demands of a joint defence would imply that Finland voluntarily abandons its independence and becomes part of a major power' (cited in Joenniemi 2001: 183).

Holkeri also deployed a metaphor of 'squaring the circle' (Ojanen, Herolf et al. 2000: 95) and, in so doing, re-articulated the representation of the total incommensurability of the EU membership and policy of neutrality.[59] Significantly, the greatest obstacle for the membership, it was argued, was the European Community's developing foreign and security policy dimension which was to be re-formulated in Maastricht in 1991 (Ojanen, Herolf et al. 2000: 86).[60] Accordingly, the EC membership was constructed as impossible in Finland. That is, for the policy makers neutrality provided the structure of meaning in which the possible and feasible policies could be articulated. The construction of total incongruity and unfeasibility, I suggest, is indicative of a hegemonic discourse and the common sensibility of Finland's neutrality.

Further, neutrality policy also dominated the foreign and security policy research agendas during the 1980s and early 1990s. Significantly, the neutrality discourse constituted a dominant structure of meaning within scholarly debates. The literature can be divided in two broad categories. First, scholars attempted to explain Finnish neutrality policy and claimed a neutral position in world politics. Whereas some explanations drew from systemic theories of IR and emphasised Finland's relatively powerless position as a small state located next to a super power in the bi-polar world (Väyrynen

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[59] Constructing a square equal in area to a circle using only a straightedge and compass was one of the three geometric problems of antiquity. It was finally proved to be an impossible problem when pi was proven to be transcendental in 1882. (Weisstein)

[60] In Finland the term European Community (or Communities) referred to the three original European communities of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euraton), and the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1967, the institutions of the three were merged and since then it has become common to talk of the European Community. After Maastricht Treaty was agreed in 1992 the term European Union quickly replaced the term European Community. However, the latter term is still used in some specific legal and administrative discourses dealing with, for instance, the EU institutions and legislation of the first pillar.

1988; Knudsen 1992), some explanations highlighted the importance of political agency embedded in policy-makers. Here the two post-war Presidents', Juho Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen, role was underlined for the Finnish neutrality (Apunen 1977).[61] Second, as early as the 1960s onwards for some scholars' neutrality was also doing the explaining (Hakovirta 1975; see, for instance, Hakovirta 1976; Hakovirta 1990; Iloniemi 1990). These scholars viewed neutrality as a rather permanent condition and, as such, it became the central factor explaining the Finnish foreign policy (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta 1993: 20). I suggest that the research tradition in which neutrality was doing the explaining, is indicative of the successful interpellation of the neutrality discourse.

3.2 Articulation of EU Foreign and Security Policy: Alignment or Non-Alignment?

Whereas the first section of this case study discussed the hegemonic eminence of the neutrality discourse in Finland in the early 1990s, the purpose of this second part is to analyse the articulation of the EU foreign and security policy in the official foreign and security policy discourse. I suggest that in conjunction with the Finnish EU membership, the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse was re-articulated radically differently in 1995. That is, the key elements of the discourse and its structuring of meaning were transformed. Significantly for this dissertation, the so-called 'European Union's security dimension' had a major role in the re-articulation of the discourse. Again, I first situate the new articulation of Finland's place in the world by describing the changing discourse. I then deploy the discourse analytic tools of predication, presupposition and subject-positioning in order to analyse the new discourse and role of the EU foreign and security policy in it.

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[61] Given the consensus, some disagreements also emerged. Accordingly (Möttölä 1993: 65), a significant one was related to the weight given for neutrality policy and the FCMA treaty. Some members of the policy elite wondered about whether the emphasis on neutrality could harm Finland's good neighbour relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, from 1960s onwards some aspects of the IR scholarly debate between idealism and realism fed into Finnish debates (Möttölä 1993: 65). The key question was, to what extent, if at all, Finland should attempt to influence to the bi-polar international system after it had consolidated its own position. A particular, disagreement concerned Finland's engagements with the Third World issues, international development and world peace (Möttölä 1993).

3.2.1 Situating the Articulation of Alignment Discourse: Post-Cold World Europe and the EU membership

> When the Cold War system broke down it was natural that Finland's foreign policy changed (Forsberg and Vogt 2003, my translation).

In Finland the EU membership largely represents a break with the past in terms of the official foreign and security policy discourse. Prior to the membership negotiations, which started in 1992 Finland was seen as a neutral state. However, in 1995 Finland joined the European Union as a *previously* neutral state. Although Finland remained militarily non-aligned (Report by the Council of State 1995: 58-59) Finland was seen to side with the western Europe both economically and politically.

The rapid and unexpected change in the state officials' articulations of Finland's place in the world was made within the context of two simultaneous processes of large scale political, social and economic change: the disintegration of eastern Europe and the integration of western Europe. As a response to these external changes, Finnish foreign policy leadership argued that Finland's foreign and security policy also had to change.

In 1990, after the re-unification of Germany, Finland unilaterally announced that the military restrictions (with the exception of nuclear weapons ban) of the Paris Peace Treaty, signed in 1948, were not applicable anymore.[62] At the same time the military articles included in the bilateral treaty for Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet Union were 'reconsidered'. In January 1992, after the break up of the Soviet Union, Finnish foreign policy leadership announced that the FCMA treaty was terminated. A new treaty governing relations between Finland and the

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[62] The 1948 Paris Peace Treaty included several military and weapons restrictions. Part III, Articles 13 - 22, limited the future troop strength to 34,400 soldiers, the navy to 4,500 individuals, and the air force to 3,000. There were also exclusions of equipment of an offensive nature, such as bombers, missiles, and submarines. Warships could not exceed a combined total of 10,000 tons. The air force could acquire up to sixty combat planes, but they were not to include bombers or fighter bombers. None of the services was allowed to construct, to procure, or to test nuclear weapons ('Suomen Rauhansopimus' 1947)

Russian Federation was signed soon after. The treaty text excluded military issues. In 1992 Finland joined NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and in 1993 Finland became member of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme (PfP).

However, for many it was the decision to apply for EU membership in 1992 which represented a sudden and profound change in the Finnish post-war foreign policy.[63] Although the foreign policy leadership emphasised several continuities and later argued that the membership was a logical continuation of the Finnish neutrality policy (Report by the Council of State 1995) for political reasons, it did not deny the fundamental transformation of Finland and it's position in the world. Even if the more recent scholarly literature has also dealt with some continuity in the Finnish policy (Tiilikainen 2001: 68), the analysis published around the membership mainly dealt with the change.[64]

Importantly for this study, the foreign policy leadership suggested that 'security policy considerations were the most important factors behind Finland's membership and that the economic factors were, after all, secondary' (Koivisto 1995: 554, my translation). The same conclusion has been reached by several scholars. Even if for some policy makers and scholars the rationale for the membership was economic (Redmond 1997; Ingebritsen 1998), the debate over the membership was about security (Arter 1995; Tiilikainen 1998) and identity (Arter 1995; Tiilikainen 1998; Browning 1999; Joenniemi 2001; Browning 2003; Moisio 2003). Moisio

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[63] During the EEA negotiations the foreign policy leadership had constantly argued that the EEA was sufficient enough for Finland and that there was no need to discuss the EC/EU membership. Suddenly, when the EEA treaty was going through the ratification process in the Finnish Parliament, the Government announced that the treaty was not enough to secure Finnish long term trade interests since Sweden (1990) and Austria (1989) had both applied full membership in the EC (Rehn 1993: 205-207).

[64] The terms deployed to capture the period of so-called 'rapid re-orientation' (Joenniemi 2001) are illustrative. It was called as 'westernisation' or 'Europeanisation' of the Finnish policy, and described as a move 'from Moscow to Brussels', 'from neutrality to alignment' (Forsberg and Vogt 2003, my translation). Notwithstanding the differences among these scholars, they broadly agreed that the importance of the East and neutrality in the Finnish foreign policy diminished. In contrast, the significance of the West, mainly through economic integration and the EU's foreign, security and defence policies as well as NATO's partnership for peace program (PfP), increased.

argues that given the 'massive economic decline in the early 1990s with increasing unemployment rates, degreasing GDP, collapsing financial markets, the crisis of the welfare state and rising social insecurity' one would have expected that the EU membership debate would have been about rational economic argumentations (Moisio 2003: 13). However, and as Moisio suggests, although this economic dimension existed, it was overshadowed by the seemingly 'irrational' argumentation related to the Finnish identity, geopolitics and security (Moisio 2003).

Although, EU membership was generally understood as a foreign and security policy question, the European Union's developing foreign and security policy had a particularly strong impact on the Finnish official discourse. In 1992 the EC Commission explicitly expressed its concern about the level of Finland's commitment towards the CFSP and, in particular, the ESDP.[65] The Commission highlighted, for instance, that the European military alliance, Western European Union (WEU), had broader political aspirations than the crisis management tasks welcomed by the Finnish Government (Rehn 1993: 208). Accordingly the CFSP and the EDSP entered the official Finnish foreign policy discourse in 1992.

Consequently, the foreign policy leadership re-articulated the Finnish foreign and security policy. In 1992 Koivisto indicated that 'he did not have anything against re-defining neutrality in terms of *non-alignment and independent defence'* (Koivisto 1995: 548, my translation). In 1994 membership negotiations with the EU were closed and on 1 January 1995 Finland became a full member of the EU. At the same time it became an observer member in the WEU. In June 1995 the government's report re-articulated and clarified the new Finnish foreign and security policy. Crucially, the paper argued that neutrality was no longer an option. The report said:

> Since the end of the East-West division, the policy of neutrality that Finland followed in the Cold War is no longer a viable line of action. During the Cold

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[65] In 1995 the foreign policy leadership indicated that it was privately pushed to clarify Finnish position in several high level meetings during membership negotiations (Koivisto 1995: 548, 550).

War, Finland tried to avoid making political, and especially military, commitments that might have drawn it into conflicts between the great powers. In the new situation, Finland's strategy is an active participation in international political and security cooperation fro prevention and resolution of security problems.

In acceding to the Union, Finland has not made any security policy reservations concerning its obligations under its founding treaties or the Maastricht Treaty. Finland has joined the Union as a militarily non-aligned country which wishes to play an active and constructive role in creating and implementing a common foreign and security policy. A capable EU in Finland's interests (Report by the Council of State 1995: 58).

Moreover, whereas in 1990 the code word for independence was neutrality and the membership in the European Community was seen to endanger Finnish independence, the 1995 report argued that 'membership of the European Union (EU) will reinforce the foundations of Finnish security and provide a significant channel through which Finland can pursue its interests and carry its responsibility in international relations (Report by the Council of State 1995: 5). Accordingly, alignment (with the European Union) became a new code word for Finland's security.

The 1995 Report by the Council of State to the Parliament

The 1995 report of Finland's security policy addressed a wide range of security questions.[66] The report was based on a 'broad' or 'comprehensive conceptualisation of security' which highlighted the so-called 'new' and 'soft' security issues such as development, economic cooperation and environmental degradation (Report by the Council of State 1995).

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[66] The 1995 report is a 78-page long document supplemented with maps and annexes. It was published in Finnish and translated in to English. The analysis of the White Paper is based on the English version of the report. The documentation of the parliamentary hearings concerning the report were in Finnish and the translations are mine. The Report had two main sections: *(i) The International Security Environment and Finland* (pp. 11-56); and (ii) *Development of Finland's Security Policy* (pp. 63-69). The first section – some three quarters of the document – established what existed in terms of Finland's foreign and security policy and clarified Finland's position and policies towards its external environment. The second part of the Report, a seven page conclusive section, outlined the development of the Finnish security policy in the near future.

Significantly, the 1995 White Paper informed the subsequent security and defence policy reports in 1997 and 2001. Accordingly, the 1995 white paper articulated a 'security environment' in which Finland found itself during the 1990s and beyond. Hence the 1995 white paper is the key foreign, security and defence policy document of the 1990s. It addressed the changed external environment and clarified Finland's changed position. As such the 1995 White Paper is an appropriate starting point for the analysis of the new Finnish security discourse. (Report by the Council of State 1995).

Importantly, the report was explicitly tied to Finland's EU membership and, in particular, to the European Union's developing security dimension, the CFSP and the ESDP (Report by the Council of State 1995: 5-6, 9-10, 58-62). As Ms O. Ojala, a senior MP of the Left Alliance, suggested:

> These issues [of the white paper] are particularly related to the development of the European Union's common foreign, security and defence policy… we are here to discuss how the decision accepted by the Finnish people to join the European Union will affect Finland's security policy ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Palautekeskustelu' 1995, my translation).

The report also addressed the approaching EU Council meeting in Amsterdam in 1996. The Amsterdam Treaty clarified the future development and decision-making mechanisms of the CFSP (Report by the Council of State 1995: 61-62).

Although the large-scale social, political and economic transformation set up the wider context in which Finland's new position in the world was made meaningful, the EU and its 'developing security dimension' were central for the re-articulation of the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse, that is, for the articulation of a radically different discourse than before.

3.2.2 Europeanisation of Foreign and security Policy Discourse: Articulation of the Alignment Discourse

The 1995 report re-articulated Finland and its position in the world differently in comparison with the neutrality discourse. That is, the predication, presupposition and subject positioning of the major subjects and objects in the 1995 report were significantly different from the earlier re-articulations. Accordingly, a new discourse was articulated. I call this discourse as the *alignment discourse*. The expression illustrates the key feature of this discourse: economic and political *alignment* and military *non-alignment* with the West. In terms of official foreign and security discourse, the former represented continuity and the latter signifies change. Importantly, the emerging EU foreign and security policy played a key role in the hegemonic struggle between the discourses. The state officials constructed it as a middle way between neutrality and full alignment.

Finland	The East	The North	The West	The Globe
An independent state A member of the international community A small state A democratic state Has stable defence Has to adapt to its environment/international changes Has stable international position Is no longer placed between the East and the West/ Has broken free from its Cold War international position The only EU member that shares a common border with Russia Is a member of the core group of European democracies A Nordic state (part of Nordic Community) Has market economy Supports international cooperation Can influence arrangements concerning its international standing and national security Has played an active role in international organisations Has respect for human rights Is a welfare state Is militarily non-aligned Can defend itself	**Russia**: Is a great power Has substantial military power Has nuclear capability Can shape the world and European politics Has a great culture **The Former Eastern European States and Commonwealth of Independent States:** Are independent states Are European states Are unstable states and unpredictable states Have violent conflicts Are moving towards democracy Are moving towards market economy Have several internal problems Have crime Have environmental problems Are a source of transnational deceases Are nationalistic Have minority problems	**Nordic Community/Nordic Countries:** Are democratic states Have respect for human rights Are just states Are welfare states Have prestigious international status Can contribute to international crisis management **Sweden**: Has a special historical relationship with Finland	**The EU**: Is the core group of European democracies Is a developing organisation Has a crucial role in European security Is a union of independent democratic states Is a major political actor in international politics Has a vital role in international security Can promote stability Can promote (Finnish) national interests Re-enforces the foundations of Finnish security **The NATO**: Is a military alliance Has substantial military might Can promote stability Can threaten Russia Can create new dividing lines in Europe Has a crucial role in European security Can enforce peace Is credible in peacekeeping **The US**: Is a superpower Has nuclear weapons	**OSCE:** Is a security organisation Has important role in European security Is exclusive organisation Can built mutual trust and enhance human rights Cab not quarantine security or enforce peace **The UN**: Is the corner stone of common shared rules in international politics Has respect for human rights Is democratic Can promote security Cannot enforce peace **CoE:** Is a human rights organisation Is promoting values of democracy and freedom Has vital role in Europe **The South:** Has several regional and local wars and crises (in central America, southern Africa and Southeast Asia)

Table 3.2: Predication of the alignment discourse

Predication

The main subjects and objects as well as their predication in the 1995 report are presented in the Table 3.2. Whilst some of the representations generated in the texts hang together in a familiar way, others form a novel and distinct story line. I suggest that the table is indicative of two discourses. Moreover, in the 1995 report the Finnish state identity emerged in the intersection of the two discourses reflecting continuity (neutrality) and change (alignment).

In the table, some of the important representations of Finland clearly indicate continuity of the neutrality discourse. For instance, in 1995 Finland was seen as a 'small' and 'militarily non-aligned state' which 'has to adapt to international changes' (Table 3.2). On the other hand, the predication suggests that the geopolitical location of Finland had changed. Finland was 'no longer located between the East and the West' and Finland had become a member in the 'core group of European democracies' (Table 3.2). Moreover, although Finland was still identified as a Nordic country and member of the Nordic community, the explicit predication of Finland as a welfare state, with respect of human rights, is also somewhat different from the neutrality discourse. Moreover, whilst in the neutrality discourse normative aspects of foreign and security policy were marginal, in 1995 several international organisations such as the United Nation, the OSCE and the Council of Europe (CoE) were constructed as organisations which could enhance 'human rights', 'democracy and freedom' and 'shared rules' (Table 3.2). Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that the predication of the West changed most.

In relation to the representations of the West, the role of the European Union became dominant and the western European states were increasingly made meaningful within this context. Several attributes that were previously associated with western states, such as democracy, influence in world politics and international 'security', were now explicitly attached to the European Union. Through predication, the European Union emerged as a 'developing organisation', 'a union of independent democratic states', 'a major market area', and 'a major political actor in international politics'

(Table 3.2). As such, it had a crucial role in European and international security. The European Union could 'promote stability' and Finnish national interests (Table 3.2), for instance. On the other hand, the number of representations of particular western states, such as Britain, decreased.

Significantly, and contrary to the neutrality discourse, the relationship between Finland and the West with reference to the European Union was based on similar and complementary aspects. As the report argued, the membership in the European Union 're-enforced the foundations of Finnish security' and it offered 'a channel for influence' to enhance Finnish interests in world politics (Table 3.2). Within the West, NATO's role for European security was also highlighted, for instance, in relation to 'crisis management' (Table 3.2). Whereas in the neutrality discourse, NATO was constructed in terms of difference and otherness (Table 3.1), in the alignment discourse a more positive relationship with it is established (Table 3.2). Accordingly, the previously unimaginable NATO membership became an option, which could be discussed.

The representations of the East changed significantly as well. Whereas the Soviet Union largely disappeared from the discourse, Russia inherited some of its great power status and characters. In addition, the predication of the eastern subjects changed. Whilst in the neutrality discourse they were simply construed as great powers, their allies or satellites with distinct values and norms reflected the economic political systems of these states, in the alignment discourse the eastern subjects were seen as transforming towards western values and systems. However, and in so doing, they were construed as unstable and as a source of insecurity. The representations of the East highlighted 'political instability', 'poverty', 'uncontrollable migratory movements' and 'regional and internal disputes' as well as 'nationality conflicts' (Table 3.2). Whereas the West was constructed as a source of security, the East was rendered a source of insecurity. Accordingly, Finland's oppositional features with the East increased.

Presupposition

Presupposition that establishes a particular kind of knowledge about the world out there and, in so doing, constitutes the operational logic of a discourse, changed in Finland in 1995.[67] The analysis suggests that although the *minor/great* opposition retained some of its importance, a new core opposition of *unstable/stable* underpinned the re-articulation of Finnish foreign and security policy discourse. Several other binary oppositions can be subsumed under this core opposition. These include *democratic/undemocratic, economically developed/underdeveloped, reason/passion and order/disorder*. These oppositions informed the presupposition of the radically different 'security environment' in which Finland found itself.

Unstable/stable. This core opposition was clearly stated in several parts of the 1995 report. For instance, the section describing European security order argued:

> Managing stability has come to be the main task of security policy for Europe. If the opportunity of change is to be seized, every state in Europe must be involved. The challenge facing European security policy is to support both change promoting stability and balanced development simultaneously, and to manage the new kinds of conflict. (Report by the Council of State 1995: 19)

Accordingly, *stability policy* was articulated as the underlining feature of the Finnish foreign and security policy. The report argued: 'Finland's central goal in the post-Cold War situation has been to maintain and strengthen the stability that has long existed in northern Europe' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 65). Importantly, the EU was given a key role in the field of stability policy. The Report argued:

> In the area of stability policy, Finland is broadly committed to international cooperation and has plenty of institutional channels for exerting influence. …
>
> The primary channel for Finland's stability policy is to exert effective influence on the European Union's common foreign and security policy. (Report by the Council of State 1995: 68)

However, the articulation associated with managing instability and creating stability presupposed a certain world. In this world, Russia and the former communist states were articulated as fundamentally different from the

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[67] By operational logic I mean a structure in which the things are given meaning and simultaneously positioned vis-à-vis other subjects and objects (see, Doty 1993).

western European states. The markers of difference were the binary oppositions of democratic/undemocratic, developed/undeveloped, rational/irrational and order/disorder.

Democratic/undemocratic and developed/underdeveloped. Within the official discourse, the Eastern state identities were characterised by non-democratic or quasi-democratic regimes and underdeveloped economies and poverty. The predication of the subjects was embedded in the large scale political, economic and social transition from communism and command economy to liberal democracy and market economy. However, the process of transition was in its early stages and the democratic political systems as well as the market economy in these states were, at best, developing. Importantly, in the 1995 report the conception of transformation and development was extended to other former communist states in Finland's near abroad and beyond. An extract taken from the government's report is illustrative:

> The transition to democracy and a market economy has advanced farthest in Central Europe, including the Baltic countries. Profound social and economic change is also under way in Russia and the other countries of the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS), and in parts of the former Yugoslavia … (Report by the Council of State 1995: 18)

The process of transition also presupposed insecurity. That is, the process of change was so magnificent and rapid that it could resort to worsening living conditions, disputes and violence. The report argues:

> Political and economic reform is uncertain, irregular sequence of events over a long period. Change since the end of the Cold War has brought with it several new problems: political instability, regional and internal disputes, uncontrollable migratory movements, nationality disputes and other problems. At worst these escalate in to armed conflict and subsequently streams of refugees. (Report by the Council of State 1995: 18)

Relatedly, the unstable/stable core opposition drew on the binaries of *violence/non-violence* and *order/disorder.* The period of transition, as articulated above, was characterised by potential conflicts. Violence was argued to be an 'everyday reality in today's world' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 14). The report suggested:

> The number of armed conflicts has not decreased, and they are increasingly connected with internal or historical ethnic or religious disputes or nationality issues. Conflicts sometimes lead to collapse of state structures, making it even more difficult for the international community to help manage and resolve them. The forms violence takes include violations of human rights, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and terrorism. The result of conflicts is often a wave of refugees in nearby regions and elsewhere. (Report by the Council of State 1995: 14)

Another opposition encompassed in the above extract is order/disorder. This binary opposition presupposed a particular kind of western identity. The West was an orderly space based on democratic political systems with functioning economies that can deliver welfare. The poor and undemocratic or quasi-democratic states of the East, with internal problems that may lead to violence could, in turn, collapse and lead to chaos.

This presupposition of the East and the West and Finland's location in between resonates with the historical constructions predating, but significantly shaped by, the communist revolution in Russia in 1917. As Harle and Moisio notes, the Finnish geopolitical reasoning traditionally includes two directions of the world's political map, the East and the West. Historically, both have been given rather different political meanings (Harle and Moisio 2000; Moisio 2003). In the historical discourses, the East is typically reduced to Russia, which functioned mostly as the negative other in Finnish identity politics. Russia represents difference in terms of culture and political tradition. Moreover, Russia constitutes the 'hereditary enemy' of Finland (Kekkonen 1943; Harle and Moisio 2000; Moisio 2003), the Finnish nation and people, their society and the state. It signifies a clear threat to the very existence of Finland.

Conversely, the West, in particular the Nordic countries as well as the western Europe, is represented as a highly valued societal, political and economic space. In the historical discourses, the West functions as the ideological 'home' (Browning 1999) and a model for development. It represents the political, economic, societal and cultural values that Finland and Finns wants to be identified with (Harle and Moisio 2000; Browning

2003; Moisio 2003). Notwithstanding, periods of anxiety, the West is largely constructed as a friend rather than a foe.[68]

Significantly, the core opposition underpinning the construction of the East and the West in the 1995 report is significantly different than in the neutrality discourse. Whereas the neutrality discourse construed a specific eastern and western identity in terms of minor/great power and periphery/centre oppositions in the bi-polar world, and downplayed cultural and ideological difference in the superpower confrontation, the 1995 discourse articulated the eastern and western subjects in terms of instability in the post-Cold War world. Moreover, cultural differences of the East and the West (re-) gained dominance in the official Finnish foreign and security policy discourse. In so doing, the East was constituted as a source of insecurity and the West as a source of security.

Subject Positioning

The major subject-positions of the 1995 re-articulation of the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse positioned Finland differently in relation to the East and the West than the neutrality discourse. The subject-positions constructed in 1995 included: (i) a stable, developed and potentially influential Finland; (ii) a stable, developed and powerful West; and (iii) an unstable, developing and potentially powerful East. The analysis suggests that a significant factor that postulates the change is the articulation of Finland's relationship with the European Union and, in particular, with its developing foreign and security policy. The initial phases of the CFSP and the ESDP were constructed as complementary and in terms of similarity in the Finnish discourse.

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[68] This polarised view of the East and the West in debating Finnish foreign policy and security is, of course, oversimplified. The representations of the East and the West are more multifaceted and their meaning has never been fully fixed. For instance, during the time of autonomy (1809-1917) and the 'national awakening' several competing political opinions emerged. Whereas parts of elite were favourable for Russia, some wanted to re-gain Finland's historical position as a part of Sweden; the ideas of national self-determination also ran high in both camps and some prominent figures were openly hostile towards Russia (Harle and Moisio 2000: 72-82).

Whilst the representations of Finland still reflected a small state identity Finland's potential to shape its external environment increased. In 1995 Finland is constructed as a more pro-active, 'responsible' and 'influential' subject. Moreover, and significantly, Finland 'had broken free from its Cold War international position' (Table 3.2). It was no longer located between the East and the West and it is a member in an 'influential core group of European democratic states' (Table 3.2). As such, Finland could influence more the 'arrangements concerning its international standing and national security' (Table 3.2)

Whereas in the neutrality discourse, Finnish subject-position was arrived at positioning it in relation of two rather similar, although ideologically different great power subjects, in the East and the West, in the 1995 discourse Finland was positioned in relation to significantly different eastern and western identities. Despite the significant degree of agency attributed to Russia, its internal problems rendered it as a developing subject. Although all the states in the new Europe were argued to be committed to the shared values of 'democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, minority rights, the rule of law, social justice, as well as economic liberty and responsibility for the environment' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 10), some states were constructed as more advanced in practising these ideals. As the 1995 report argues: 'Since the end of the division of Europe, Finland is no longer placed between East and West … In terms of security policy the world and Europe are living through the post-Cold War era, a period that can be described as a new transition' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 65). On the other hand, the paper argued: 'Developments in Russia have a major impact on Finnish security … Finland will support democratic reform in Russia and its commitment to European unification and compliance with international norms' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 6).

In addition to the neutrality discourse's linkage with realist ideas of world politics reflected in minor/great power opposition, the new security discourse correlated with liberal ideas of a modern state and development

manifested in unstable/stable binary. That is, while the representation of the East in the neutrality discourse highlighted the insecurities related to the possible superpower conflict and their strategic interests, the new representations drew from different premises of insecurity. The insecurity was based on problems associated with the 'political instability' and underdevelopment constitutive of 'new security issues' such as 'regional and internal disputes, uncontrollable migratory movements, nationality disputes' and 'environmental problems' and alike (Report by the Council of State 1995: 18). However, the internal disputes could escalate to regional conflicts which, in turn, could develop to great power conflicts.

By contrast, the subject position available for the West and the EU was characterised by increasing influence and fully developed political and economic systems. The West and the European Union implied an extensive and complex identity and they were endowed with a significant degree of agency. As the 1995 report argues: 'The EU is a key force for change and stability in the new Europe. It is also a global actor with evolving economic and political relationships of cooperation with states and groups of states on all continents' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 10). Finland's relationship with the West, and Finland's subject position, was constructed as similar and complementary with the West and the European Union. For Finland, the West and the European Union constituted a highly valued political space and was providing Finland with opportunities and influence. Moreover, the European Union was seen to empower Finland as a small state. The report stated:

> Membership in the European Union (EU) has clarified and strengthened Finland's international position. Finland has joined a community of similar democratic states. Finland's foreign and security policy rests on a national security assessment and decision making. Membership in the EU gives the change to pursue Finland's aims as a member of an influential and evolutionary association of states. Membership in the EU has become part of Finland's international identity.
>
> EU membership has increased Finland's possibilities for influencing arrangements concerning its international standing and national security. It also faces Finland with more responsibility for European security and the future of the whole world (Report by the Council of State 1995: 10)

Accordingly, in the 1995 discourse Finland was positioned differently in relation to the East and the West than within the neutrality discourse. The discourse assigned Finland a considerably greater degree of agency. Finland possessed a more complex and wide-ranging identity than before. It was a more powerful initiator of action, formulator of Europe wide policies, and assessor of the European security environment. Whereas the neutrality discourse positioned Finland with a significantly limited ability to influence its environment and to take part in international cooperation, the 1995 discourse re-articulated Finnish identity as an influential and pro-active actor in Europe and beyond. The Report stated:

> Ever since its independence, Finland has believed that effective international collaboration on the basis of equality promotes the security of small states. Finland has played and active role in the work of international organizations, seeking in particular opportunities for influence through cooperation with the other Nordic countries; this has shaped Finland's international identity. (Report by the Council of State 1995: 9)

Significantly, the European Union's developing foreign and security policy was argued to reflect Finnish and Nordic values and norms. The government's report stated that the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law which have 'already long cherished in Nordic countries' were the 'foundation for the common foreign and security policy of the European Union' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 10). Taken together both the empowering aspects of Finland's relationship with the European Union, as well as the construction of similarity and commensurability of the EU foreign and security policy with the Finnish foreign and security policy, enabled a radically different re-articulation of Finnish foreign and security policy discourse. That is, the 'membership in the European Union (EU) will reinforce the foundations of Finnish security…' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 5).

I suggest that the re-articulation of the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse and the articulation of the European Union and its foreign and security policy were central for the emergence of a new discourse in Finland in 1995. This new discourse highlighted alignment rather than non-alignment

with the West in the post-Cold War world. In the remainder of this case study the new discourse is referred as the alignment discourse.

3.2.3 Interpellation of the Alignment Discourse: The 1995 Parliamentary Debate

In the 1995 parliamentary debate over the government's report, the alignment discourse clearly structured several representations generated in the speeches, questions, remarks and proposals (hereafter remarks) made by the Members of the Parliament (MP). On the other hand, some documents as well as several remarks were governed by the neutrality discourse and many included elements of both discourses. In short, notwithstanding the importance of the alignment discourse, it was put under scrutiny by the MPs and competing views on Finland's place in the world and the CFSP and the ESDP were articulated.

The analysis of the debate is based on an examination of the representations which were generated in the remarks made by the MPs in the hearings. The official records of the debate were read through with an eye on the *predication* of the subjects and objects featuring in the texts, *presupposition* of certain kind of knowledge, and *subject positions* available. Through careful analysis, I determined whether a particular remark made in the debate was governed by the alignment discourse, the neutrality, both discourses or some other discourse.[69] The data collected is presented in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1.

Remarks and speeches	Neutrality discourse	Neutrality and alignment discourse	Alignment discourse	n/a	Total
First Hearing	44	12	31	4	91
Second Hearing	68	73	36	7	184
Overall Debate	108	84	67	11	270

Table 3.3: Neutrality and alignment discourses in the 1995 Parliamentary Debate

[69] This research design is detailed in chapter 2.



Figure 3.1: Neutrality and Alignment Discourses in the 1995 Parliamentary Debate

The data suggests that although a new discourse was clearly articulated in 1995, it had not become hegemonic. Rather, competing views largely drawing on the traditional neutrality discourse were articulated. Moreover, the remarks introducing and defending the government's report and the (non-) alignment discourse included representations structured by the neutrality discourse.

Prime Minister Lipponen's opening speech on the parliamentary hearings over the report serves as an example. He suggested:

> In a world of rapid changes, security policy must be coherent and flexible. It must keep up with the change. We Finns are accustomed to the idea that Finland's basic line of policy is adaptation to the international environment. This is a natural approach for a small state with a challenging geopolitical position. ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Lähetekeskustelu' 1995, my translation)

This excerpt creates several representations typical for the neutrality discourse. The predication constructed Finland as a small state, which was located next to a great power. This presupposed a realist world-view highlighting great power interests and also Finland's peripheral existence. The subject-position available for Finland is characterised by a significantly limited degree of agency. Adaptation was articulated as a key feature of the Finnish identity. However, PM Lipponen continued:

> Since the end of the Cold War conditions [of Finnish security] have changed in

many ways. The international field has opened up and agendas have broadened. Security is no longer seen merely in political or military terms but as a comprehensive and broad question. Security is improved when human rights are respected and democracy strengthened. International crime, environmental crisis and uncontrollable population movements requires closer international cooperation.

> Membership in the European Union enhances the foundations of Finland's security. It offers an effective channel of influence to advance Finland's interests and fulfils its international responsibilities. European Union's membership has brought Finland into a union of states, which has a central role in international relations. ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Lähetekeskustelu' 1995, my translation)

The alignment discourse clearly governed the representations articulated in this extract. For instance, through predication the object of Finland's actions, security, is seen as a broad concept. The presupposed world-view was very different from that of the previous extract. Moreover, the membership in the European Union was seen to empower Finland. The new Finnish subject position assigned Finland more influence, but also more responsibilities. Both are suggestive of an increased degree of agency. In the remarks that were made during the 1995 parliamentary hearings, both of these different representations indicative of different discourses were often identifiable. As Prime Minister said: 'At the same time when we, as a small state, have to adapt, we also want to have influence. That is the core question for today's security policy' ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Lähetekeskustelu' 1995, my translation).

Also, the key issues of the 1995 debate can be portrayed in terms of these two main discourses. That is, the representations related to the debate were mostly structured by the neutrality discourse or the alignment discourse. The government's initiative to establish the Rapid Deployment Force in conjunction with the Finnish Defence Forces (Report by the Council of State 1995) was the most debated issue in the 1995 parliament hearings over the report. Relatedly, the Report was interpreted as a blue print to amend the Finnish Peacekeeping Act to allow more extensive engagement in crisis management. These initiatives, in turn were closely related to the development of the CFSP and the ESDP. As the report argued:

> The main emphasis [in European Union's security and defence issues] will be on developing the Union's own capabilities, and combined capabilities of the Union and the WEU, in humanitarian and other peacekeeping operations in the field of crisis management. Finland supports consolidation of the European Union's crisis management capacity. (Report by the Council of State 1995: 62)

The majority of the representations generated in the remarks opposing the government's plans drew from the neutrality discourse. As MP Kääriäinen representing the main opposition party argued:

> While reading the report one is inevitably left with an impression that its content is structured mainly to promote and explain one issue: establishing Rapid Deployment Force …
>
> The difference between traditional peacekeeping and development and deployment of the Rapid Deployment Force is a not a minor, but a fundamental question. If the troops are created, we have to be ready to take a new kind of responsibility and accept unfortunate consequences. Depending on the mission, casualties are possible. These would be given for another purpose than defending Finland's independence. Are the Finnish people and the parliament ready for this? ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Lähetekeskustelu' 1995, my translation)

In the Second Hearing, MP Aho, clarified this position. He said:

> The fact that the responsibility in crisis management is different is self-evident. We cannot be asked to fulfil the same requirements as countries belonging to a military alliance… Our basic starting point is that a country which is member of a military alliance has a different responsibility than a non-aligned country. ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Palautekeskustelu' 1995, my translation)

Although the opposition highlighted that Finnish peacekeeping capabilities should be strengthened, it emphasised that Finland did not have the same moral obligations, responsibilities or resources to take part in crisis management than major powers and other more secure states. The representations created in these statements clearly drew on the neutrality discourse. However, the representations generated in the government's defence were mainly structured by the alignment discourse. As the Prime Minister responded:

> MP Aho said that we do not have the same responsibility as others. Yes we do. In participating in peacekeeping missions we have responsibility for the whole mission. We only limit our engagement to a suitable level, which reflects our foreign policy line and our resources. ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Palautekeskustelu' 1995, my translation)

MP Paasio explicitly highlighted the moral dimension of the initiative. He said: the committee suggests that there are no reasons why Finland should not carry out its international responsibilities' ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Palautekeskustelu' 1995, my translation). Moreover, the foreign minister explicitly noted that Finland could be marginalised if it did not carry out its international responsibilities. She said:

> It is possible that Finland could be involved in Bosnia [peacekeeping mission] if the mandate, peace accord, and all the other requirements have been fulfilled. It is obvious that it is not a problem to find enough troops for Bosnia without Finland being involved. It is possible that the Polish troops can replace the Finnish troops in the lively discussed Nordic group [battalion] ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Palautekeskustelu' 1995, my translation)

The representations generated in these articulations were clearly governed by the alignment discourse. Finland had responsibilities and it was in a position to address normative questions. Moreover, the Finnish state identity in the realm of foreign and security policy was increasingly constructed in terms of similarity with the other Nordic countries. In the neutrality discourse Nordic countries had different geopolitical security interests. Moreover, Finland's new position in the North and the West could be potentially challenged by other nations, more willing to engage with the crisis management.

The empirical analysis of the 1995 parliamentary debate, based on the detailed discourse analysis of the previous sections and careful examination of the representations generated in the MPs remarks made in the debated, suggests that in 1995 the alignment discourse was clearly articulated. However, this discourse was not hegemonic. That is, the decision makers were not interpellated by the Alignment discourse. Rather, they responded to it by questioning the representations of the world articulated and the warrants of action indicated by the foreign policy leadership. In so doing, competing views emerged. These articulations were largely structured by the traditional neutrality discourse.

3.3 Re-Articulation the Finnish Foreign and Security Policy Discourse After 1995

The purpose of this section is to examine the role of the European Union's developing foreign and security policy in the light of the alignment discourse. In particular, I am interested in knowing how the construction of the CFSP and the ESDP developed in the official discourse and whether or not the alignment discourse become hegemonic. To do that, I first analyse the security and defence policy reports published in 1997 and 2001 and then the parliamentary debates over the 1997 and 2001 documents. I conclude that the alignment discourse had become hegemonic by 2001. Moreover, the role of the EU foreign and security policy amplified in the discourse. Moreover, towards the end of the 1990s, traditional military aspects related to these developments of the ESDP and NATO enlargement re-gained importance in the Finnish debates. In terms of Finnish state identity, I suggest that the CFSP and the ESDP had a central role in the transition from neutrality to alignment identity.

3.3.1 Situating the Discourse: The CFSP and the ESDP in Finnish Foreign and Security policy

The aim of the 1997 and 2001 security and defence reports was to review the development of the Finnish foreign and security policy in the light of the 1995 report, which laid out a 'broad and sturdy foundation for the development of a comprehensive security policy' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 6). Although the 1997 and 2001 reports centre more on the defence and military issues, both included comprehensive (re)assessment of the developments in Finland's external security environment after the publication of the 1995 report.[70] Therefore, these reports and the parliamentary debates over them constitute analytically interesting empirical material for an analysis of the development and impact of the 1995

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[70] The 1997 White Paper, *The European Security Development and Finnish Defence*, and the 2001 paper, *The Finnish Security and Defence Policy*, are both hundred pages long supplemented with annexes. The 1997 report is divided in two main sections: European Security Development and Finland; and Development of Finland's Defence. Whereas the first section (42 pages) articulated the environment within which Finland found itself in terms of security and defence, the second section (45 pages) laid out the main guidelines to develop the Finnish defence. The 2001 paper included four main sections. Again the first section on 'the Security Environment and Finland's Policy (43 pages), formed the context in which the Finnish policy was then outlined in subsequent sections on Developing Finland's Defence (22 pages), International Crisis Management (11 pages) and Precautionary Measures and Combating Threats to Society (10 pages). (Report by the Council of State 1997; Report by the Council of State 2001).

articulation of the alignment discourse in which the European Union and its developing foreign and security policy had a central position.

The introductory sections of both reports tackled the changes 'put in motion after the end of the Cold War are both profound and lasting' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 8; Report by the Council of State 2001: 7). Relatedly, they suggested that the European security arrangements were under a 'constant change' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 11; Report by the Council of State 2001: 6-7). Both reports re-articulated the representations of the insecurities created in the 1995. The 1997 paper noted that a threat of large-scale military conflict in Europe remained low. On the other hand, Finland was facing new kinds of security threats such as 'political instability, regional and international conflicts, ethnic disputes and other security problems which can erupt as armed conflicts and associated refugee flows' as well as extensive 'environmental problems' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 8; see also, Report by the Council of State 2001: 7). In the 2001 report these security issues are supplemented with the threats and risks including human rights violations, damage to infrastructure, information threats, disasters, terrorism, international crime and epidemics (Report by the Council of State 2001: 17). The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and uncontrolled spread and use of conventional weapons were also explicitly mentioned in both reports (Report by the Council of State 1997: 17; Report by the Council of State 2001: 17).

Significantly for this study, both reports highlighted the increasing importance of the European Union as a security actor (Report by the Council of State 1997: 18-19; Report by the Council of State 2001: 22). The 2001 report declared:

> The importance of the European Union in relation to Finland's security interests and goals has continued to increase. A strong Union based on solidarity will enhance security, prevent crisis from emerging and improve Finland's ability to cope with such situations should they arise' (Report by the Council of State 2001: 8).

Finland's first European Union initiative, the European Union's Northern Dimension, aiming to increase regional stability in the North of Europe, is important for the construction of Finland's increased international influence as an EU member.[71] The 2001 report notes that the 'implementation of the European Union's common policy on the Northern Dimension will provide a long-term approach for promoting sustainable development' (Report by the Council of State 2001). Indeed, with the initiative of the Northern Dimension, Finland emerges as a regional security provider. Significantly, for the Finns the Northern Dimension also indicates that a small member state of the European Union can play an important and constructive role in shaping the Union's policies (Arter 2000).

The development of the CFSP and specifically the ESDP was also highlighted in both reports. In the 1997 paper, the meaning of the approaching European Union's IGC in Amsterdam was explicitly addressed in the report (Report by the Council of State 1997: 19). It suggested that the 'EU has a central task in countering the security problems arising form economic and societal instability in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 13). Significantly, in the 2001 report, European Union's responsibility was highlighted in the field of crisis management and the importance of its military capabilities was underlined. The 2001 paper argues:

> The Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed in 1997 and came into force in 1999, has made EU decision-making more effective and given it new tools for pursuing its common foreign and security policy. The Treaty expanded the scope of the EU's common foreign and security policy by adding crisis management to the EU competence.' (Report by the Council of State 2001: 22)

Moreover, the 2001 paper affirmed that a further 'improvement in the European Union's ability to take action will remain a fundamental principle of Finland's policy on Europe (Report by the Council of State 2001: 8).

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[71] The initiative was launched in 1997 by the Finnish Prime Minister, Paavo Lipponen, This initiative excluded traditional 'hard' security policy issues, and instead promoted 'soft' security issues, advocating strategies associated with economics, the environment and nuclear safety (Ojanen, Herolf et al. 2000). By including non-EU member states, the initiative had implications for EU's external relations and it has been linked to the EU's emerging foreign and security policy.

The subsequent sections of both reports outlined the development of Finland's defence policy and Defence Forces in the near future. In both Reports, Finland's defence was developed according to the policies of military non-alignment and credible independent defence (Report by the Council of State 1997: 54; Report by the Council of State 2001: 47). That is, Finland stayed outside the military alliances and the Finnish defence was based on a territorial defence system. This system was anchored in general conscription, which was seen as necessary to ensure the capacity to defend the entire country (Report by the Council of State 1997: 59; Report by the Council of State 2001: 47).

To keep the defence 'up-to-date', the Government introduced several structural changes for the Defence Forces to 'meet the demands of the early parts of the next millennium' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 54). These were largely based on the new perceptions of warfare and strategy, suggesting that the defence of the core areas of the country had to be strengthened (Report by the Council of State 1997: 71; Report by the Council of State 2001: 45-46). Another key theme of the White Papers was the development of the interoperability of the Finnish troops with international force, mainly through NATO's PfP program and the participation in the European Union's developing military structures (Report by the Council of State 1997: 65-66; 'European Decence - Minitry of Defence Policy Paper' 2001, 69-81). This was seen to serve both Finland's Defence Forces and Finland's international crisis management capabilities. The development of crisis management troops and Finland's defence were constructed to be 'mutually beneficial' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 52; Report by the Council of State 2001: 46, 69).

In short, the European Union's foreign and security policy largely constituted the rational of these reviews. In so doing, the CFSP and the ESDP played a key role in the re-articulation the Finnish state identity in the realm of foreign and security policy in 1997 and 2001. However, although the security was defined broadly, aspects relating to military and defence

issues re-gained importance in the light of developing European Union's military crisis management capabilities.

3.3.2 Re-articulation of the (Non-) Alignment Discourse in the Light of the CFSP and the ESDP

I suggest that the representations of the world created in the security and defence reports in 1997 and 2001 were progressively structured by the alignment discourse. The predication of the subjects, the knowledge presupposed and the subject positions available for the subjects of the official discourse increasingly reflected the alignment discourse. On the other hand, and although still identifiable, the neutrality discourse was clearly fading away. This is a significant finding since the 1997 and 2001 reports explicitly dealt with the traditional 'hard security' question of military and defence in which the legacy of neutrality has been argued to prevail.

In the 1997 and 2001 reports, the main subjects established were broadly the same as in the 1995 report. However, the West was increasingly constructed in terms of the European Union and NATO and the East was increasingly reduced to Russia. The 1997 paper argued: 'From the perspective of Finland, the European Union, Russia and NATO are the most central actors in the security development in Europe.' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 6)The meaning of the North was, however, still important, yet it was increasingly addressed in relation to the European Union. For instance, the reports explicitly refer to the joint Finnish-Swedish proposal in 1997 related to the European Union's defence dimension (Report by the Council of State 1997: 19).

Significantly, in both reports, Finland's relations with the rest of the world are increasingly discussed in terms of the European Union. In particular, Finland's role is highlighted in its relations with the East and Russia (Report by the Council of State 1997: 23; Report by the Council of State 2001: 31-32) and NATO (Report by the Council of State 1997: 22-23; Report by the Council of State 2001: 23-24, 41), and with West and the United States

(Report by the Council of State 1997: 25; Report by the Council of State 2001: 41).

The West, the North and Finland: The European Union, the CFSP, Crisis Management and NATO

As suggested, the main theme of the 1997 report was the changing European security arrangements. The report argued that the European security was 'seeking a shape', it was 'in a state of flux' and the institutions were 'adjusting to new challenges' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 11). Significantly, the western identity was changing and its role in the construction of Finland's place in the world was increasing. Whereas in the 1995 report, the CFSP is constructed as a developing policy, in 1997 paper it is construed as pivotal in the European security. As the 1997 report suggests:

> The EU's importance as a player in the field of security will grow as integration proceeds. The Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty, which entered in to force in 1993) broadened the scope of the Union's competence to encompass the development and implementation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Maastricht Treaty provides for a security and defence dimension to be part of development of the CFSP. This dimension includes the eventual framing of common defence. (Report by the Council of State 1997: 18)

Moreover, whereas, in 1995, the link between the CFSP and national defence policies was seen insignificant, in 1997 the government articulated a relationship between the two. Moreover, Finland's engagement in military crisis management was re-articulated as non-contradictory with the policy of military non-alignment and independent defence with reference to a another Nordic and previously neutral country, Sweden. As the 1997 paper agues:

> The joint Finnish-Swedish proposal was made on the basis of the defence dimension provided in the Maastricht Treaty …Under the proposal, humanitarian and crisis-management tasks involving the use of military organisations would be included in the Union's competence … The proposal would further provide for all EU member states contributing to crisis-management operations, including those not participating in military alliances, to have an equal opportunity to take part in planning and decision making within the WEU in relation to those operations.' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 19)

Significantly, it is not the participation in the military missions but the exclusion from these missions which constituted a problem in 1997 for militarily non-aligned Finland. This type of reasoning related to the new Finnish subject position established by the alignment discourse. That is, the European Union provided Finland with influence.

The participation in crisis management is seen as politically significant. This representation relates to the increasing importance given to the European Union in the realm of foreign and security policy and Finland's overall European policy to be in the 'core' of the European Union, where decisions affecting Finland are made. As Prime Minister Lipponen argues, after deciding to join in the European Union the best way forward is to 'be, as much as possible, within the circles in which the future of the union is decided' (Lipponen 1990: 166). Hence, through participation Finland guarantees 'the effectiveness of its foreign and security policy' (Report by the Council of State 2001: 7) and impact on the EU policy. As such, the closer integration with reference to the ESDP is constructed as complementary to Finnish defence. The 2001 report argues:

> By improving its security cooperation and operational capacity in line with UN and OSCE principles within the EU, within NATO Partnership Cooperation and with other Nordic countries in international crisis management, Finland will improve its own capacity to manage crisis and threats affecting the country. Engaging in international cooperation also supports Finland's precautionary measures aimed at securing key functions in society in times of exceptional circumstances. (Report by the Council of State 2001: 39)

Importantly, Finnish Defence Forces credibility is here linked with the forces 'interoperability' (Report by the Council of State 2001: 73) abroad.

Relatedly, NATO clearly gained more weight in the re-articulation of the non-alignment discourse in 1997 and 2001 reports. I suggest, however, that the European Union, the CFSP and the ESDP were constitutive for the construction of NATO in the reports. That is, NATO was largely discussed in relation to the European Union and crisis management in terms of the 'EU access to NATO resources and military infrastructure in EU-led crisis management' (Report by the Council of State 2001: 23). NATO was also

discussed due to the enlargement of the alliance (Report by the Council of State 1997: 6; Report by the Council of State 2001: 16). Also the NATO enlargement was linked to the European Union, specifically to the EU enlargement. As the 1997 report argued:

> Although the EU and NATO enlargements are independent of each other and apply to different spheres, they are *mutually-influencing because they are parallel and both have security linkages*. The significance for stability of the EU enlargement may be accentuated as NATO gradually expands. Several EU members states would like all of the other members to be in both the WEU and NATO before long. (Report by the Council of State 1997: 20-21, my emphasis)

Whereas in the 1995 report the representation of NATO as a military alliance established a clear distinction between NATO and the CFSP and the ESDP, in 2001 NATO and the European Union were articulated in relation to complementary and similar features. In so doing, the question of Finland's relationship with NATO became more topical.

The 2001 report also emphasised the importance of NATO's 'open door policy' (Report by the Council of State 2001: 24) and re-articulated the policy of militarily non-alignment as non-alignment 'under prevailing conditions' (Report by the Council of State 2001: 7). This re-articulation of Finland's policy in 2001 known also as the 'NATO option policy', is suggestive of the increasing role of the (non-)alignment discourse in official documents. In other words, the neutrality discourse is largely dismantled.

The East: Russia, the Former Soviet Republics and the Eastern European States

The East retained its importance for construction of the Finland's foreign and security policy environment in the 1997 and 2001 reports. Although the eastern subjects were moving towards the West in terms of their developing western political and economic values and norms, they were still important markers of difference in the alignment discourse. First, the East constituted significant insecurities in terms of both the traditional and the new and broader conceptualisations of security. For instance, the 2001 paper suggested that 'Russia was continuing its transition toward democracy, rule of law and a functioning market economy. However, there were still

uncertainties surrounding the country's future development.' (Report by the Council of State 2001: 31) These included political and economic instability and adjustment to Russian declined international position (Report by the Council of State 2001: 16-19, 31-32). Accordingly, the background knowledge in which the representations of Finland's place in the world were largely generated was based in the unstable/stable core opposition.

Importantly, the role of the European Union in Finland's relations with the East increased in 1997 and 2001 reports. The 2001 report argued:

> The importance of cooperation between the EU and Russia for the future of Europe is continually growing Security in the Baltic Sea region will improve as a result of regional cooperation within Europe. This will be shaped by the enlargement of the EU and of NATO and developments in relations between Russia and the Baltic States. (Report by the Council of State 2001: 7)

Moreover, Finland's EU membership and full participation in the CFSP and the ESDP were noted in this respect: 'The key aim of the political and economic integration process that begun in Western Europe is to improve the European stability, security and prosperity' (Report by the Council of State 2001: 22). The report also argued that 'although the EU is primarily a political and economic entity, its Member States have wished to strengthen their ability to manage crisis in Europe and its environs by including military means, following experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo' (Report by the Council of State 2001: 23). Here, the presupposition of unstable East and stable West is taken as given and the European Union is imperative in the constitution of the specific kind of East in the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse.

Moreover, and according to the alignment discourse Finland was not facing the Eastern threats alone. In the 1995 some aspects of the neutrality discourse were still clearly governing some representations generated in the report such as the notion that 'Finland has never enjoyed protected security status' and 'neither will it have a privileged status amid the present changes in Europe, or in the conceivable future' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 66). However, the remnants of the neutrality discourse were clearly

fading away in 1997. The report in 1997 declared: 'membership of the European Union has added clarity and strengthened Finland's international position. Although membership does not entail security guarantees, it does include the protection that is founded on mutual solidarity' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 6). The 2001 paper went further and argued:

> A strong Union based on solidarity will also benefit Finland's security situation and help to prevent the eruption of crises that may affect Finland, as well as improve Finland's ability to deal with such crises. Strengthening the effectiveness of the EU remains firm basis for Finland's policy on Europe. As an EU member Finland plays a role in promoting the stable development and security of its neighbouring areas and Europe as a whole. (Report by the Council of State 2001: 40)

Accordingly, the alignment discourse was increasingly structuring the construction of Finland's geopolitical position. Finland was no longer located alone between the East and the West. Rather, Finland was located firmly in the West.

3.3.3 Interpellation of the Alignment Discourse: The Parliamentary Debates in 1997 and 2001

The examination of the parliamentary debates over the 1997 and 2001 security and defence policy reports supports the claims made above. The number of remarks that were structured by the neutrality discourse decreased in 1997 and 2001 parliamentary hearings. This suggested that over time the policy makers were increasingly interpellated by the alignment discourse. That is, the representations created by the government and increasingly drawing on the alignment discourse are largely accepted as adequate and true reflections of reality (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 29). The data collected through a careful reading and analysis of the 1997 and 2001 parliamentary debates is presented in the Tables 3.4 and 3.5 and Figures 3.2 and 3.3.

Whereas in 1995, several of the remarks made by the government's ministers, MPs representing the parties in the government and opposition mainly drew from both the neutrality and alignment discourses, in 1997 the remarks were increasingly structured by the alignment discourse. In 2001, they were predominantly governed by the alignment discourse.

Remarks and speeches	Neutrality discourse	Neutrality and alignment discourse	Alignment discourse	n/a	Total
First Hearing	20	18	51	15	104
Second Hearing	7	30	55	56	148
Overall Debate	27	48	106	71	252

Table 3.4: Neutrality and alignment discourse in the 1997 Parliamentary Debate



Figure 3.2: Neutrality and alignment discourse in the 1997 Parliamentary Debate

Remarks and speeches	Neutrality discourse	Neutrality and alignment discourse	Alignment discourse	n/a	Total
First Hearing	9	5	101	26	141
Second Hearing	4	6	100	65	175
Overall Debate	13	11	201	91	316

Table 3.5: Neutrality and alignment discourse in the 2001 Parliamentary Debate



Figure 3.3: Neutrality and alignment discourse in the 2001 Parliamentary Debate

Prime Minister Lipponen's opening speeches in 1995 and 1997 serve as examples. In 1995 PM Lipponen argued that the adaptation to the external environment was natural for a small state like Finland. However, he also noted that Finland also wanted to have influence ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Lähetekeskustelu' 1995). In 1997, Lipponen argued:

> The EU membership is of key importance in Finland's overall security policy. The membership has stabilised Finland's position in the new Europe and in so doing, it has security value for our country. In the Union, we carry joint responsibility and we influence to the strengthening of security ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Lähetekeskustelu' 1997, my translation)

Here, the Prime Minister created representations in which Finland could decide how to adapt to the external environment. Accordingly, the increased Finnish influence was largely taken as given.

Whereas in 1995 the issues and remarks made in argumentation reflected both the neutrality and alignment discourses, in 1997 and 2001 the issues changed accordingly to the growing importance of the alignment discourse. These were, for instance, Finland's participation in the military crisis management and peacekeeping operations and military alignment. The majority of the competing views drew from the neutrality discourse. However, some representations generated were indicative of military alignment, rather than non-alignment.

The competing view that questioned the increasing Finnish participation in the European Union's military crisis management operations explicitly reflected the neutrality discourse. In 1997 MP Aho argued:

> We have not opposed to Finland's participation in the Bosnian peacekeeping operation at any stage. However, we have underlined that it is not wise to place peacekeeping training and Rapid Deployment Force designed for peacekeeping operations, under the Defence Forces peacetime organisation. ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Lähetekeskustelu' 1997, my translation)

The logic governing this remark relates to the special character of the Finnish Defence Forces in the neutrality discourse. In this discourse, the credibility of Finland's independent defence is largely based on the willingness of the Finnish people to defend their country. Central for the construction of the 'strong will' is the defensive character of the Defence Forces whose purpose is spatially defined to operate within the borders of the Finnish state. As MP Aho continues, 'Finland's strength lies in our strong will to defend our country. This can only last if the citizens have a clear vision of the country's policy and the tasks of the Defence Forces'. Moreover, Aho indicated that it is important that each Finn can relate to the Defence Forces and, 'if needed, is willing to participate in defending our country' ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Lähetekeskustelu' 1997, my translation).

Relatedly, Finland's possible NATO membership was explicitly raised in the both parliamentary debates. Significantly, the analysis suggests that the EU foreign and security policy had a central role in these debates. Although the government clearly stated that Finland remained militarily non-allied, some MPs argued that increased interoperability of the Finnish troops with EU and NATO forces was a preamble for NATO membership. As MP Vistbacka argued: '… we cannot accept the hidden agenda of the report aiming to subsume Finland in NATO' ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Lähetekeskustelu' 2001, my translation). Vistbacka noted that the same 'slow but sure strategy', which was used to take Finland in the European Union, has been applied again to take Finland in NATO ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Lähetekeskustelu' 2001, my translation).

On the other hand, the remarks defending the government's view suggested that, the developmnet of national defence capabilities and the European Union's military crisis management ability were not mutually exclusive. As MP Kekkonen argued: 'Quite the opposite! Finland's military contribution to the international peacekeeping operations is based on troops which main task is national defence' ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Lähetekeskustelu' 2001, my translation). However, within this context the membership in a military alliance become an increasingly feasible option and subject of increasing discussion.

Crucially, the analysis suggests that the EU membership and the EU foreign and security policy were significant for the emerging consensus among the majority of parliamentarians. More specifically, in the 1997 and 2001 the European Union's developing crisis management capabilities which Finland had been 'planning and building' ('Valtiopäiväasiakirjat, Lähetekeskustelu' 2001, my translation) constituted a key rationale for the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy discourse in Finland. The increasing participation in the European Union's crisis management also highlighted Finland's relationship with NATO. In so doing, it enabled increasing discussion concerning military alignment.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy discourse in Finland. The analysis has suggested that European Union membership and the European Union's developing foreign and security policy have had a significant impact upon the Finnish official discourse. They had a major role in the re-articulation of the official discourse in the post-Cold War in terms of alignment rather than neutrality. Moreover, the development of the EU foreign and security policy, specifically the creation of European Union's crisis management capabilities, was central for the subsequent re-articulations of the official discourse and successful interpellation. The EU membership and the participation in the CFSP and

the ESDP enabled the transition from neutrality to alignment in the realm of foreign and security policy and shaped the state identity of Finland.

Chapter 4

Europeanisation of British Foreign and Security Policy Discourse(s): Re-Articulating Great Power Identity

Introduction

Throughout the 1990s Britain was widely viewed to have a problematic relationship with the European integration project. This common sense view drew from several historical representations which constructed Britain as a great power in decline. After the refusal to participate in the initial phases of the European integration in the 1950s Britain decided to join it in the1960s largely due to the worsening economic conditions. However, Britain's entry in the European Community was blocked by France until 1971.[72] As a member, Britain was soon constructed as an reluctant and 'awkward partner' both in Europe and in Britain (Allen 1988: 171; Wallace 1992; Forster 1998; George 1998; White 2001). Britain was seen to oppose any development which could undermine its autonomy or sovereignty. In Britain

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[72] In the British case the terminology used to refer to the institutional aspects and development of the European integration is assorted. The terms such as 'European Community', 'European Communities' and 'European Economic Communities (EEC)' are often used to refer to the same political entity known as the European Union (EU) since the Maastricht treaty in 1992. Originally, there were three Communities: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euraton), and the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1967 the institutions of the three were merged and since then it has become common to talk of the European Community.

As George suggest, the British usage of Communities or EEC is an example of 'awkwardness' (George 1998: 2). Moreover, the expression of '(European) Common Market' used in Britain and the United States indicates a degree of exceptionality (George 1998: 2; see also, Diez 2001). In this dissertation, the term European Community and its abbreviation EC were used prior to 1992 and the European Union and its abbreviation EU thereafter except where the reference is specifically to one of the three Communities, or to the period prior to the merger in 1967, or where other writers or policy makers are being quoted.

as well as in the other member states, Britain was largely considered a difficult state to work with. As such, it was seen to hold back the development of the European Community.

Scholars and observers have noted that there was strikingly little debate among the British policy-makers concerning the significant changes related to the large-scale political, economic and social change in Europe and beyond. As Forster suggests, the most remarkable aspect of the British foreign policy debate in the 1990s was how little it appeared to be affected by the transformation of the international system. Relatedly, the debate over the Europeanisation of foreign and security policies in wake of the CFSP and the ESDP stimulated very modest debate until the late 1990s. Accordingly, the debate about Britain's place in the world continued along the familiar lines (Forster 2000: 47).

However, this changed in the late 1990s. The Labour party's entry to the government in 1997 and the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) followed by the joint British-French declaration on European defence at St. Malo in December 1998, stirred a significant debate concerning Britain's place in the world. The government argued that Britain needed a fresh start with Europe and a more engaging policy towards the European Union. Importantly, the major factor propelling the change was the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The aim of this case study is to establish what impact, if any, the EU foreign and defence policies have on the seemingly rigid foreign and security policy discourse(s) in Britain.[73] To do that, I first analyse the foreign and security policy documentation in Britain in the 1990s prior to the publication of the SDR. This analysis of the official documentation suggests that there existed a dominant discourse in which the CFSP and the ESDP had a marginal role.

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[73] As in the previous case, here too, I underline that instead of examining change and continuity in the British foreign and security *policy*, my purpose in this chapter is to analyse the effect of the CFSP and the ESDP in the official foreign and security policy *discourse*.

Second, to determine the impact of the increasing weight given to the CFSP and the ESDP in the official foreign and security policy discourse, I examine the foreign, security and defence policy documents and the parliamentary debates around the joint British-French declaration on European defence in St. Malo in 1998. My analysis indicates that the increasing Europeanisation of foreign and security policies was important in the 1998 re-articulation(s) of the British foreign and security policy discourse. However, this re-articulation represented a twist rather than a turn in the discourse. That is, the key elements of the discourse largely remained the same. Finally, to examine how this re-articulation developed in the light of the intensifying Europeanisation, I analyse the subsequent white papers and the parliamentary debates over these documents in the House of Commons. I suggest that in this documentation, as well as in the parliamentary debates, the traditional British great power identity was largely re-produced.

4.1 British Great Power Discourse

This section lays out the discursive context within which the EU foreign and security policy were first articulated and made meaningful. To do that, I map out the dominant foreign and security policy discourse(s) in Britain until 1998, when a turn in discourse in relation to the CFSP and the ESDP became evident in the empirical material. I suggest that the dominant discourse in which these policies were made meaningful was the traditional British great power discourse. The main elements of this discourse were: (i) Britain as a great power with a global reach; (ii) Britain as a leading member of several international organisations: most importantly the (iii) European Union, and (iv) NATO, in which Britain emerged as the (v) closest ally to the United States. To elucidate the great power discourse, I first situate the discourse by a brief descriptive discussion based on the scholarly literature of Britain's foreign and security policy. I then analyse the official foreign and security policy discourse from 1989 to 1997. I deploy a discourse analytic approach to analyse the status and re-articulation of the great power discourse in the light of the increasing Europeanisation of foreign and security policy.

4.1.1 Situating Discourses: Traditional Understandings of Britain in the World

An initial survey of the empirical material suggested that the dominant theme in the official foreign and security policy debates in the 1990s was Britain's place and influence in the world.[74] The documents I looked at highlighted Britain's aspirations to retain and increase its influence in the world economy, international institutions and military affairs in the post Cold War world. In short, the British foreign and security policy was debated in terms of capabilities, influence and leadership. Although the analysis of the primary material forms the core of the subsequent sections of this case study, the purpose of this section is to place the material in a broader historical context by reviewing some of the relevant scholarly literature. In the scholarly literature, two themes appear to be central for the claims concerning the Europeanisation of the British foreign policy. These are the 'three circle' doctrine and Britain's decline in the world politics.

In a conventional study of the perceptions of Britain's foreign policy role from 1989 to 1993, Macleod suggests that three themes dominated the academic debates over the British foreign policy in the post-war era. These were: (i) the nature of Britain's position in the world; (ii) the relevance of the special relationship with the US; and (iii) Britain's link with Europe (see also Hill 1988; Smith, Smith et al. 1988; Macleod 1997: 165). Macleod's findings indicated a continuing salience of the so-called 'three circles' doctrine in the British foreign policy documentation. This doctrine

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[74] This material included six Statements on Defence Estimates (SDEs) from 1990 to 1996 produced by the Ministry of Defence (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1990; Statement on the Defence Estimates 1991; Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992; Statement on the Defence Estimates 1993; Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994; Statement on the Defence Estimates 1995; Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996); the Strategic Defence Review ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998); the 1999 Defence White Paper ('Defence White Paper' 1999); the 2001 Ministry of Defence Policy Paper on European Defence ('European Decence - Minitry of Defence Policy Paper' 2001); a 1992 Conservative Party Election Manifesto (Conservative Party General Election Manifestation 1992), ten UK Prime Ministers' speeches addressing the British foreign and security policy and the developing CFSP and the ESDP (Thatcher 1989; Thatcher 1990; Major 1994; Major 1994; Blair 1997; Blair 1997; Blair 1998; Blair 1998; Blair 1998; Blair 1998), Joint British-French declaration of European Defence in St. Malo (Rutten 2001); and parliamentary debates relating to SDR, the 1999 Defence White Paper and the 2001 European Defence Paper in the House of Commons ('Commons Hansard' 2000; 'Commons Hansard' 2000; 'Commons Hansard' 2001)

was initially articulated by Churchill in the Conservative Party Conference in 1948. In his speech, Churchill located Britain at the intersection of three spheres of influence embracing the Commonwealth, the United States and Europe.

A review of other sources suggests that the 'three circles' doctrine constitutes 'a most significant conceptual framework to have influenced the making of the post-war British foreign policy' (see also, Allen 1988: 169; Hill 1988: 44; Tugendhat and Wallace 1988: 13-14; White 2001:120). As such, it is integral for the British state identity in this policy field. Within the three circles doctrine a particular kind of identity emerges. That is, a great power identity. White's analysis of the three key assumptions of the 'three circles' doctrine is illustrative. First, the doctrine portrays Britain as a global power with global interests rather than a middle-range state pursuing mostly regional interests. Second, it raises pragmatism and flexibility as key principles of the British foreign policy aimed to play a leading role in all three dimensions and not to become committed to any particular 'circle' in the expense of the others. Consequently, and third, Britain is seen as a central and powerful player. As White suggests: 'Churchill's notion that the British 'have the opportunity of joining them [the three circles] all together' provided a rationale for the 'bridge-builder's' role for Britain, which has continued to be a powerful self-image throughout the post-war period' (see also, Macleod 1997: 165-7; White 2001: 120).

Another common theme related to the literature dealing with the Europeanisation of Britain's foreign and security policy is Britain's declining international status.[75] Several accounts argue that latest by the Suez Crisis in 1956 Britain had lost its dominant position in world politics.[76]

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[75] The notion of decline underpins for instance the well established volume on the British foreign policy edited by M. Smith, S. Smith and B. White's (Smith, Smith et al. 1988; see also, Macleod 1997; White 2001). For instance, Allen notes that 'implicit in many of the chapters in this book is the argument that Britain has ceased to be a global power with global interests.

[76] The failed Franco-British intervention in 1956 in Suez due to Egypt's decision to nationalise Anglo-French Suez Canal Company is often seen as an important watershed in Britain's post-war history. For instance, Sanders suggest that although British power in the world had declined prior to the Suez Crisis, it is seen, however, as a prelude to the large-

This argument is linked to the end of the British Empire and, more recently, to the diminishing role of the Commonwealth. However, several other international and domestic developments are also noted in the literature. Macleod's account is illustrative. He argues:

> The rise of the two superpowers, the loss of empire, and the birth of a European Common Market, to which it [Britain] was forced to apply three times before being finally admitted, were in themselves enough to shake that country's self-confidence in its international status. But Britain has also had to contend with domestic decline, in particular in the economy, which saw this country gradually fall behind its two major West European rivals, France and Germany. This loss of capacity and influence, in terms of political, economic, technological, and military power, which could only be fleetingly masked by the Falklands adventure, has been accompanied by a crisis of national identity and status as Britain has striven to define its place in Europe and adjust to qualitative change in its 'special relationship' with the United States. (Macleod 1997: 161)

Central for the decline theme is the representation of Britain as a state which is searching for a new international identity. As Dean Acheson put it in 1962, 'Britain had lost an empire but had not yet found a role' (cited in Macleod 1997: 161).

Alternative analyses render some of the decline arguments as an overstatement. For instance, Hill suggests that one of the 'apparent geohistorical continuities' or 'givens' in the British foreign policy has been its global reach which should not be underestimated 'in the closing years of the twentieth century' (Hill 1988: 31-32). Hill argues that British diplomatic influence is still considerable and certainly beyond its economic ranking. He also pointed out that British culture was capable of exerting a formative influence on millions of people in many different kinds of societies, independent of the British military capability, and in the latter field Britain had maintained a formal nuclear weapon status. Moreover, in the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher's assertive foreign and security policy rhetoric inspired some scholars to conclude that Britain's influence in the world is increasing rather than diminishing. In these accounts, Britain is seen as one of the most

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scale withdrawal from the Empire and the shift towards Europe which occurred after the 1960s. (Sanders 1990: 88-89)

influential states in the Cold War world. As the closest US ally, it had a key role also in the post Cold War world (Macleod 1997: 165).

Nevertheless, there exists a broad scholarly consensus which suggests that although Thatcher restored a certain sense of national self-assurance (Tugendhat and Wallace 1988: 22), her time in office does not indicate a return of the British dominance in the world politics (Sanders 1990: 291-294; Macleod 1997: 165). Moreover, Macleod notes that, instead of increased British influence, the collapse of communism aggravated Britain's identity crisis by removing the foundations of one of the vital pillars of its special place in the world; namely, its contribution to the Western defence network. Britain's influential identity 'could no longer depend on being perceived as one of the principal European ideological and military bulwarks against any possible show of the Soviet strength' (Macleod 1997: 162).

The decline thesis and the 'three circles' doctrine are both central for the scholarly understanding(s) of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy in Britain. For instance, Britain is widely seen to have valued the special relationship with the United States over the participation in the western European integration (Sanders 1990; George 1998; White 2001). In the 1950s, Britain endorsed the transatlantic defence cooperation over the European cooperation and highlighted NATO's role in European defence. British policy makers' explicit aim was to safeguard the United States commitment in the post-war European security and defence. On the other hand, Britain's decision to opt out from the initial stages of the economic integration signals an autonomous or detached relationship with Europe (Sanders 1990; George 1998; White 2001).

The reconsideration of this decision in the 1960s can be interpreted to reflect British pragmatism in terms of rational calculations of the economic costs of the detachment. Accordingly, and as scholars have noted the membership application did not represent any special commitment to the western European integration. (Larsen 1997: 53; Duff 1998; George 1998-

40; White 2001: 121). Rather, Britain aimed to consolidate its special relationship with the United States (Sanders 1990) and safeguard its trade interests in Europe and, in so doing, to retain some of its international ranking given the end of the Empire. After the eventual entry in the EEC in 1973, Britain quickly gained its reputation as a reluctant partner. For observers, the British claims to renegotiate its entry and to retain full autonomy in several policy areas signalled a continuing salience of the three circles doctrine. In the 1970s, Jenkins defined Britain's relationship with Europe in terms of 'semi-detachment' from the Community (White 2001: 121). By the late 1980s, George suggested that Britain had become 'an awkward partner' (George 1998).

However, and as White notes, in the 1990s, the Major and Blair governments increasingly argued that they were committed to 'locate Britain in the heart of Europe' (White 2001: 121). Nevertheless, the empirical material of this study, as well as the scholarly literature, suggest that the Britain was still seen as a reluctant partner. The series of successive negative descriptions of Britain's relationship with Europe such as detached, semi-detached and awkward still underpinned the policy statements of these governments. Importantly for this study, Forster suggests that the political 'symbolism' related to British autonomy and the reluctance to integrate has obscured important concessions on substance, including the incremental introduction of majority voting and developing linkage between the community and intergovernmental pillars. In scholarly literature this so-called 'ratchet effect' indicates that Britain has been drawn into integration in foreign and security policy without ever 'admitting to a domestic audience how far integration in this policy sector has proceeded' (Forster 2000: 47). Instead of asking *why* the Europeanisation has been masked in Britain, the aim of the remainder of this section is to explicate *how* it was *possible* for the policy-makers to marginalise the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy in the official foreign and security policy discourse.

4.1.2 Re-articulating the British Great Power Discourse: The End of the Cold War and the CFSP

The purpose of this section is to examine the official foreign and security policy discourse(s) in Britain until 1998 when the more engaged articulations of the EU foreign and security policy emerged. I analyse the official policy papers, election manifestation and Prime Minister's speeches formulated prior to the British-French declaration on European Defence in 1998. A discourse analytic approach, utilising the analytical tools of predication, presupposition and subject positioning, is employed to map out the key features of the official discourse, in which the Europeanisation in terms of the CFSP and the ESDP was first raised.

Predication

The main subjects and objects and their predication in the texts is presented in Table 4.1. The numbers in the brackets in the table refer to the source document. The documents are listed in Appendix 2. The table is suggestive of a dominant foreign and security policy discourse. That is, the representations arrived at by assigning predicates, adverbs and adjectives to the subjects and objects (i.e. predication) in the texts corresponds with each other and none seem to be radically out of place. For instance, the predication of Britain as a 'major participant in world affairs,' a 'leading member' of several international organisations' and a 'responsible nuclear power' which 'promotes democracy, liberal capitalism and the rule of law' (Table 4.1) make sense within the particular discursive context of the official British foreign and security policy. They establish a particular kind of British subject characterised with greatness, influence and ability to provide leadership. I label this dominant discourse as a great power discourse.

The table also suggests that the official discourse is euro-centric and, although, the dramatic changes related to the end of the Cold War are noted in the texts, the construction of the subject reflects bi-polar world order in terms of the East-West division. That is, the main subjects established in the texts are western subjects such as NATO (also cited as the Alliance), the European Union, the WEU, the United States and the western European states, or eastern subjects including the Soviet Union, its predecessor

Russian Federation and the former eastern European states. In addition, some other important subjects such as Israel in relation to the Palestine question, Iraq and other Gulf states in relation to the Gulf crisis in 1990 as well as several international organisations such as the UN, the CSCE, G7, the WTO and the Commonwealth are articulated in this discourse.

In the great power discourse, the adjectives, attributes and predicates assigned to subjects hang together in a certain way. The representations generated indicate distinct political spaces. I suggest that three geopolitical dimensions were central for British state identity. These were the West, the East and the Globe. Moreover, Britain was clearly located within the West.

The representations of western subjects highlighted similarity, particularly in terms of political tradition reflecting a set of values. Whereas Britain 'promotes democracy, liberal capitalism and the rule of law,' NATO is 'committed to peace, democracy and the rule of law', and the European Union, including the majority of the western European states, can build 'democratic systems and enhance liberal democracy and the rule of law' (Table 4.1). However, and importantly for this study, within the realm of security and defence, the predication of the western subjects, in particular, NATO and the European Union, differs.

Whereas NATO is seen as the 'only credible' defence organisation in Europe, the European Union is construed mainly as 'an economic organisation' with 'a developing foreign and security policy' dimension (Table 4.1). Whereas the credibility of NATO is based on its military supremacy guaranteed by the United States and its member states' full 'commitment to the common defence' (Table 4.1), the European Union lacks capabilities and political will in this field. For instance, it 'includes four neutral member states' with *distinct* security and defence policies (Table 4.1). Accordingly, whereas more cooperation is seen as feasible within the field of the CFSP, development of a common defence policy is construed as 'not credible' and 'not feasible' (Table 4.1).

The UK	The West	The East	The Globe:
A Major participant in world affairs [4] A leading member of several international organisations such as NATO, the EU, the WEU, the Commonwealth and G7 [9] A permanent member of the UN's Security Council [9] A nation that lives by trade and investment [8] Has global interests and responsibilities [8] Is a mature democracy [1] Promotes democracy, liberal capitalism and rule of law [8] Is a source of international ideas and can spread those [1] Cannot be everywhere and do everything [5] Is a formidable military power [6] Has nuclear forces [2, 3] Can defend its territory [2, 3] Can defence European mainland [2, 3]	**NATO**: Unique political and military alliance [2] Committed to peace, democracy and the rule of law [2] Primary instrument of Western security [2, 8] Essential framework to safeguard freedom and security [1, 2] Can ensure full US and Canadian role in the defence of Europe [3] Has political dimension [4] Is enlarging [9] **The US**: Is the corner stone of NATO's military forces [2] Central for European security [3] **The EC/EU**: Basis for crowing economic interdependence [6] Arena for foreign policy coordination [6] Has economic and trade relations [9] Can resolve conflicts and disputes [9] Can build democratic systems and enhance liberal democracy and rule of law [9] Has neutral member states [9] **The CFSP**: Is intergovernmental cooperation [4, 9] Distinguishes between security and defence [4] Is becoming more important [6] Has a long history [6] **EU's Common Defence:** Not feasible and not credible [8, 9] **WEU**: Has central role in building European pillar within NATO [3] Has a peacekeeping role [5] Should be able to operate when NATO as whole won't [8] Should not be folded in to the EU [8]	**The Soviet Union**: A threat [2] Is going through dramatic changes [2] Has a massive military superiority in Europe [2] Was under totalitarian control [2] Is becoming freer and more democratic [2] Was a menace [4] **Russia**: Is still the largest single military power in Europe [4] Is undergoing a process of political and economic reform [4, 8] which will take decades [6] Facing several security related problems [8] **Eastern European States**: Emerging from forty years of political stagnation [3] Is going through dramatic changes [2] Are unstable [4] Rising nationalism, extremism and ethnocentrism [6] Has environmental problems [8] **Balkans and Yugoslavia:** Has tragic and dangerous conflicts [6]	**Iraq**: Is an enemy [3] Ruled by brutal dictator [3] Threat to regional peace and stability [9] Threat to international peace [3] Has oil [9] Iraqi people are oppressed [3] **Africa**: A troubled continent [7] Third world countries [7] Is in dept [7] Underdeveloped [7] **The UN**: Maintains international security and peace [5] Growing influence [6] Can authorise operations [1, 5] Transforming [6] **CSCE/OSCE**: Is an essential element of the new European security architecture [4] Provides a forum for a dialogue on arms control and confidence-building measures [9] Can assess and prevent conflicts [4] Is developing [3] Is inclusive [3] Is becoming more important [9] Has links with NATO (peacekeeping) [5]

Table 4.1: Predication of the great power discourse in Britain

The official discourse suggests that the CFSP clearly 'distinguishes between security and defence'. Further, it is seen to have a 'long history' (Table 4.1). As such, it does not mark a break with the past. Rather, it relates to a longer-term development of the 'intergovernmental' European Political Cooperation (Table 4.1). Importantly, due to the continuing salience of NATO and the increasing importance of the European Union, Britain emerges as a particularly pivotal western subject. The British initiative of the 'Atlantic assembly' re-articulated Britain as a 'bridge' between the western European and the North-American states as well as between the European Union and NATO.

The representations of the eastern subjects also construe a particular kind of political space. In the East, Russia has a dominant role. Russia largely inherits the Soviet Union's 'military might' and it constitutes 'a great power' (Table 4.1). However, in the post-Cold War 'Russia is not a menace' and it does not poses a clear and present 'military threat' to the West (Table 4.1) Nevertheless, it retains its potential to do so. Several predicates, adjectives and attributes assigned to the eastern subjects highlight the ongoing process of 'political, economic and social transformation' (Table 4.1). Although this process is attached some positive features, the predication of some eastern subjects, such as the (former) Yugoslavia, generated representations of unpredictability and instability of the ongoing transition (Table 4.1). The general representation of the East as an 'unstable' region is arrived at through the predication of the eastern subjects in terms of the 'political instability,' 'nationality disputes' and 'environmental degradation' (Table 4.1). Yet some positive developments are acknowledged in relation to some eastern subjects. Nevertheless, the East is largely constructed in terms of difference to the West.[77]

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[77] Neumann suggests that in the contemporary discourses of the European identity formations the East is used as a sign of otherness on the all-European, regional, and national levels (Neumann 1998)

> The respect with which Britain is regarded in the world has rarely been higher. We play a central part in world affairs as a member of the European Community, NATO, the Commonwealth and the Group of 7 leading industrial countries, and as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council. No other country holds all these positions. (Conservative Party General Election Manifestation 1992)

Even if the scholarly literature of Britain's post-war foreign and security policy is preoccupied with the question of decline, in the official foreign and security policy discourse Britain's pre-eminence in the world politics is clearly re-articulated. However, the overwhelming emphasis on British great power status can be interpreted as a response to the representations suggesting decline. For instance, Thatcher argues that 'we *re-establish* respect for Britain abroad' and she suggests in a defensive manner how Britain's economic achievement's 'are not measured just in statistic, but in changing attitudes and in our much greater influence in the greater world' (cited in Macleod 1997: 178). Even if Thatcher's successor, Prime Minister Major, was more willing to accept Britain as a European power, he also insisted that Britain was a power 'with continuing responsibilities in many parts of the world.' (Major 1991, cited in Macleod 1997: 178).

Central for British greatness is its global rather than local interests and responsibilities. The great power discourse suggests that the well-being, prosperity and the greatness of Britain is distinctively tied to its global reach as an island state depending on sea and air transportation. As the SDE in 1996 argues:

> …our well-being depends to a greater degree than the most other developed economies on international trade and investment. We are as a consequent reliant on the secure transport of goods by sea and on the supply of raw materials from overseas. (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996)

This presupposition underpins one of the core aspects of Britain's greatness, that is, its global military reach. The first paragraph of the first chapter of the SDE in 1994 argued:

> The United Kingdom remains one of the world's most formidable military powers. Only the United States, Russia and France can deploy as broad a range of capabilities as the armed forces of the United Kingdom who, in terms of their experience, training, leadership and spirit, are the match of any in the world. (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994: 7)

The other key subjects constructed in the discourse do not construct a definable geopolitical region. Rather, they relate to Britain's global presence. The predication of some subjects like Iraq generated representations of enmity. Iraq is straight-forwardly construed as an 'enemy' and 'threat' to the regional and international peace and the British interests in a strategically important region. Moreover, its leader is seen as a 'brutal dictator' who can acquire 'weapons of mass destruction' (Table 4.1). On the one hand, the representations of Africa and the African states highlight the 'problems' and 'instability' of the continent related to 'underdevelopment' (Table 4.1). Then again, the predication of several international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), the G8 group of leading industrial economies and Russia, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), generated representations which emphasise the importance of these subjects in enhancing British interests in the world.

Presupposition

The above representations make sense within certain background knowledge. As the theoretical and methodological framework of this study suggest, the knowledge presupposed in the process of the articulation and re-articulation of a discourse simultaneously position the subjects and objects created in the discourse. The positioning in turn usually takes place along the binaries established by certain core oppositions. Therefore, the identification and discussion of these oppositions shed light into the identity construction related to a particular discourse. I suggest that whilst the British great power discourse included one core opposition of *great/minor,* several other oppositions such as *global/local, liberator/oppressor, stable/unstable* and *developed/ underdeveloped* can be subsumed under the core oppositions. Taken together, these oppositions enabled the construction of a particular kind of British state identity.

Great/minor. In the great power discourse, Britain is straightforwardly construed as a great power. The ruling Conservative Party's general election manifestation in 1992 is illustrative. It argued:

> The respect with which Britain is regarded in the world has rarely been higher. We play a central part in world affairs as a member of the European Community, NATO, the Commonwealth and the Group of 7 leading industrial countries, and as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council. No other country holds all these positions. (Conservative Party General Election Manifestation 1992)

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The focus on the military power is also indicative of a realist world-view in which states' seek to maximise their power in world politics and to safeguard their interests. On the other hand, in the great power discourse, Britain's global responsibilities reflect Britain's historical role in several regions around the globe. In this presupposition, Britain is positioned along the binary opposition of *liberator/oppressor*. Interestingly, in the mid 1990s, this opposition informed the representation of the on going transition in the eastern Europe. As Prime Minister Major argued in 1994:

> ...the challenge now is to catch the tide of events that have flown in recent years so very strongly in our favour, to draw the nations of eastern Europe - historic, vivid nation states: Poland, Hungary, the Czech lands, and others - back into the European camera [sic], to make democratic Russia an ally and not a threat, to help the democracies in the third world escape the excessive debt that cripples their development - and time after time it has been British initiatives that have led the way in achieving this, to use our age-old links with Africa to help prepare that troubled continent for a better future.
>
> These are historic roles; historic roles for which Britain and the Conservative Party are marked out by history and by experience. We will use that experience. (Major 1994)

Central for the great power discourse, then, is Britain's ability 'to lead the way' in the post-Cold War Europe. This representation, in turn, assumes a particular British role in world; that is, a liberator. Although this 'historical role' draws on specific and rather positive representations of Britain's colonial rule and its role in the Second World War, in the 1990s Britain's historical role was re-articulated in terms of the end of the Cold War.

The 1992 SDE argues that the 'lowering of the Red Flag over the Kremlin on Christmas Day last year brought to an end the menace of the discredited ideology with its struggle for the global dominance by every means available…' (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992: 5). It notes that when the communist rule collapsed 'nations in Central and Eastern Europe have elected democratic governments…' and Britain in turn is 'helping the former communist countries to achieve the unprecedented transition…' (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992: 7). Moreover, Britain's major

role as a liberator is also re-articulated in relation to the Gulf crisis in 1990. The 1991 SDE argues:

> The British forces from all three Services made the largest European contribution to deterring further aggression and defending Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States; to enforcing the embargo against Iraq; and eventually to the military operations that liberated Kuwait. (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1991: 7)

Here British greatness is arrived at by combining representations of its material global reach with its normative responsibilities in the world. Thatcher's speech given in 1990 is illustrative:

> My Lord Mayor, I can't remember a time when the demands upon us—upon Britain and the Western countries—have been greater: calls for help to sustain democracy and reform in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Eastern Europe; the call to help defend countries outside Europe threatened by aggression. Thank goodness we kept our defences strong so that we could respond to the crisis in the Gulf with our Tornados and our Royal Navy ships and the Desert Rats!

In the great power discourse, Britain emerges as a particular kind of great power – a power with a global reach and a normative commitment to liberate peoples from oppression.

Stable/unstable. On the other hand, the representation of specific and rather great British responsibilities presupposed and generated knowledge that was familiar, for instance, in the field of security and development studies in the post Cold War world. The binary oppositions of stable/unstable and developed/underdeveloped are of key importance here. The SDE in 1995 argued:

> The removal of the constraints imposed by the structure of ideological confrontation has resulted in civil war, cross-border conflict and the collapse of economic links in Europe and elsewhere. The previous low risk of global war has as a result been replaced by greater risk of smaller-scale conflict and suffering, spawned by the instability present in many parts of the world, exacerbated in many cases by resource and economic pressures. The consequences of the rise of nationalism, extremism and ethnocentrism are nowhere more apparent than in some of the newly independent states of eastern Europe and in the former Yugoslavia, where we have seen how quickly regional instability can erupt into violence and how quickly conflict in one state can spill over into a neighbour. (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1995: 23)

The presupposition relating to the core opposition of *stable/unstable* constructed particular kind of subjects. They were stable and developed or unstable and underdeveloped. For instance, in the great power discourse the former communist states, African states as well as Middle Eastern states are constituted a particular kind of subjects. That is, developing and unstable states.

A short extract taken from the SDE in 1996 is illustrative of how the core opposition of stable/unstable established a certain knowledge about the world in which a particular British identity emerged. The White Paper said:

> The United Kingdom has interests and responsibilities across the globe. We have a commitment to the security of our 14 Dependent Territories. Our trading history has resulted in a large expatriate population, with significant numbers of British nationals living in areas of potential instability such as Africa and the Middle East, to whom we have obligations (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996: 3)

Straightforwardly, this world is exhibited with certain kind of subjects. That is, global and stable powers and more regional developing and unstable subjects. In this world it is presupposed that Britain is an influential global and stable power with significant international responsibilities.

Subject Positioning

The construction of subjects along the oppositional dimensions discussed above simultaneously positioned these subjects in a hierarchical order. This hierarchical positioning is evident in the degree of agency assigned to the subjects in the discourse. I suggest that the arrangement positioning the subjects in relation to others was the anarchical international society. In the light of the increasing interdependence, however, the emphasis on common interests and shared norms became more visible towards the end of the 1990s. I suggest that the great power discourse incorporated four major subject positions: (i) the powerful, global and transatlantic Britain; (ii) the credible and transatlantic NATO; (iii) the increasingly powerful but unreliable European Union; and (iv) the dependent and developing countries in the East, the Middle East and Africa. The relationships among the positioned subjects (re-) produced a particular kind of British state identity.

As the central subject of the discourse, Britain was attributed a significant degree of agency. Specifically, Britain's global reach and ability to safeguard its interests were emphasised. As the extracts in the previous sections suggest, Britain had the capacity to defend itself and its interests militarily as well as to influence through international organisations. Moreover, the historical constructions of Britain as a 'former maritime empire', one of the oldest 'democracies', the 'founder of industrial development and technological innovation' and the 'victorious power of the two world wars' (Table 4.1), underlined Britain's power and responsibility as an international subject. Britain could and should 'shape the world' (Table 4.1).

These aspects of British leadership and power were particularly pertinent in Britain's position in relation to the former communist states in Europe and to the developing states in the third world, for instance. Britain had responsibilities based on its history, society and economics to 'lead' and 'show the way' within the Commonwealth and in Africa, as well as in Asia and former Eastern Europe. Although the representation(s) of Russia also indicated significant agency in terms of capabilities and resources, the subject position available for Russia in the hierarchical arrangement of the great power discourse was the one of a collapsed great power. As such, Russia was re-articulated as an unstable and developing subject, which needed guidance and assistance.

The other western subjects include mainly NATO, the United States and the western European states. Whereas the United States was associated with NATO, the other western European states were largely addressed increasingly linked to the European Community and, after 1993, to the European Union. The most significant difference between NATO and the European Union in the field of foreign and security policy reflected the degree of agency assigned to them. NATO's supremacy was arrived at by allotting the United States a greater degree of agency than Britain or other western European states. Although, the United States was rarely explicitly

mentioned in the documents, it clearly underpinned the agency of NATO. As the SDE in 1994 argues:

> NATO is the only security organisation with the military to back up its security guarantees. It secures the vital link between Europe and North America: vital in political terms because of our shared fundamental values and common interests, and in military terms because no other European country or group of counties is likely to be able to field the intelligence capabilities, sophisticated firepower or strategic lift supplied by the United States. (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994: 9)

Here the United States is empowering the West. The US military power invested in NATO which constituted the corner stone of the western European defence and military arrangements against the traditional large-scale military attack as well as the new post-Cold War security issues and threats. Moreover, NATO's increasing political role in Europe was directly noted in the texts. NATO was 'enlarging' and due to its cooperation and partnership programmes, it was becoming a more political and inclusive organisation (Table 4.1). Moreover, notwithstanding Britain's own nuclear capabilities, the United States largely reinforced the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrence.

Significantly, in the great power discourse, Britain's special relationship with the United States signified an influential role within NATO. That is, the close political and cultural ties with the United States, 'who share our belief in freedom, democracy, the rule of law and the non-violent mechanisms for political change' (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994: 9) politically empowered Britain within NATO and, consequently, in Europe. On the other hand, Britain's relationship with western Europe and the European Union was also significant for British influence in the world economy.

Accordingly, and although the role of the European Union in the field of foreign and security policy was noted already in the early 1990s, it did not translate into a powerful subject-position in this policy field. As the common sense of the 'capabilities-expectations gap' thinking indicates, the CFSP was seen to lack institutional structures and political will enabling a

strong and decisive policy. On the other hand, the development of common defence was constructed as an unfeasible project. Nevertheless, Britain 'endorsed a development of European security and defence identity, which will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance…' (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994: 15). That is, a more prominent European and British role within NATO.

Important representation constitutive of the British great power identity highlighted Britain's ability to shape European developments. As Prime Minister Major put it, he was 'to carve out a right position for Britain in the right sort of Europe' (Major 1994). On the other hand, none of the major representations generated in the discourse highlighted the impact of the European Union upon Britain. In the light of the Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy, the 'right sort of Europe' had the more effective CFSP, but not the ESDP. In so doing, the relationships among the subject positions that were established in the great power discourse highlighted NATO's and the United States' continuing significance in Europe and for the British foreign and security policy. Moreover, whereas the CFSP was constructed potentially beneficial and developing the EU policy, the ESDP was merely seen as incredible and unfeasible in the near future.

4.1.3. Hegemony of the Great Power Discourse and the European Union Foreign and Security Policy

Notwithstanding the struggles in the discursive field, and the continuous need of re-production of identities, I suggest that until 1998 the re-articulation of the British foreign and security policy discourse continued in a familiar way. That is, the policy-makers continued to identify their state with the subject position established in the great power discourse. Given this particular kind of great power identity, I argue that there was very little discursive space for re-articulations that highlighted the significance of the EU developments in the field of the foreign and security discourse. Consequently, the British foreign and security policy documentation largely ignored and downplayed the development of the CFSP with the prospect of the ESDP until 1998. On the other hand, the representations that

were generated were highlighting the developing and problematic nature of the CFSP and the ESDP.

The predication, presupposition and subject positioning of the great power discourse indicated that the development of a European Union foreign and security policy was, however, not beyond reason. The CFSP and the ESDP could be intelligibly articulated. Indeed, these twin policies were articulated in a seemingly radical way in the official discourse in 1994. As the SDE argued:

> There is a long tradition of co-operation with our European partners on foreign and security policy issues. The growing interdependence of our economies and in increasing coincidence of foreign policy concerns and goals will mean that our foreign and security policies will to greater degree be coordinated and implemented at European level. We have declared through our signature of the Maastricht Treaty our intention to contribute to work towards a common European defence policy which may, in time, lead the European Union to a common defence.(Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994: 15).

However, it is striking how little this re-articulation of the CFSP, with a prospect of the ESDP, was discussed and elaborated. The lack of debate over EU foreign and security policy is evident in the empirical material that I looked at until 1998. However, it was also reflected in the foreign policy discourse more generally. As Hill notes, in the Prime Minister's address to the British government conference on British foreign policy at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1995, John Major did not mention the CFSP even once (Hill 1997: 89, footnote 28). I suggest that the lack of discussion and elaboration of the CFSP and the ESDP was indicative of hegemony of the great power discourse. In short, in the great power discourse this articulation of the CFSP and the ESDP appeared to be political rhetoric rather than political reality.

First, the notion of the 'long tradition of the European foreign policy cooperation' (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994: 15) highlighted the incremental nature of the recent developments. That is, the CFSP and the ESDP did not represent a break with the past. Rather they highlighted continuity. Given the failure of European efforts to establish a more

independent foreign and security policy role, and the continuing salience of NATO and the Unites States in European security, a particular construction of the CFSP and the ESDP emerged. Within the great power discourse, the European Union foreign and security policy was rendered deeply suspect. Whereas the CFSP was constructed as indecisive and weak, the ESDP was seen as a not viable security arrangement. The SDE in 1994 directly mentioned the weaknesses of the CFSP. It argued: 'the United Kingdom wishes to ensure an effective CFSP, and to preserve its intergovernmental status. The CFSP should be more active, less declaratory than previous foreign policy co-operation…' (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994: 15).

Second, the development of a common European Union defence capability and the merging of the WEU in to European Union were seen as deeply problematic and unfeasible. Here, the European Union's lack of capabilities and political will to act in the field of defence was explicitly underlined with reference to the three 'neutral' states of Austria, Finland and Sweden that joined the European Union in 1995. As the SDE in 1996 suggests:

> …common decisions and actions in the defence field – most sensitive area of policy – must proceed by consent …Here we are particularly conscious of the way in which the Inter-Governmentalism and the principle of consensus have served the Atlantic Alliance and WEU well over nearly 50 years… The European Union contains at present four neutral countries which do not share obligations to mutual defence. Against that background, we do not believe it realistic for the European Council to take decisions in the area of defence – nor is it equipped to do so. (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996: 13)

Here, the difference between the European Union and NATO is re-articulated. Within the great power discourse NATO is constructed as a distinct and credible defence organisation. On the other hand, the diversity among the European Union member states indicates a break down of consensus and commitment in the sensitive area of defence. Accordingly, the SDE in 1996, published prior the IGC in Amsterdam in 1997, in which the issues related to the CFSP and ESDP were high on the agenda, argues:

> We believe that the European Union can achieve the extension of security and prosperity we enjoy by helping to embed liberal democracy, freedom and

> prosperity in the countries of central and eastern Europe, *without any need for it to emerge from the IGC as an organisation with a defence component*. (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996: 13, my emphasis)

The great power discourse, then, constructed the ESDP as an unfeasible development in the field of the European foreign and security policy/ies.

This discursive construction of the CFSP and ESDP was still re-articulated by the ruling Conservative Party in 1997. Although the 1997 Conservative Party manifestation argued that 'we will seek more co-operation between national governments on areas of common interest - defence, foreign policy and the fight against international crime and drugs' (Concervative Party General Election Manifestation 1997), the kind of cooperation underlined was very limited. The manifestation continued:

> We will retain Britain's veto and oppose further extension of qualified majority voting in order to ensure we can prevent policies that would be harmful to the national interest. (Concervative Party General Election Manifestation 1997)

In terms of the European Union's defence capabilities, the ruling party suggested that,

> NATO will remain the cornerstone of our security. We will resist attempts to bring the Western European Union under the control of the European Union, and ensure that defence policy remains a matter for sovereign nations. (Concervative Party General Election Manifestation 1997)

However, the Conservative Party were voted out of the office after 18 years in power, and the New Labour entered office with a seemingly more engaging policy towards the European Union's foreign and security policy. Whether this represented a break with the past in the level of discourse, or a Europeanisation of British state identity, is the question underpinning the remainder of the case study.

4.2 Articulation of the CFSP and the ESDP and the Re-Articulation of the Great Power Discourse

Whereas the first section laid out the discursive context in which the CFSP and ESDP were first raised in 1990s, this section analyses how these EU policies were constructed in Britain in the late 1990s. For many, the entry of

the Labour government in office in 1997, a new Strategic Defence Review and the British-French declaration on European defence at St. Malo in 1998, marked a turning point in the British foreign, security and defence policy debate. A key feature of this turn was Britain's seemingly new and more engaged approach to the European integration. Whether this reflected, or postulated, a change in the dominant foreign and security policy *discourse* is the key question of this section. I suggest that although these policies had a central role in the British foreign and security policy debates after 1997, the articulation of these policies represented a twist, rather than a turn, in the official discourse. That is, the re-articulation of the great power discourse was characterised with significant continuity.

I first situate the articulation of the EU foreign and security policy by describing the assumed turn in the official British foreign and security policy discourse in the light of the emerging ESDP. I then utilise the discourse analytic tools of predication, presupposition and subject positioning to analyse the re-articulation of Britain's place in the world. Finally, through the examination of the parliamentary debates over the 1998 re-articulations, I analyse whether the government's re-articulation of the great power discourse interpellated the parliamentarians.

4.2.1 Situating the Re-Articulation of the EU Foreign and Security Policy: Strategic Defence Review and St. Malo Declaration in 1998

Although the post Cold War era is mostly seen as a period of large scale transformations in Europe and beyond, scholars have noted that these changes did not lead to a dramatic re-evaluation of the British foreign and security policy in terms of Britain's self-image. Rather, they argue that despite the transition in world politics 'the debate on Britain's place in the world continued in familiar lines' (Forster 2000: 47).

In terms of the European foreign and security policy integration, Forster notes an interesting paradox: while the British involvement in the development of the ECP, the CFSP and the ESDP has been notable, the

official foreign policy documents on these policies have been obstructing. As Foster argues:

> … the imagery of intergovernmentalism, first through the development of European Political Cooperation (EPC) outside of the Community structure and then pillarisation of the CFSP, has been used to deliberately obscure important concessions on substance, including the incremental introduction of majority voting, the merger of the ECP and the Council Secretariat and developing linkage between the *communautaire* and intergovernmental pillars, both functionally and through the budget. (Forster 2000: 47, emphasis in original)

Therefore, the EU foreign and security policy and the British involvement in it have been much deeper than the foreign policy leadership has ever admitted to the domestic audience in Britain (Forster 2000).

I suggested that this aspect of the British foreign and security policy debate changed in 1998. That is, in 1998 the recent developments in this field were explicitly acknowledged by the foreign policy leadership. Moreover, Britain's full engagement and commitment with the CFSP and the ESDP were noted. A brief descriptive journey into the New Labour re-articulation of foreign and security policy discourse is illustrative.

Part of the novelty of New Labour was the party's allegedly more positive and engaged stance towards European integration (Driver and Martell 1998: 145-146). Prime Minister Tony Blair clarified the British position towards Europe in his speech at the French National Assembly in 1998. He argued:

> Yet it is these same fundamental changes which call for new ways of working and organising our society that impel us to cooperate ever more closely between nations. Just over half a century ago, Europe was at war. Then for 40 years or more, the Iron Curtain descended. Now we are members of the European Union, and clamouring to enter are the former East European communist dictatorships. It is on any basis a remarkable achievement.
>
> Yet here too the challenge of change confronts us. Let me first clear away any remaining doubts about the new British Government's position. Britain's future lies in being full partners in Europe. At Amsterdam, we played a constructive part in bringing about a new European Treaty. Now, as EU President, we are launching the enlargement negotiations and doing our best to ensure the Euro starts successfully. (Blair 1998)

Blair also highlighted his personal commitment to integration. He continued:

> I believe in a Europe of enlightened self-interest. Without chauvinism. It is the nation-state's rational response to the modern world. If globalisation of the world economy is a reality; if peace and security can only be guaranteed collectively; if the world is moving to larger blocs of trade and cooperation and look at ASEAN or Latin America: if all this is so, then the EU is a practical necessity. I happen to share the European idealism. I am by instinct internationalist. But even if I weren't, I should be internationalist through realism. The forces of necessity, even of survival are driving us to cooperation. In the United Nations, in Bosnia, no less than in international trade.

The traditional British argument suggesting that the integration was about economy and that the political aspects of it, including the foreign and security policy issues, should be kept at a minimum level, was revised. Conversely, Blair embraced a 'political vision' of the EU (Blair 1998).

Nevertheless, Blair indicated that the Europeans felt strongly about their states and integration must consider public opinion(s). He implied that the political vision for Europe was not an easy task to achieve. However, in addition to the obvious benefits of the economic integration, Blair suggested that there was another increasingly important field in which the UK could take part. Blair argued that in the field of defence Britain and France were particularly qualified states to cooperate (Blair 1998). He argued:

> Now is the time for a new initiative on the military side. We are in the final stages of conducting a major Defence Review. You are in the middle of the complex process of professionalising and restructuring your armed forces. When our review is complete, I am asking the Defence Secretary and Chiefs of Staff to report to me urgently on the scope for future Anglo-French co-operation. How we can create a capacity to deploy forces rapidly on a joint basis in future crises, where both countries agree.(Blair 1998)

These initial suggestions materialized later during the year in the British-French Joint Declaration issued in St. Malo.

Strategic Defence Review and St. Malo Declaration

Launched on 28 May 1997, the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) set out to determine the future direction of the British defence policy. The main

objective of the review was to respond to the challenges of the post-Cold War world and it addressed both the traditional and new security threats and issues. The new threats were largely constituted by political instability and increasing transnationalism. As the review argued:

> Instability inside Europe as in Bosnia, and now Kosovo, threatens our security. Instability elsewhere - for example in Africa - may not always appear to threaten us directly. But it can do indirectly, and we cannot stand aside when it leads to massive human suffering.
>
> ...There are also new risks which threaten our security by attacking our way of life. Drugs and organised crime are today powerful enough to threaten the entire fabric of some societies. They certainly pose a serious threat to the well-being of our own society. We have seen new and horrifying forms of terrorism and how serious environmental degradation can cause not only immediate suffering but also dangerous instabilities. And the benefits of the information technology revolution that has swept the world are accompanied by potential new vulnerabilities. ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998)

Although, the CFSP and the ESDP had a rather minor over-all role in the review, it laid out the wider context in which the CFSP and the ESDP were re-articulated. The review argued that 'the European Union has a vital role in helping to preserve and extend economic prosperity and political stability, including through the Common Foreign and Security Policy ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998). Accordingly, and later during the same year in St. Malo, the European Union was given a key role in European security.

In St. Malo the British Prime Minister and the French President agreed on several issues aimed to strengthen the CFSP and the ESDP. They argued first (i) that 'the European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage.' It was argued that this involved enforcement of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which re-formulated the decision-making process of the CFSP; (ii) to this end, it was argued, that the Union must develop 'the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.' However, the declaration re-assured Britain and France's commitment to NATO, (iii) the declarations noted that in order for the European Union to 'take decisions and to approve military action, where the Alliance [NATO] as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be

given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU.' In this regard, the European Union was argued to need recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework); (iv) Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology; and (v) the United Kingdom and France expressed that they are united in their efforts to enable the European Union to give a concrete expression to these objectives ('British-French Joint Declaration on European Defence' 1998).

The St Malo declaration is central for this study because it is widely considered to represent a major shift in the United Kingdom's official foreign and security policy discourse. Significantly, the CFSP and the ESDP were seen as the key features of this change. In so doing, the number of studies suggesting Europeanisation of the British foreign and security policy increased. As, for instance, Rutten argues that in St. Malo Britain lifted 'its decades-long objections to the EU acquiring an 'autonomous' military capacity' (see also, Rutten 2001; see also, Howorth 2004). Howorth argued that in so doing the British foreign and security policy elite constructed a radically new discourse on the European security (Howorth 2004). On the other hand, the SDR is significant for this study because it constructed the foreign and security policy context in which the re-articulation of this new discourse took place.

4.2.2 Europeanisation of the British Foreign and security Policy Discourse: A New Discourse? A New Identity?

In order to examine what, if anything, changed in the British official foreign and security policy discourse, and whether the re-articulations indicated the emergence of a new discourse in 1998, a discourse analysis of the official foreign and security policy documentation is needed. The empirical material

includes the SDR, speeches made by the PM Tony Blair and the St. Malo declaration. The analysis suggests that, rather than articulating a radically new discourse, the traditional British great power discourse was re-articulated. However, some significant changes took place within the discourse. These related to Britain's position within the other major western subjects, namely the European Union and the United States.

Predication

The examination of adjectives, attributes and predicates assigned to the subjects and objects constructed in the 1998 texts indicated that the key subjects were constructed somewhat differently than previously. The predication is presented in Table 4.2. Again the numbers in the brackets in the table refers to the source documents which are listed in Appendix 3. Significantly, these changes mainly relate to the predication within the West. That is, Britain, the European Union, NATO and the United States. However, continuity is also remarkable in the Table.

In documents examined, predication generates representations that emphasise Britain's status and leadership in the world. Britain is referred to as 'a leader in the world' and it was articulated to have 'immense importance to the international community as a whole' (Table 4.2). Britain is also seen as a 'major' and a 'leading' power in several international organisations (Table 4.2). Moreover, its global reach is underlined in the representations generated in the texts. Britain has 'overseas territories', it is 'a major global economic power' and the British people are 'international people (Ibid.). In this respect, not much has changed in comparison to the earlier foreign and security policy articulations. However, the number of references emphasising the British leadership and power in military affairs increased. On the other hand, the number of textual qualifiers accentuating normative leadership in the world also increased. Moreover, and significantly, the adjective (attribute) 'European' was directly attached to Britain. For instance, the UK was a 'major European state' and 'a leading European member of the Alliance' (Table 4.2).

The UK	NATO and the US	The EU	Russia and the Eastern Europe	The Globe
A major European State [1] A Leading member of the EU [1] The Leading European member of the Alliance (NATO) [1] Strong in Europe [2] Strong with the US [2] The British are international people [1] Is a global player [3] Leader in the world [1] Has immense importance to the international community as a whole [1] Force for good [1] Has international responsibilities [1] Is a major global economic power [1] Influential member of several international organisations [1] Has 13 overseas territories spread around the globe [1] Has 10 million citizens living overseas [1] Is an open society [1] Is vulnerable [1] Has value based foreign policy [1] Does not aspire to be world's policeman [1] Has forces with valuable skills and capabilities [1]	**NATO**: Corner stone of UK security and defence [1] Has been militarily reinvigorated and has shown its continuing value [1] Highly relevant in Europe today [1] Is positive and imaginative [1] Is enlarging [1] Is engaged with peacekeeping and crisis management missions [1] **The US**: Has strong bonds with the UK in history and heritage: language, political pluralism and freedom [2] Is different from the UK [2] Has defended free and open markets [2] Has helped the UK and Europe preserve democracy and freedom [2] Willing to stand up for what it believes [2] Military forces under change [1]	**The EU**: Is a partner an ally [1] Has a common foreign and security policy [1] Is about to have a defence policy [1] Can preserve and extent economic prosperity [1] Needs to be in a position to play its full role in international stage[4] Must have capacity of autonomous action[4] Must have credible military forces[4] **The CFSP**: Enhance political stability [1] **The ESDP**: Is not a European Army [1] Is for the EU to undertake crisis management operations [1] **France**: Similar interests in defence [4, 5] **The WEU**: Has important role in fostering defence coordination among its member [1]	Does not threaten the West militarily [1] Is operating under NATO umbrella [1] Has changed to positive direction [1] Has instabilities, in particular in former Yugoslavia [1]	**Middle East**: Important region [1] Increasing risks [1] Confrontation in Middle East potentially escalation (for instance to North Africa) [1] **Iraq and Saddam Hussein:** A powerful remainder of conventional threat or war [1] Can acquire ballistic missiles, biological and chemical weapons [1] Has oil **Afghanistan:** Exports drugs [1] **OSCE**: Important role to build confidence and preventing conflict [1]

Table 4.2: Predication of the 1998 re-articulation of the great power discourse

The predication of NATO in 1998 also reflected significant continuity in comparison to the pre-St. Malo discourse. NATO was re-articulated as the 'corner stone of the UK security and defence' (Table 4.2). Significantly, the representations generated in the official documentation suggest that NATO's role was increasing and its purpose was widening. NATO was 'engaged with peacekeeping operations' in Kosovo and Bosnia, and it was 'enlarging' to the former communist states (Table 4.2). As the SDR argues: 'Politically, it [NATO] has responded positively and imaginatively to the aspirations of the new European democracies' ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998). In so doing, the predication of the official discourse also highlighted NATO's political role in Europe. Through enlargement, embracing the former eastern Europe, and cooperation with Russia and the Ukraine, for instance, NATO was constructed to strengthen the 'political and security relationships in Europe' and to bring about 'stability' (Table 4.2).

In terms of the pre-1998 articulations, the United States retained a minor role in the 1998 SDR and the St. Malo declaration. However, and implicitly, its dominant role in NATO was re-articulated. The SDR noted that the 'partnership between Europe and North America has been a uniquely effective' ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998). On the other hand, Britain's relationship with the United States is increasingly addressed directly in the Prime Minister's speeches in 1997 and 1998. This change in the official discourse can be partly explained by the new British government's aspiration to re-articulate its continuing transatlantic commitment. However, in these speeches, the British-US relations were mostly addressed in conjunction with Britain's relations with Europe and the European Union. An extract taken from the Prime Minister Blair's key foreign policy speech in 1998 is illustrative. He said:

> … Britain does not have to choose between being strong with the US, or strong with Europe; it means having the confidence to see that Britain can be both. Indeed, that Britain must be both; that we are stronger with the US because of our strength in Europe; that we are stronger in Europe because of our strength with the US. (Blair 1998)

Accordingly, in 1998 the British-US relationship became a key issue in the official discourse. Although the difference among the United States and the United Kingdom is noted, the representations of similarity of these two states are arrived at through predication of shared culture, politics, economics and security. The US had 'strong bonds with the UK in history and heritage' as well as through 'language,' 'political pluralism' and 'freedom' (Table 4.2). In terms of world economy, the United States and Britain had 'defended free and open markets' (Table 4.2).

In addition, the predication of the United States as the 'mightiest military and economic power' in the world generated representations of the United States importance for the world order and peace. The United States is 'able and willing to provide assistance' for others. For example, the US had 'helped the UK and Europe preserve democracy and freedom' and it was 'willing to stand for what it believes' Table 4.2). However, representations of unwished for isolationism also emerged. Blair's speech in Washingtion DC is evocative. He said: 'we [Britain] are back as a country engaged and constructive in Europe. Internationalist not isolationist in perspective. There is no future in isolationism in today's world.' (Blair 1998). Here, Britain's increasing engagement in Europe is made meaningful in relation to increasing internationalism. Simultaneously, and implicitly United States is construed as a potentially isolationist superpower.

In 1998 the predication of the European Union generated the representation of its increasing economic and political significance. Although the key representation still highlighted the European Union as and an 'intergovernmental' and state-based 'international organisation' (Table 4.2), the representation of the European Union as a more autonomous and distinct political entity emerged, specifically, in the field of the world economy. As Blair argued in 1998:

> We have an economic framework for the EU. We now need a political framework that is dramatically more relevant, more in touch than the present one. I say this quite apart from the pressure of enlargement. The next step for Europe is to match its vision of its economic role with one for its political and social role. (Blair 1998)

In addition to its increasing weight, ever since the late 1980s, to 'preserve and extend economic prosperity,' the predication of the European Union in the above extract is rather different from the pre-1998 discourse. First, the European Union's role to 'enhance political stability' in the former Eastern Europe, for instance, through cooperation programmes and enlargement increased. Importantly, the political dimension of the European Union is underlined in the representations of the European Union's increasing importance in the field of foreign and security policy.

Prior to 1998, the representations of the CFSP and the ESDP were few in number and they tended to emphasise the initial steps taken in this policy field. In 1998, the number of representations associated with the CFSP and the ESDP increased and official discourse suggested that the European Union have 'a common foreign and security policy' and it was 'about to have a defence policy' (Table 4.2). Whereas the SDR argued that 'The European Union has a vital role in helping to preserve and extend economic prosperity and political stability, including through the Common Foreign and Security Policy' ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998), the St. Malo Declaration went further. Whereas the earlier discourse merely noted that, in the future the European Union could develop its defence policy, in St. Malo Britain *called for* an independent military capability of the European Union. The document argues:

> 1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union…
> 2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. ('British-French Joint Declaration on European Defence' 1998)

The predication of the European Union, then, changed quite dramatically. Although the developing nature of the CFSP and the ESDP is still clearly noted, these policies became a central issue in the British foreign and security policy discourse. Moreover, establishing the ESDP became the explicitly articulated objective of the British policy towards Europe.

Several other subjects were also constructed in the 1998 re-articulation of the official foreign and security policy discourse. Significantly for this study, the predication of the East continued to highlight 'transition', 'political instability' and 'environmental degradation', for instance (Table 4.2). The crisis in Bosnia and Kosovo were explicitly mentioned as threats to European and British security (Table 4.2). Some positive developments were also articulated. The eastern European states were increasingly included 'within NATO umbrella' and hence the possibility of direct military threat decreased (Table 4.2). The predication also noted the progress that some of the eastern European states had made in their transition towards democracy and the market economy.

Presupposition

Although the predication of the subjects constructed in the British foreign and security policy discourse in 1998 changed to some extent, the key binary oppositions remained very similar to the pre-1998 discourse. The binary opposition of *great/minor* and the related oppositions of *global/local, liberator/oppressor, stable/unstable* and *developed/ underdeveloped* largely constituted the operational logic of the texts according to which the subjects/objects were given meaning. However, some changes also took place. These were related to the core opposition of great/minor and the global/local distinction presupposing an increasingly interdependent world.

The presupposition of *great/minor* formed an important operational logic through which subjects construed in the discourse were given meaning and simultaneously positioned vis-à-vis each other. Several aspects of British statehood presupposed a great power status. As Prime Minister Blair argued:

> By virtue of our geography, our history and the strengths of our people, Britain is a global player.
>
> As an island nation, Britain looks outward naturally. The British are inveterate travellers. We are the second biggest outward investors, and the second biggest recipients of inward investment, behind the US in both cases.
>
> Our task has to be to shape these strengths and give them definition within a foreign policy that is clear and stated. (Blair 1997)

However, whereas previously Britain was presupposed to be a global rather than regional power, in 1998 Britain was constructed as a global *and* regional state in an increasingly interdependent world. Blair asserted:

> We live in a global economy, and an interdependent world. Nations must maximise their influence wherever they can. To be a country of our size and population, and to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a nuclear power, a leading player in NATO, a leading player in the Commonwealth, gives us huge advantages which we must exploit to the full.
>
> Our membership of the EU gives us huge advantages too, and we must exploit those to the full as well. It requires a new maturity in our relations with Europe. This new Government will deliver that new maturity, and Britain will be the winner from it. (Blair 1998)

The kind of regional integration embraced in the 1998 re-articulation of the official discourse, presupposes a global rather than local world out there. Moreover, being a great power is increasingly construed in terms of prominent role in the international organisations.

Although, Britain's material and military capabilities were still highlighted especially in defence policy documents, Britain's greatness was increasingly constructed through its ability to provide leadership (global and regional). As Blair argued: 'for the first time in many years there is a growing consensus in Britain in favour of constructive engagement with Europe… when British people see a strong, dynamic Britain influencing Europe, they support our stance…' (Blair 1998). Moreover, the Prime Ministerargued that the emerging 'alliance of people who believe that British values of creativity, tolerance, fairness and democracy can influence the shape and destination of Europe… People who are in favour of Europe, but in favour of a reformed Europe' (Blair 1998).

Consequently, Britain's more positive role in European Union politics largely makes sense in the light of Britain's ability to lead. Here the binary opposition of global/local provides important background knowledge for the re-articulation of the British leadership in contemporary world and Europe. Although British autonomy still features in the discourse, it is presupposed that the world is increasingly interdependent. In so doing, the aim of the

British foreign and security policy is not full autonomy (i.e. sovereignty). Rather, the British interests and status in the world could be secured and enhanced through interaction, cooperation and integration in an increasingly interdependent world. Britain should 'exploit' its political and economic relationships around the globe. As the Prime Minister argued:

> We live in a multilateral world where influence comes from working with others. We willingly pay the price of pooled sovereignty in defence, for the greater prize of collective security through NATO. We should be ready to pay a similar price in the European Union for the prizes of political security and stability, liberal and open markets, higher incomes and more jobs. Security used to come from self-reliance and defensive barriers. Today, it comes increasingly from openness and the removal of barriers. (Blair 1998)

In the interdependent world, greatness is associated with leadership in institutions representing emerging global or regional governance. Prime Minister Blair's reasoning is illustrative. In 1998 he said:

> On External Policy, the EU must be both effective and seen to be effective internationally. Political will, not hot air. We need to project our values on the world stage, to be open, outward-looking, supportive of free trade, human rights and democracy, and playing a major role in the great international issues of the day. We must equip Europe with better machinery. This means the right candidate to be the EU's voice on common foreign and security policy issues, and the right back-up. It also means enabling Europe to act in a sensible and co-ordinated way both politically and economically… (Blair 1998)

The presupposition of interdependence is, thus, important for the construction of Britain's more engaged relationship with the European Union foreign and security policy. Simultaneously, the acronyms of the CFSP and the ESDP are given particular and more central meaning in the discourse. They become vehicles in advancing certain values and norms such as openness, free trade, human rights and democracy.

Subject Positioning

I suggest that the re-articulation of the great power discourse in 1998 included five key subject positions: (i) the influential, global and transatlantic Britain; (ii) the powerful and credible NATO, supported by the (iii) influential and global United States; (iv) the increasingly influential European Union with developing foreign and security policy; and (v) the

developing and unstable states in eastern Europe and elsewhere.[78] In comparison to the earlier re-articulations, the European Union was given a more prominent role in the world politics. Nevertheless, the key subject positions and their availability for the subjects construed in the discourse indicated significant continuity. Moreover, although the hierarchical order of the discourse in 1998 was increasingly shaped by the ideas of interdependence, the subject positioning still corresponded with the traditional views to power and security in an anarchical international society.

In the re-articulations of the great power discourse, Britain was still assigned a great degree of agency in terms of its influence in the world politics. In the light of the traditional views on foreign and security policy, Britain undoubtedly possessed a great power identity. This identity was arrived at by constructing Britain as the key player in combating the dangers of the contemporary world. For instance, Britain is re-articulated as the key US ally. In 1998, Prime Minister Blair argued that Britain is 'absolutely together [with the US] in our analysis of the continuing dangers posed by Saddam Hussein and our determination not to allow him Weapons of Mass Destruction' (Blair 1998).

Relatedly, the defence policy documentation argued that Britain must prepare itself for possible military interventions around the globe in order to secure its interests and to help others to solve conflicts. As the Defence Secretary Robertson argued in the foreword to the SDR:

> The Government is committed to strong defence, and sound defence is sound foreign policy. As Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, said 'You can do a lot with diplomacy but, of course, you can do a lot more with diplomacy backed up with firmness and force'. It is my strong belief that the Strategic Defence Review will deliver Modern Forces for the Modern World which will enable Britain to achieve a 'lot more' in the 21st century. ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998)

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[78] The East characterised with political and economic instability that could lead to disputes and conflicts, was important, if not influential, in that it was constructed as a test for the EU's ability to establish stability. The developing South had a marginal role in the 1997 and 1998 foreign policy documents. That is, the discussions were euro- and the US-centric. Accordingly, the British subject position emerged in relation to the European Union and the United States in 1998.

The re-articulation of the great power discourse explicitly re-stated the link between foreign policy and military capabilities as a constitutive feature of the great power identity. Moreover, and as the above extracts suggest, the United Stated had a central role in the re-production of the great power identity. In the SDR and Prime Minister's speeches in 1998, the United States was constructed as the most powerful international actor. It was the only remaining superpower with immense importance in the world economy, politics and military affairs. Moreover, Britain was still empowered with the special relationship with the United States. That is, the close cultural and political ties with the United States highlighted Britain's influence in the world and in Europe. Therefore, the hierarchical order positioning the subject retained several traditional features that reflected an anarchic international system or society.

Significantly for this study, the European Union was clearly assigned more agency than before, and the need to further develop its abilities to engage with the world politics were highlighted. I have suggested that the availability of this more influential subject position is linked to the idea of interdependence. That is, the representations of the increasingly interdependent world enabled a more prominent subject position for the European Union. However, the construction of the means to achieve a more prominent EU role largely reflected the traditional ideas of power and influence embedded in the great power discourse.

In the St. Malo Declaration Britain emerged as the key advocate of, and the central player in, EU defence. As the Prime Minister Blair said:

> In defence we [Britain and France] can and should do more together. We are both nations that are used to power. We are not frightened of it or ashamed of it. We both want to remain a power for good in the world. And we start off with great advantages. We both possess a minimum nuclear deterrent. We are both permanent members of the Security Council. We have without doubt the best equipped, most deployable, most effective military forces in Europe. (Blair 1998)

Crucially, the British engagement with the development of the ESDP reflects continuity rather than change. That is, the traditional British subject position highlighting power and greatness is here being re-produced through

the participation in the ESDP. Relatedly, the more engaged role in the European Union was also reflected in the British-United States relationship. Significantly, Britain's role as 'a leading member of the EU' was tied with the representations highlighting Britain's pivotal role for the United States. In so doing, Britain's traditional identity as the transatlantic bridge between the US and Europe was re-produced. As Prime Minister Blair argued:

> I have said before that though Britain will never be the mightiest nation on earth, we can be pivotal.
>
> It means building on the strengths of our history; it means building new alliances; developing new influence; charting a new course for British foreign policy.
>
> It means realising once and for all that Britain does not have to choose between being strong with the US, or strong with Europe; it means having the confidence to see that Britain can be both. Indeed, that Britain must be both; that we are stronger with the US because of our strength in Europe; that we are stronger in Europe because of our strength with the US. (Blair 1998)

The increasing agency assigned to the European Union through the British engagement in the development of the CFSP and the ESDP, emphasised Britain's influential position in the world politics. Therefore, in Britain the Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy became an important element of the re-production of the British great power identity. However, I have suggested that this represents a twist, rather than a turn in the discourse.

4.2.3 Parliamentary Debates

The examination of the parliamentary debates in 1998 suggests that, although the government's re-articulation of British foreign and security policy discourse did not mark a break with the past, the representations of the European Union's more prominent role for Britain sparked a debate and significant opposition.[79] In other words, the discursive constructions

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[79] The examination of the debates proceeded in two phases. First, I examined the Official Reports of the UK Parliament called Hansard for the relevant time periods. Hansard was read with an eye to the debates in which the SDR, the CFSP and the ESDP were addressed. Second, and after this initial phase, I chose seven debates for analysis. These were the debates on SDR, after its publication, on 8 July 1998 and 19 October 1998; the debate on the European Union on 11 November 1998; and the debate on Foreign Affairs and Defence on 27 November 1998. The post St. Malo debates included a debate on the European Council, 14 December 1998; a debate on defence on 22 March 1999, and on Foreign and

generated in the official re-articulations of the discourse were not accepted as adequate representations of the world out there and Britain's place in it.

The findings of the analysis presented in the Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 confirmed that the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy became one of the most debated issues in Britain in 1998.[80] In the debates related to the SDR after its publication in June 1998, the question of the CFSP and the ESDP was explicitly raised. However, and as the further analysis indicated, the new discourse did not appear to govern the majority of the speeches and remarks. Yet, there was clear evidence that a re-articulated discourse shaped by the CFSP and the ESDP emerged; and the remarks drawing on this discourse were put under closer scrutiny through references to the more traditional great power discourse. Importantly, after the St. Malo declaration the CFSP and the ESDP gained a substantially more prominent role in the parliamentary debates. Moreover, the number of the remarks structured by the re-articulated discourse increased. However, so did the opposition drawing on the pre-1998 great power discourse.

Commonwealth Affairs on 18 May 1999 (in both debates the European defence cooperation was addressed in distinct sections).

[80] The acronym 'GPD 1' is used for the Great Power discourse prior to the 1998 re-articulation and the 'GPD 2' for the 1998 re-articulation of the discourse

Remarks and Speeches	GPD 1	GPD 1&2	GPD 2	N/A	Total
Defence Policy 27.11.97	42	4	4	46	96
SDR 8.7.98	25	4	2	20	51
SDR 19.-20.10.98	60	6	10	182	258
EU (Defence Policy) 11.11.98	8	2	25	23	58
Foreign Affairs and Defence 27.11.98	17	2	34	37	90
European Council (Vienna) 14.12.98	13	0	31	16	60
Defence 22.3.99	33	0	15	31	79
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 18.5.99	70	0	23	16	108
Overall	226	14	140	325	704

Table 4.3: The Europeanisation of great power discourse (GPD) in 1998 Parliamentary Debates



Figure4.1: The Europeanisation of great power discourse (GPD) in 1998 Parliamentary Debates

The analysis of the parliamentary debates largely confirmed the findings of the discourse analysis of the previous section. That is, the predication, presupposition and subject positioning of the re-articulations of the government in the parliament indicated a twist rather than a turn in the discourse. The remark of the Secretary of State for Defence, Robertson, is illustrative. He said: (Campbell 1998)

> The review will fundamentally reshape and modernise Britain's armed forces, sorting out the weaknesses, building on our strengths and providing a structure to deal with tomorrow's threats, not yester days enemies. Our forces will be more mobile, better manned, better supported and equipped, and better able to act as a force for good in the world, where we can and when we choose. ('Commons Hansard' 1998)

Although the increasing interdependence presupposed a world of cooperation and integration, representations created by the Labour ministers and MPs continued to highlight Britain's leadership and influence, rather than dependence, in the world. The modernisation of British defence was intended to improve Britain's ability to deploy troops and use force if needed. In so doing, the re-articulation that generated representations of the feasibility of the European Union foreign and security policy largely resonated with the traditional presuppositions of the great power discourse re-articulated in the increasingly interdependent world.

In the debate, the representations that suggested a more prominent role of the European Union foreign and security policy were explicitly questioned. For instance, the key representation created by the foreign and security policy leadership of 'strong in Europe and strong with the US' was questioned in several remarks in the debate. MP Maples' remark is illustrative. He said:

> History teaches us that – in Henry Kissinger's memorable phrase – international stability can come only from equilibrium or domination. There is, as yet, no new world order but, if there is to be one, surely it will be American for the foreseeable future. Europe's role will be subsidiary, and should be supportive. While European co-operation at all levels is vital, the context for our defence partnership must be NATO, and cannot be the European Union. ('Commons Hansard' 1998)

Straightforwardly, the extract downplayed the role of the European Union in world politics. The logic structuring this representation drew on the pre-

1998 great power discourse. Whereas the 1998 re-articulation of the great power discourse constructed Britain's relationship with NATO and the European Union foreign and security policy as mutually beneficial, the above extract constructed it as mutually exclusive. This in turn is arrived at by presupposing a world in which order (or equilibrium) is established by hegemonic state rather than interdependence among various kinds of actors.

Crucially the data collected (Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1) suggests that the re-articulation of the great power discourse was not turning into a hegemonic discourse among the British policy-makers. That is, the twist in the discourse was not accepted by the policy-makers. Quite the opposite, the hegemonic struggle within the foreign and security policy discourse intensified when the European Union foreign and security policy was given a more substantial role.

4.3 Re-Articulating British Foreign and Security Policy Discourse After St Malo

The purpose of this section is to further examine what impact, if any, the 1998 re-articulation of the British foreign and security policy discourse had on British state identity. To do so, I analysed the subsequent security and defence policy white papers published in 1999. I also examined the policy paper of the Ministry of Defence on European defence published in 2001. The analysis of these official documents suggests that the new discourse was becoming more prominent and the discourse was Europeanised. In order to examine how these re-articulations were scrutinised, and to determine whether they interpellated other policy-makers, I analysed the parliamentary debates over these policy documents. The findings suggested that the Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy became a key feature in the British foreign and security policy debates, the Europeanised discourse did not become hegemonic. In particular, the representations of the foreign and security policy leadership related to the CFSP and the ESDP faced significant opposition in the parliamentary debates. Accordingly, the pre-1998 great power discourse was re-articulated. In this discourse

Britain's closer relationship with the European Union's defence policy effectively undermined Britain's special relationship with the United States.

4.3.1 The Europeanisation of Discourse: The Defence Policy Papers in 1999 and 2001

The 1999 Defence White Paper ('Defence White Paper' 1999) is a 24 page long document. It set out the progress that had been made, and it illuminated some new issues that had arisen since the publication of the SDR. The white paper argued that the recognition of the new post-Cold War threats and security issues made in the SDR was correct. The paper noted that since the policy framework to address these issues was made, 'there has been ample confirmation of that judgement' ('Defence White Paper' 1999). Significantly, of the first two chapters which set out the strategic context in which Britain found itself; the latter specifically deals with the European security in the light of the institutional development of the European Union and NATO. The paper argues:

> NATO is and must remain at the heart of our security and defence policy. But events such as those in the Balkans have shown us that Europe needs to shoulder a greater share of the burden of its own security. Britain and the other nations of the EU also wish to play an appropriate part in the response by the wider international community to crises elsewhere. ('Defence White Paper' 1999)

Although the commensurability of the European Union foreign and security policy and transatlantic link was noted, Britain highlighted the need to establish independent capabilities. The paper suggested:

> Britain has consistently argued that the European defence debate should be about how to provide genuine capability improvements… At the Helsinki European Council, on the basis of UK proposals, EU Member States committed themselves to concrete goals for capability improvement. They specified the scale of armed forces that they should be able to deploy rapidly, with the right skills and equipment, and be able to sustain in a theatre of operations until the military job is done. ('Defence White Paper' 1999).

Nevertheless, it was suggested that this was not a European (federal) army. Rather, the EU forces were under command of the member states as in NATO. Significantly, for this study the developments in defence policy were argued to require further developments in defence related areas. The 1999 paper argued:

> … it makes real sense to create arrangements such that when EU nations decide to act together, they can act with maximum effect' …Thus, for the EU to undertake crisis management operations in support of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, it also needs the ability to take informed decisions in the defence field and see them through. Our approach is to establish within the EU just what is required to properly support defence decision making and the political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations. ('Defence White Paper' 1999)

On the other hand, due to these major developments in the European Union the 2001 policy paper ('European Decence - Minitry of Defence Policy Paper' 2001) exclusively addressed the topical issue of European Defence and its evolving institutional arrangements. The 2001 policy paper outlined the development of the CFSP and the ESDP from 1992 to the present. It clarified the aims of these policies and the British government's policy towards the future developments. The paper argued:

> We want to strengthen the ability of European nations to act together on foreign policy objectives. In addition to national efforts and efforts within NATO, this means strengthening the European Union's (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and enabling the EU to respond to crises, co-ordinating its civilian and humanitarian assistance with, as necessary, a military element. ('European Decence - Minitry of Defence Policy Paper' 2001)

Both papers indicated increasing Europeanisation of the British foreign and security policy discourse. The European Union constituted a key feature and the rationale of the British government's policy papers in the field of security and defence. Moreover, both papers created representations of Britain's place in the world in relation to the European Union and NATO. As such, these policy documents formed a set of artefacts adequate for the analysis of the impact of the Europeanisation to the discourse.

4.3.2. Re-Articulation of the Great Power Discourse

I suggest that the representations of the world generated in the 1999 and 2001 policy papers reflected the great power discourse as re-articulated in 1998. That is, the predication of subjects, the knowledge presupposed and the subject position available were structured by the great power discourse. However, the increasing Europeanisation of foreign and security policy discourse – namely, the European Union's CFSP and the ESDP increased

visibility in the re-articulations of the discourse – did not alter the key features which largely structured the meaning within the discourse.

The main subject constructed in the 1999 and 2001 policy papers was largely the same as in 1998. Nevertheless, due to an increasing focus on the European Union, the discourse became more Euro-centric. The identities of the developing and potentially unstable East and other regions were re-produced and they continued to be central for the construction of insecurities. As the 1999 white paper suggested: 'The SDR focused attention to consequences of the break-up of states, and on ethnic and religious conflict, population and environmental pressures, competition for scarce resources, on the effects of illegal drugs, terrorism and crime' ('Defence White Paper' 1999). The paper highlighted that nothing in the past two years had changed that assessment. Rather, the events in the East and around the globe underlined the severity of these issues. The paper argued:

> Indeed, events in Kosovo and East Timor and work we are undertaking on proliferation of asymmetric threats, have reinforced some of our concerns and underlined importance of much of the defence modernisation that we are undertaking.' ('Defence White Paper' 1999)

Significantly, the documents did not include a lengthy discussion or analysis of these insecurities. Rather, they were mentioned as facts and largely taken as given. Moreover, the threats were mainly assumed to be located outside the boundaries of the West. Yet, the insecurities in the East took place in the borderlands of the West and as such, they were constructed as essential for the security of the West.

Britain in the West: Interplay of the EU and NATO

The 1999 and 2001 papers largely re-articulated the British great power discourse as in 1998. In short, both papers explicitly quoted the SDR in this respect. The 1999 white paper argued:

> Britain's place in the world is determined by our interests as a nation and as a leading member of the international community. Indeed, the two are inextricably linked because our national interests have a vital international dimension.' ('Defence White Paper' 1999).

Moreover, the 2001 paper suggested that 'other European nations have also recognised the need for change and most have recently conducted defence reviews that have come broadly similar conclusions as the SDR' ('European Decence - Minitry of Defence Policy Paper' 2001). The British subject position, here, emphasises Britain's ability to lead the way in Europe and beyond.

The representations of the other key western subjects, namely NATO, the United States and the European Union were also re-articulated in terms of the 1998 re-articulation. First, the EU foreign and security policy was seen increasingly important for Britain, NATO and the United States. Second, the relationships among these subjects were constructed as complementary. The predication of the European Union highlighted common values and shared interests. As the paper argued:

> Aims to safeguard common values and fundamental interests, strengthen the security of the Union, preserve peace and international security, promote international co-operation and develop and consolidate democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and freedoms. ('European Decence - Minitry of Defence Policy Paper' 2001)

The subject position available for the European Union was increasingly similar to the one of NATO, Britain and the United States. The European Union was assigned a significant degree of agency in the British discourse. This representation was arrived at by emphasising the recent developments related to the EU foreign and security policy in particular in the military field. As the paper continued:

> In short, it [The ESDP] will strengthen European military capabilities and thereby strengthen the European contribution to NATO. It will bring new responsibilities to the European Union - responsibilities which the EU is uniquely well placed to carry out. It will ensure that Europe takes a fairer share of the security burden and reinforce and sustain the relationship between Europe and North America. These aims are supported by Europeans and North Americans alike. ('European Decence - Minitry of Defence Policy Paper' 2001)

Although the European Union is re-articulated in terms of influence and uniqueness, the presupposition of the world out there is characterised with significant continuity. The world is inhabited by states and their alliances

and the influence is tied to the traditional conceptualisations of the foreign and security policy.

4.3.3 The Parliamentary debates in 1998 and 2001

At the outset, the examination of the interpellation of the British policy-makers appeared secondary. This is because of the significant continuities in the British foreign and security policy discourse. In other words, as the re-articulations of the official discourse represented a twist rather than a turn (i.e. rupture) in the discourse, the official discourse was likely to retain its hegemony. However, the examination of the parliamentary debates indicated that due to Europeanisation of the British foreign and security policy discourse the foreign and security policy debate in Britain intensified.[81] Significantly, the competing representation of Britain's place in the world generated in the debates corresponded with same discourse. That is, the debate occurred within the great power discourse rather than between two different discourses.

The data presented in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.2 suggested that the government's re-articulation of the great power discourse did not interpellate the parliamentarians. Rather, it was increasingly questioned by the MPs. Moreover, the remarks opposing the government's Europeanised discourse were structured by the pre-1998 great power discourse. The analysis of the most debated issues further elucidates these arguments.

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[81] I examined the UK parliamentary debates in the House of Commons on foreign and security policy in 1999, 2000 and 2001. The analysis suggested that the EU foreign and security policy became one of the most debated issues during this period. For a closer analysis, I chose two debates: (i) the 1999 White Paper was debated in the UK Parliaments House of Commons on 22 and 28 February 2000; (ii) the debated on the European Security and Defence Policy on 19 March 2001 explicitly addressed the issues clarified in the 2001 policy paper on European Defence.

Remarks and Speeches	GPD 1	GPD 1&2	GPD 2	N/A	Total
Defence White Paper 22.2. - 28.2.2000	88	2	32	149	271
European Defence 19.3.2001	26	0	27	38	91
Overall	114	2	59	187	362

Table 4.4: Europeanisation of the great power discourse (GPD) in 1999 and 2001 Parliamentary Debates



Figure 4.2: Europeanisation of the great power discourse (GPD) in 1999 and 2001 Parliamentary Debates

The most debated issue in both debates was the relationship between NATO and the EU foreign and security policy and the Britain's position between the EU and NATO. This was to be expected in the 2001 debate on European Defence in the light of the ESDP. However, in the 1999 Defence White Paper, the issue was also extensively debated. The institutional developments in the European foreign and security policy/ies were explicitly linked to the events in Balkans: the Kosovo crisis and the NATO's Serbian bombing campaign, as well as to the continuing and expanding peacekeeping operations in the region ('Commons Hansard' 2000; 'Commons Hansard' 2000; 'Commons Hansard' 2001). Two rival positions emerged in the parliamentary debates.

First, the foreign policy leadership argued that engaging with the European Union in the foreign and security policy field was imperative due the events in Balkans in 1990s. The Secretary of State for Defence Hoon's argumentation is illustrative. He said:

> … it is wrong that Europe collectively can contribute such a small proportion of the total forces required to solve a problem on its doorstep [Crisis in Balkans].
>
> … At the Helsinki European summit in December, the European Union took an enormous step forward in the process of solving Europe's military capability problems, which were so evident in the first half of last year as we pulled together forces to go into Kosovo. We seek to improve Europe's ability to put more forces in the field and to put them there more rapidly. ('Commons Hansard' 2000)

Moreover, through participation Britain enhanced its wider military influence in the world and its status in the world politics. As Hoon continued:

> We will be judged by one thing, and one only: our ability to deliver that force better than ever before. As I speak, we have men in Kosovo acting with skill and courage of which we can all be proud. We have HMS Illustrious in the Gulf at the head of a major naval deployment. We have Royal Air Force aircraft in the skies over Iraq. Those interventions show that we are acting as a force for good, day after day. All the developments that I have described are designed to increase the effectiveness of our forces. I commend them to the House. ('Commons Hansard' 2000)

The representations of Britain's place in the world generated in these extracts reflected the 1998 re-articulation of the great power discourse. The predication of the subjects, the presupposition of knowledge about the world out there and the agency assigned to the actors, were indicative of a great power identity in an increasingly interdependent world. In this world, the EU foreign and security policy was increasingly important for various subjects constructed in the discourse. The Minister for Armed Forces Vaz's argumentation was illustrative in this respect. He said:

> Let me, in closing, re-state the fundamental points for the benefit for of the right hon. Member for Wokingham. The ESDP is good news for Britain, Europe and NATO. That is why the Government developed it, why Europe supports it and why the United States and NATO have welcomed it in the statement made by

> President Bush and Prime Minister on 23 February. This Government, the United States Government, our EU partners and NATO allies bare engaged in making success of the ESDP. Nice was important step towards realising the goals of a NATO-friendly ESDP. It was good in result for NATO and a good result for Britain. ('Commons Hansard' 1998)

In this extract, the ESDP is discursively constructed as complementary to NATO and other subjects such as the United States and Britain. The complementary relationship between these subjects implicitly suggested shared interests and values.[82]

However, and second, a number of MPs questioned the representations initiated by the government's re-articulation of the great power discourse. Specifically, it was argued that St. Malo was a mistake, that the CFSP and the ESDP was a myth rather than reality, and that NATO was the only credible security organisation in Europe. The leader of the opposition, Duncan Smith, argued: 'I warned that, in late 1998, at St. Malo, the Prime Minister's rushed attempt to change policy, which then moved at an alarming pace in 1999, was a big mistake' ('Commons Hansard' 2000). In Duncan Smith's view the developments put in motion in St. Malo were opposed by the United States. He continued:

> … Americans and others have spotted that the words in the series of agreements show up the ambitions to create a defence identity beyond NATO – outside NATO. Those are the lines and words that have been used from St. Malo to Helsinki. It is a reality. That is what the Government have signed up to. ('Commons Hansard' 2000)

On the other hand, the credibility of the ESDP was rendered deeply suspect. MP Cash's speech is illustrative. He argued:

> The European security and defence policy is a sort of satire, reminiscent of 'Gulliver's Travels' and the tales of Baron von Munchhausen. It is a myth; a voyage in time and space, which is completely at variance with judgment, experience and reality. ('Commons Hansard' 2001)

Significantly, the former British Prime Minister Thatcher re-appeared in the debate in relation to the credibility question. As MP Frank Cook noted:

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[82] For a detailed analysis of the re-articulation of the great power discourse see the section 4.2.2 of this chapter.

Some of her [Thatcher] views were very reasonable. For example: 'As the Kosovo conflict showed, and as the figures for defence spending confirm, European defence capabilities are lagging dangerously far behind those of the United States. That is eminently sensible and perfectly accurate. She added: 'This is particularly true in the vital area of military technology.' That point is as plain as the nose on one's face and it is absolutely right. However, Baroness Thatcher said that there would be a problem because the impulse towards developing a new European defence and separate European armed forces has little to do with the fact that Europe is cutting its defences while America is increasing hers... ('Commons Hansard' 2001)

The remarks opposing the Europeanised discourse of the government created several alternative representation's of Britain's place in the world. The closer participation in the EU foreign and security policy could undermine NATO's pre-eminence in the European security, it could jeopardise the United States' commitment in the continent and, crucially, Britain's special relationship with the United States. I suggest that the predication of subjects established, the knowledge presupposed and the subject position available for the subjects of these representations were indicative of the pre-1998 British great power discourse. In so doing, the Europeanised official foreign and security policy discourse in Britain did not translate in to a hegemonic discourse. Quite the opposite, the Europeanised discourse was increasingly resisted in the parliament.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy discourse in Britain. The analysis has suggested that European Union membership and the European Union's developing foreign and security policy became central features of the British foreign and security policy debate in the 1998. However, the discourse analysis indicated that the Europeanisation of the discourse did not mark a break with the past. Instead, the hegemonic great power discourse was re-articulated in a familiar way. It highlighted Britain's great power status, leadership and international responsibilities. Nevertheless, the analysis has showed that the European Union and its foreign and security policy became increasingly important for the re-production of the British great power identity. That is, in the late

1990s and early 2000s Britain emerged as a pivotal and influential state, because it 'was strong in Europe' and 'strong with the United States' (Blair 1998). On the other hand, the late 1990s re-articulation of the British great power discourse did not interpellate the British parliamentarians. Rather the traditional discourse continued to structure the representations generated by the policy-makers. However, this significant struggle took place within the boundaries of the great power discourse.

Chapter 5

The Europeanisation of Foreign and Security Policy: Comparing the re-production of State-Identities in Finland and Britain

Introduction

Following the analysis of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy discourses in Finland and Britain, this chapter turns the focus on the relationship between the European Union and the member state foreign and security policy/ies. Specifically, my task is to discuss the similarities and differences between Finland and Britain in the light of the findings of the case studies. In so doing, this chapter also elucidates the contribution of a context specific discourse analysis with a comparative element.

The case studies suggest that the EU foreign and security policy has been central for the re-articulations of the foreign and security policy discourses in Finland and Britain. As such, it has shaped the re-production of these states identities. However, the comparison of the findings of the discourse analysis indicates that the process has had very different effects on these states identities. Whilst in Finland, the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy was fundamental in the transformation of the neutrality identity to the (non-) alignment identity, in Britain it enabled the re-

production of the great power identity along familiar lines. Three key arguments follow.

First, the comparison suggests that the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy is more than state-centric cooperation. The findings indicate that the identities of the states that participated in the integration are shaped or even transformed. On the other hand, and second, the variation between Finland and Britain is suggestive of the continuing importance of the member state level in the process of Europeanisation of foreign and security policy. Therefore, convergence and divergence is possible. Finally, the differences between Finland and Britain underline that the context specific discourse analysis is helpful in establishing knowledge about the foreign and security policy governance in Europe. On the other hand, the comparative element is imperative in explicating what, if anything, is context specific in the analysis.

In order to illustrate these arguments, I first re-visit the broader background of the dissertation in the light of two questions: Why the comparison? Why these cases? Second, I compare and contrast the findings of the case studies. Third, I discuss the relevance of these findings for the analysis of the European foreign policy/ies.

5.1 Europeanisation of Foreign and Security Policy Discourses and the Comparative Element of the Study

This dissertation analyses how the process of European integration in the field foreign and security policy is shaping the European Union member states' identities. It has been suggested that the dominant modes of analyses based on cooperation and integration approach fail to account for the complex relationship between the different levels of governance in the European foreign and security policy/ies.

The dissertation asserts that the understandings of the recent developments in the European foreign and security policy/ies have been largely based on

the IR inspired cooperation approach. In general, the domination of the cooperation approach has resulted in a narrow state-centric conceptualisation of Europeanisation. Although the scholars have acknowledged the increasing cooperation among the EU member states, the number of studies explicitly addressing the emerging EU foreign and security policy have been, until recently, marginal. When the EU developments have been addressed, the analysis has tended to focus on the member states interest and influence in the process. In so doing, the role and impact of the small states have been frequently downplayed (Arter 2000; Joenniemi 2001; Hansen 2002; Smith, M. 2003). On the other hand, the interests of the major member states have been largely taken as granted. As such, their role in the process has been reduced to commonsense understandings such as, Britain in opposition to, and France in favour of, further integration in the field.

The recent developments in European foreign and security policy/ies have highlighted, however, the role of the small states as well as the changing interests of the major powers. Small states have had a central role in the development of the EU foreign and security policy. For instance, Finland and Sweden played a key role in the development of the European Union's military crisis management. First, they opposed the merger plans of the WEU and the European Union. Second, a Finnish-Swedish counterproposal was adopted as a compromise: the so-called military crisis management tasks were transferred to the European Union, the territorial defence aspect of the WEU was left outside the European Union competences (Græger, Larsen et al. 2002: 22-23). In relation to the European Union's decision to establish the Rapid Reaction Troops for crisis management missions, Finland and Sweden wished to see an explicit statement that the aim was not establish a European Army. Subsequently, the Helsinki Presidency Conclusions stated that the process 'does not imply the creation of a European Army' ('Presidency Conclusions' 1999; Græger, Larsen et al. 2002: 165). On the other hand, the major EU member states' traditional roles in the European foreign and security policy/ies have changed. For example, Germany has acquired a more prominent role in European foreign

and security policy/ies partly through the EU foreign and security policy (Lankowski 2001: 107-111). Moreover, observers have noted that whereas France has revised its traditional reluctance in participating in NATO (Sauder 1999), Britain has been engaged with the CFSP and the ESDP since the St. Malo declaration (Howorth 2001). In so doing, the cooperation approach appears to be rather ill-suited to examine the European foreign and security policy/ies.

Moreover, due to the rapid institutionalisation and the further development of the EU foreign and security policy towards the end of the 1990s, the cooperation approach has been increasingly challenged by scholars operating within a more integrationist understanding of the European politics. Some theories and theorists have drawn explicitly on the functionalist inspired integration theory, in particular the neo-functionalist idea of spill-over. Neo-functionalism suggests that the integration in one policy area will over time move on to other areas. For the integrationists the developments in the 1990s indicated that integration was spilling over to the most sensitive policy fields of the member states, namely foreign, security and defence affairs. Consequently, they argued that the explanations of the European foreign and security policy/ies should account for supranational governance of the European Union.

The adequacy or quality of a research strategy must be evaluated with reference to the questions asked and problems raised. Therefore, there is nothing inherently wrong in seeking to explain the European foreign and security policy/ies from the member state or European Union perspectives. However, these two seemingly mutually exclusive choices appear to be ill-suited to address the complex relationship between the levels of governance in the contemporary European foreign and security policy/ies. That is, how each member state constructs its interests and identity, and how these constructions feed back to the process of integration. Some important theoretical innovations follow.

First, the acknowledgement of the emergence of a distinct European system of foreign and security policy with the European Union at its core has made it sensible to examine the impact of the EU policy upon the member states. Second, to deal with the levels of analysis problem scholars have deployed the concept of Europeanisation. The concept suggests that the domestic contexts may entail different policy outcomes, which may feed back on to process of Europeanisation (Jupille and Caporaso 1999). By this logic, the member state level serves as the dependent variable at one (time) point and becomes the independent variable at the next. Finally, and relatedly, the national variation in EU member states foreign and security policies have highlighted the utility of comparative frameworks in elucidating governance in Europe.

However, the Europeanisation literature has been largely rationalism-inspired and conventional social scientific methods driven (White 2004). In so doing, the recent theoretical innovations of the 'critical', 'constructivist' and 'poststructural' IR (Doty 1996; Campbell 1998; Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999), which have recently fed into the European studies (Christiansen, Jørgensen et al. 2001; Diez 2001; Wæver 2002), have been largely missing in the analysis of the Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy. In these accounts, the question of structure and agency as well as the levels of analysis are dissolved in an understanding which highlights the mutually constitution of social relationship. Within in this understanding, either structures or agents do not exist independently of each other. Rather, they are (mutually) constituted at various levels of social interaction (Doty 1997; Doty 1999) such as global, regional, sub-regional, state, sub-state, for instance.

The acknowledgement of the Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy, then, takes us towards the question of the re-production of state identities through the foreign and security policy discourses (Campbell 1998; Neumann 1998). Here, states are not exogenous to the process of integration. Rather, they are re-produced and re-shaped through continuous re-articulations of the discourses that are crucial for our understanding of

state. Accordingly, to elucidate the relationship between the EU and the member state level foreign and security policy governance we need to enquire into the discourses surrounding the identity formation in specific contexts. On the other hand, the comparison of the findings made within certain contexts, contributes to our understanding of the mutually constitutive relationship between the EU and the member state level foreign and security policy governance.

The Case Selection

The EU member states share some basic features such as a democratic political system, market economy, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, the historical and cultural diversity is often highlighted (Graham 1998: 3-9). Moreover, the comparison of groups of even more seemingly similar states, such as the major European powers (Larsen 1997; Wæver 2005) or the Nordic states (Ojanen, Herolf et al. 2000; Huldt 2001; Hansen 2002) has lead to conclusions that the states are not so similar after all. Accordingly, the specific purpose of the context specific analysis with comparative element is to account for the re-production of similarity and difference of the member state identities. In so doing, the similarity and difference of the cases chosen is approached as a research outcome rather than a presumption.

However, this is not to suggest that the differences or similarities of the states chosen would be secondary for the rationale of the case selection. Quite the reverse, the criteria for the case selection made in this study was the analytic relevance of the selection for the specific questions raised. First, to account for the diversity and difference between the EU member states two different member states, Finland and Britain, were chosen. These states are different in size, geopolitical location and cultural tradition, for instance. Moreover, these states have had a very different relationship to the European foreign and security policy cooperation in the post-war period. Whereas Britain has been a key player in NATO and in the process of European Integration, Finland has sought a neutral status and limited cooperation with the European security organisations.

Second, the case selection also reflected a rejection of generalisation (quantity) in favour of particularity (quality) (Keränen 2001). That is, the aim of this dissertation is not to provide a general picture or to develop a general theory of the European foreign and security policy/ies. The number of the cases is limited in order to provide a detailed context specific analysis of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy discourses. Relatedly, my language skills and background knowledge of these cases as a Finnish person living in Britain has a role to play in the case selection.

In sum, the comparative element of this dissertation has two dimensions – temporal and spatial. Whereas the temporal dimension of the research design is imperative for the analysis of the Europeanisation, the spatial element is crucial to establish the context specificity of the Europeanization. In other words, the comparison of the foreign and security policy discourses over time enables detailed analysis of the Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy discourses in the given contexts. On the other hand, comparison over space is needed to elucidate the relationship between the EU and member state levels of governance. The comparative element is helpful to elucidate the key question of the Europeanisation research agendas; in this study the context specificity of the foreign and security policy discourses. The comparison is a valuable tool in establishing what, if anything, is context specific. This, in turn, has a wider adaptability for the analysis of the European foreign and security policy/ies.

5.2 Comparison of Foreign and Security Policy Discourses in Finland and Britain in the Light of Europeanisation

The degree and impact of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy discourse differed in Finland and Britain. Whilst in Finland the Europeanisation of the discourse was evident already in the early and mid 1990s, in Britain it occurred in late 1990s. On the other hand, the discourse analysis indicates that although the EU foreign and security policy had a limited impact on the re-articulation of the traditional foreign and security

policy discourse in Britain; in Finland, it was central for the articulation of a new discourse and identity in 1995. Moreover, whereas in Finland the new discourse largely interpellated the parliamentarians by the early 2000s, in Britain the Europeanised re-articulation of the traditional discourse in 1998 was increasingly scrutinised in 2000s.

5.2.1 The Discursive Context of the Europeanisation in Finland and Britain

The Finnish foreign and security policy discourse in the early 1990s, generated representations of a relatively powerless neutral state located between two political, economic and military blocks of the East and the West. As such, Finland had to adapt to its external environment and avoid involvement in international value based considerations (Kekkonen 1982: 17-22). Until 1992, the membership was seen to be totally incompatible with the policy of neutrality. However, the dramatic changes in Finland's security environment, such as the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 opened up space for alternative considerations.

Accordingly, the membership of the European Union and the participation in the developing EU foreign and security policy became the central question in the national foreign and security policy debates (Lipponen 1990; Koivisto 1995). Importantly, and notwithstanding representations that highlighted the economic aspects of European integration, the membership in the European Union was largely constructed as a political question with a security dimension. As President Koivisto have argued 'the security policy reasons spoke most powerfully for the membership application. Economic considerations were secondary after all.' (Koivisto 1995: 554, my translation). When Finland accessed the European Union in 1995 it also gave up the policy of neutrality and re-articulated its foreign and security policy in terms of economic and political alignment, and military non-alignment, with the West.

	Finland	***Britain***
Timing	Early and mid 1990s	Late 1990s
Context of the Europeanisation articulated in the official discourse	The end of the Cold War and superpower rivalry Large scale economic, political and social transformations in Europe New security threats related to the instabilities of the transformation Deepening western integration EU membership application in 1992 and accession in 1995	Increasing interdependence and globalisation New security threats related to the instabilities of the transformation Developing transatlantic relationship The NATO-EU relations
Rationale for the Europeanisation articulated in the official discourse	Neutrality is no longer a viable line of action European Union is not a military alliance Participation is in line with the policy of military non-alignment Participation in the European Union foreign and security policy will re-enforce Finnish security	The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage A more engaged relationship with the European Union is needed to safeguard British interests Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks Although Britain cannot be the most powerful country in the world, it can be pivotal Britain should be strong in Europe and strong with the US.

Table 5.1: Europeanisation of foreign and security policy discourse in Finland and Britain[83]

In Britain, the first signs of the Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy were also identifiable in the early 1990s. However, the case study indicates that it was only towards the end of the decade when the CFSP and the ESDP became one of the most debated issues in the British foreign and security policy discourse. That is, although the development of the European Union based political and security cooperation was noted and, to some extent, welcomed already in the early and mid 1990s, these issues were not central for the re-articulation(s) of the British foreign and security policy discourse. The discourse analysis suggests that in the British foreign and security policy discourse, the CFSP and the ESDP were constructed in terms of high expectations but insufficient decision-making and military capabilities. The scholars and policy-makers argued that a clear 'capabilities-expectations gap' (Hill 1993) existed. As such, the twin EU policies were largely marginalised within the great power discourse. The

[83] The table is based on the reviews of scholarly and political discourses in Finland and Britain further discussed in Chapter 3 (sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.1) and Chapter 4 (sections 4.1.1 and 4.2.1).

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Douglas Hurd's reasoning in 1994 is illustrative. He argued:

> The European Union is ambitious in foreign affairs. We feel strength in numbers and we pursue a far-reaching agenda. CFSP is still in its infancy. Entry into force of the Treaty on European Union did not overnight produce a ready-made common foreign policy... As any builder knows, it is important to get the foundations and the framework of the structure right first.' (Hurd 1994: 427).

Despite the rather positive tone of Hurd's reasoning, he nevertheless suggested that there were no foundations, framework of structure in place in 1994. Thus, and in contrast to Finland, the European Union's security dimension did not constitute significant adaptation pressures in Britain. Rather, the initial representations of the EU foreign and security policy suggested that the increasing EU based cooperation was among the many international engagements of Britain.

Nevertheless, the case study suggests that the entry of the Labour Party in government in 1997, the Strategic Defence Review and, in particular, the joint British-French declaration on European defence in St. Malo in 1998 represented a break with the past in terms of British policy towards the emerging EU foreign and security policy (Howorth 2001; Howorth 2004). The policy-makers, both for and against the more engaging policy, argued that the traditional British position, laid out in the so-called 'three circles doctrine' which highlighted Britain's international location in the intersection of the Commonwealth, the United States and Europe, was changing in favour of Europe. Accordingly, the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy turned into one of the most debated issues in the late 1990s ('British-French Joint Declaration on European Defence' 1998; 'Defence White Paper' 1999).

The temporal difference of the Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy discourse between Finland and Britain is significant. Relatedly, the rationale given for the Europeanisation diverged. Whereas in Finland Europeanisation was explicitly related to the context of the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and the representation of neutrality as 'no longer

a viable line of action' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 58), in Britain it was related to the continuing British internationalism and great power status. As the 1998 SDR argued:

> The British are, by instinct, an internationalist people. We believe that as well as defending our rights, we should discharge our responsibilities in the world. We do not want to stand idly by and watch humanitarian disasters or the aggression of dictators go unchecked. We want to give a lead, we want to be a force for good. ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998)

More precisely, in Britain, the developments of the CFSP and the ESDP were linked to Europe's need of 'strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks' ('British-French Joint Declaration on European Defence' 1998). This reflected the ideas of increasing contribution of the European states to the NATO and to the developing EU foreign and security policy and crisis management capabilities ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998). On the other hand, international responsibilities and the ESDP as well as the EU's crisis management capabilities gained weight in the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse due the course of the 1990s.

5.2.2 Impact upon Finnish and British Foreign and Security Policy Discourses

Finland. The discourse analysis of the Finnish case suggests that instead of re-articulating the traditional post-war neutrality discourse, the foreign policy leadership articulated a new discourse in 1995, which highlighted Finland's economic and political alignment with the West. The alignment discourse emphasised Finland's new location within the West, increased influence in world politics, and responsibility in international affairs. On the other hand, Finland remained militarily non-aligned. Importantly, the discourse analysis suggest that the EU and its developing foreign and security policy, was central for the transformation.

The case study shows that in conjunction with Finland's accession to the European Union in 1995, the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse was europeanised. Right from the beginning of its membership, the Finnish foreign policy leadership made it clear that Finland would engage constructively in the development of the EU developing foreign and security

policy. The government said that Finland did not have 'any security policy reservations' and that Finland 'wishes to play an active and constructive role in creating and implementing a common foreign and security policy' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 58). Finland aimed to contribute in particular to the European Union's preventive diplomacy and civil and military crisis management tasks. Consequently, Finland supported the further development of the CFSP in Amsterdam IGC in 1996 and the ESDP in Helsinki ICG in 1999, for instance. Although the foreign policy leadership re-articulated Finland's continuing commitment in military non-alignment and independent defence, towards the end of the 1990s, Finland's engagements in western security organisations, such as the WEU, NATO and the European Union in terms of the ESDP raised questions concerning the feasibility and credibility of the policy. After all, the new discourse emphasised alignment rather than non-alignment with the West. (Table 5.2)

The change in official discourse is extraordinary. In 1990 the Prime Minister of Finland argued that the EC membership was totally incompatible with Finland's long term interest to seek a neutral international status (Joenniemi 2001). However, in 1995 the foreign policy leadership declared the 'the European Union will reinforce the foundations of Finnish security and provide a significant channel through which Finland can pursue its interests…' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 5). The analysis of the case study suggests that this radically different articulation of Finland's place in the world reflected a new discourse. That is, the structuring of the meaning of subjects and objects constructed in the discourse was substantially different from the earlier re-articulations. The key findings of the discourse analysis presented in Table 5.2 illustrate the differences among the traditional neutrality discourse and the new alignment discourse.

	Neutrality discourse	*Alignment discourse*
Predication (key representation of the discourse)	**Finland**: A small, independent and democratic state Is a neutral state Located between the East and the West **The West:** Great powers Democratic states *NATO:* Western military alliance *The EC:* Western economic organisation **The East:** Great power(s) with a different social political and economic system *Warsaw Pact:* Eastern military alliance	**Finland**: Stable state and developed state Is a member of the core group of European democracies (the European Union) Has international responsibilities **The West** Stable, developed and influential major and minor states *The EU:* Inclusive economic and political might with foreign and security policy Crisis management *NATO*: Inclusive military alliance with political dimension Crisis management **The East:** Unstable, developing and potentially but influential major and minor states
Presupposition (Knowledge created in the discourse)	Finland is a minor rather than great power Peripheral rather than central state	Finland is a stable rather than unstable state Democratic rather that undemocratic Developed rather than underdeveloped Order rather than disorder
Subject Position	Small and relatively powerless and peripheral state(s) in the North Powerful and central power(s) in the East Powerful and central powers in the West	Stable, developed and influential states in the North Stable, developed and powerful West Unstable, developing and potentially powerful East

Table 5.2: Structuring of meaning in the neutrality discourse and the alignment discourse in Finland

The European Union. The analysis of the Finnish case points out that over-time the representation of the European Union changes from a western European economic organisation to a European economic and political organisation with a 'security dimension'; and, later to a political entity with a full scale foreign and security policy. Whilst, in the early 1990s the European integration was constructed as a process reflecting the Cold War's

division in Europe; in the mid 1990s the European Union was articulated as an inclusive and enlarging organisation enhancing Finland's aim to create regional stability and to prevent the emergence of the old or new dividing lines in Europe. Moreover, in the mid 1990s the European Union is explicitly attributed the western values of democracy, the rule of law and market economy. Previously these norms were more exclusively associated with the western states.

Importantly, the CFSP and the ESDP have a crucial role in this new articulation. In Finland these EU policies reflect a new kind of security assessment:

> As a member of the European Union, Finland is involved in a community of democratic states which has vital role to play in international security policy cooperation. The aim is to prevent any re-emergence of confrontation or a new division of Europe. Preconditions must be created for over coming and managing security problems and countries' security concerns in cooperation and on a basis of equality.' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 67)

According to the representations generated by the Finnish foreign policy leadership, the EU, the CFSP and the ESDP are not based on traditional and boundary producing security thinking that reflect the traditional security concerns of a large-scale military confrontation highlighting the importance of military alliances. Rather, the CFSP is portrayed as an inclusive policy enabling a wide participation and support, for instance, in the field of preventive diplomacy. On the other hand, the ESDP is construed to enable military crisis-management missions also based on broader international support. Moreover, in Finland, the continuing enlargement of the European Union and the entry of the three previously neutral member states and their participation in the CFSP and the ESDP is constructed as an example of European Union's comprehensiveness.

NATO. In Finland, the representations of NATO also highlight the change. Whereas in the early 1990s, NATO was seen as a traditional military alliance, towards the end of the decade NATO is constructed as a more inclusive political and security actor in Europe. This representation draws on NATO's new partnership programs, the NATO led peacekeeping

mission in which Finland was participating as well as the NATO enlargement. However, the traditional role of the military alliance in the field of common defence was significant for the construction of the CFSP and the ESDP in Finland in the early 1990s and beyond. The 1995 report argued: 'As the members of the European Union which are NATO countries rely on NATO for their defence, the establishment of common defence of the EU, separate from NATO, is not in sight (Report by the Council of State 1995: 48). As a traditional military alliance, NATO constituted the basis of the defence of the majority of European Union member states. Accordingly, there was no need to develop common European defence in conjunction with the ESDP. More over, the developing relationship between the European Union and the NATO had significant role for the re-articulations of the 'new' NATO. The 1997 and 2001 security and defence policy reports emphasised the increasing 'interoperability' of Finnish and NATO troops (Report by the Council of State 1997: 25; Report by the Council of State 2001: 24) The analysis suggests that in Finland, NATO's military resources were seen as crucial for the European crisis management missions agreed within the structures of the CFSP. As such, not withstanding the difference of NATO and the European Union, the relationship between the European Union and NATO was articulated in complementary terms in Finland.

The East. The construction of the East was significantly different in the alignment discourse. Although the Russian Federation inherited some of the great power characters of the Soviet Union, the subject positions available for the eastern subjects in the new discourse development and transition to democracy and market economy. In 1997, the government argued that the changes in central and eastern European countries 'are taking place at disparate rates. Wars, territorial disputes and minority conflicts in the countries of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have affected and continue to affect the security of the entire continent…' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 15). In the alignment discourse the East was constructed as a very different kind of region than previously. In the neutrality discourse, the East represented a developed superpower block and its rivalry with the West constituted insecurities. On the other hand, in the

alignment discourse, the East constituted an underdeveloped region which instability created insecurity.

The Finnish case study indicates in 1995 a hegemonic struggle between the neutrality and alignment discourse was clearly identifiable in the key foreign and security policy documents, and the parliamentary debates over these statements. However, by 2001 the new discourse had become hegemonic. In the official documentation Finland's influence, responsibility and location in the West was highlighted. Simultaneously, references to Finland's smallness, limited agency or peripheral location withered away. In the parliament, the number of remarks made by Members of the Parliament (MP), which reflected the neutrality discourse, diminished (Figure: 5.1).



Figure 5.1: Interpellation of the alignment discourse in Finland

Britain. In comparison to Finland, the analysis of the British official foreign and security policy discourse indicated continuity rather than change. That is, the re-articulation of a more engaging British policy towards Europe in the realm of the foreign and security policy was largely based on the traditional great power discourse. The key features of this discourse were Britain as a great power with a global reach, a leading member of several international organisations such as the European Union and NATO, and the closest ally to the United States. Britain was also constructed to represent particular western values and, as a great power, it had a responsibility to

lead the way and shape the world. However, the analysis shows that the 1998 re-articulation gave Britain a more engaged role in the development of the EU foreign and security policy.

	Pre-1998 Re-Articulation of the great power discourse	***The 1998 Re-Articulation of the great power discourse***
Predication	**Britain:** Major power Leading member of several international organisations Closest ally to the US Responsible great power **The West:** *NATO:* Credible and powerful military alliance Bridge between Europe and North America Corner stone of the Britain's security and defence *The EC/EU:* Increasingly influential economic organisation Developing political and foreign and security policy actor Unreliable organisation for common defence **The East:** Former Communist states Significant military might Transition to democracy and market economy **The Globe:** Trading partners Dependent and developing countries around the globe Hostile Countries	**Britain:** Major Power Leading member in several international organisations Strong in Europe, strong with the US Responsible great power with normative foreign policy **The West:** *NATO:* Powerful and credible military alliance and political actor Crisis management Supported by the influential and global United States Transatlantic organisation Base for Britain's defence policy *The EU:* Major economic actor in world politics Increasingly influential political actor with developing foreign, security and defence policies **The East:** Transition to democracy and market economy Unstable and developing states **The Globe:** Trading partners Dependent and developing countries around the globe Hostile Countries
Presupposition	Great rather than a middle size Global rather than regional Liberator from oppression Stable state instead unstable Developed instead of underdeveloped	Great rather than a middle size Global rather than regional Liberator from oppression Stable state instead unstable Developed instead of underdeveloped
Subject Positioning	(i) Powerful, global and transatlantic Britain; (ii) Credible and transatlantic NATO; (iii) Increasingly powerful but unreliable European Union; and (iv) Dependent and developing countries in the East, the Middle East and Africa.	(i) Influential, global and transatlantic Britain; (ii) Powerful and credible NATO, supported by the (iii) Influential and global United States; (iv) Increasingly influential European Union with developing foreign and security policy (v) Developing and instable states in eastern Europe and elsewhere.

Table 5.3: Structuring of meaning in the pre-1998 great power discourse and the post-1998 great power discourse in Britain

Given the large scale political, economic and social transition in the post-Cold War Europe the continuity in British official discourse is remarkable. Although the political rhetoric changed, the analysis indicated that the discourse enabling and constraining what can be intelligibly said about Britain's place in the world was not altered. Indeed, in the 1998 re-articulation of the great power discourse, Britain remained a very similar kind of subject as before; that is, a great power. As Prime Minister Blair argued in 1997, 'by virtue of our geography, our history and the strengths of our people, Britain is a global player' (Blair 1997). Nevertheless, the European Union, and in particular its developing foreign and security policy, was given a more prominent role in the discourse.

European Union. As in Finland, so in Britain, the representation of the European Union in the field of foreign and security policy changed. In the early and mid 1990s, the European Union was seen as an economic organisation with a developing political dimension. Specifically, the European Union sought a more prominent role in world politics and European foreign and security policy/ies. Conversely, in the late 1990s, the European Union emerged as a global economic player and an increasingly important foreign and security policy actor in Europe and beyond. As Prime Minister Blair argued in 1998:

> On External Policy, the EU must be both effective and seen to be effective internationally… We need to project our values on the world stage, to be open, outward-looking, supportive of free trade, human rights and democracy, and playing a major role in the great international issues of the day (Blair 1998)

However, although the representation of the European Union changes, the British position towards it was articulated in a rather familiar way. That is, Britain should seek leadership in Europe. In of leadership in Europe, Britain engaged with the development of the ESDP. In 1998 at St. Malo it emerged as the key player of the military and defence affairs of the European Union. However, in terms of the British foreign and security policy discourse, this marked a twist rather than turn in the discourse. That is, the re-articulation reflected the traditional great power discourse. As Blair noted: 'Europe

wants us there as a leading player. Britain may need to be part of Europe but Europe needs Britain to be part of it. For four centuries, our destiny has been to help shape Europe. Let it be so again' (Blair 1997).

NATO. In Britain, the representation of NATO was characterised with continuity and change. The uncertainty concerning the future of the organisation noted in some political discussion on the European level in the immediate post-Cold War years (Fierke and Wiener 2001), never fed into the British official foreign and security policy discourse. Rather, NATO was continuously re-articulated as the only credible European security actor. As such, the government argued that the 'membership of NATO will continue to provide the UK with its best insurance against all these [new and old security] risks' ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998). On the other hand, NATO was seen to be undergoing changes. It was no longer merely a military alliance but a comprehensive security actor with political importance. As the SDR argued: 'Militarily, NATO has been reinvigorated and has shown its continuing value by its role in Bosnia and its response to events in Kosovo. Politically, it has responded positively and imaginatively to the aspirations of the new European democracies.' ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998). NATO also retained its role as a pivotal organisation in terms of the transatlantic link between Europe and the United States. The 1998 SDR argued that the 'partnership between Europe and North America has been a uniquely effective' in terms of political and military security ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998). Moreover, the transatlantic link was central for the construction of Britain as a particularly powerful actor in Europe and the United States. As Blair argued, Britain is 'stronger with the US because of our strength in Europe' and 'we are stronger in Europe because of our strength with the US' (Blair 1998).

The East and the Globe. The representations of Russia and other eastern subjects changed from a powerful superpower block with significant security interest in Europe, to a developing state going through political, economic and social reforms. These developments in the British discourse were very similar to the Finnish discourse. In terms of the other subjects

constructed in the British discourse, the global dimension retained its importance. An extract taken form the SDR is illustrative:

> We are a major European state and a leading member of the European Union. Our economic and political future is as part of Europe. Our security is indivisible from that of our European partners and allies... But our vital interests are not confined to Europe. Our economy is founded on international trade. Exports form a higher proportion of Gross Domestic Product than for the US, Japan, Germany or France. We invest more of our income abroad than any other major economy. ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998)

Thus, the global dimension of the British foreign and security policy discourse is clearly re-articulated. Britain emerges as a European great power with global interests. In short, Britain is global rather and regional, developed instead of underdeveloped, and a leader rather than follower.

The discourse analysis of subsequent foreign and security policy documents in 1999 and 2001 suggested that the 1998 re-articulation was increasingly shaping the official foreign and security policy statements. The eminence of the European Union and its foreign and security policy increased, and the representations generated in the policy papers largely reflected the 1998 re-articulation of the great power discourse. Nevertheless, the analysis of the parliamentary debates revealed that the 1998 re-articulation did not become hegemonic among the British parliamentarians. Instead, the traditional great power discourse prevailed and continued to structure the remarks made in the parliamentary debates (Figure 5.2).



Figure 5.2: Interpellation of the 1998 Re-Articulation of British great power discourse (GPD)

The significant degree of change in the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse and the lack of it in the British discourse may seem somewhat expected according to commonsense understandings of the small and major states. Conventionally, minor states are given a rather marginal role in the world politics (Hey 2003: 1, 4) and European integration (Arter 2000). Due to their size and limited resources, they are expected to adapt to the external changes. On the other hand, great powers are seen more able to shape the context within which they find themselves.

However, the analysis of the Finnish and British discourses highlighted the context specificity of these constructions. For instance, whilst in 1995 Finland declared that neutrality was a 'no longer a viable line of action' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 58), in 1996 Britain acknowledged the contribution 'which the neutral members of the European Union are able to make to building security in Europe' (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996: 13). On the other hand, the Finnish foreign policy leadership argued that 'Finland has not made any security policy reservations concerning its obligations under its founding treaties or the Maastricht Treaty' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 58). Conversely, Britain argued that the neutral member states' full participation in the western foreign and security policy

cooperation was uncertain in the near future (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1995: 17; Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996: 13).

According to British representations of European developments, Finland could have retained its neutrality and it was expected to opt out from any deeper engagements with EU foreign and security policy. On the other hand, in the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse, Britain was seen as a leading western European power which had a central role in European security (Koivisto 1995).[84] As such Britain was constructed as a leading actor in Europe and it was assumed to play a constructive role in the ongoing changes in European foreign and security policy/ies. Importantly, the Finnish official foreign and security policy documentation in the 1990s did not distinguish between the major western European powers. However, due to increasing interest in European Union politics in the 1990s, the British and European constructions of Britain as a reluctant partner gained a more prominent role in Finnish political discourses.

5.3 Finland and Britain: Comparing and Contrasting

The purpose of this section is to consider the relationship between the European Union and the member states. This will be done by assessing the similarities and differences in the construction of state identities in Finland and Britain in the light of increasing European Union level foreign and security policy governance. However, it is also important to remind us about the limitations and character of the comparative element of this study. Notably, I am not seeking to establish a general theory of the complex relationship between the European Union and its member states in the realm of foreign and security policy. That is, to generate a model applicable to explain this relationship over time and/or space. Rather, the aim of this section and the dissertation is to elucidate this relationship and provide us

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[84] President Koivisto reasoning in the Baltic State question in 1991 is illustrative. He noted the British Prime Minister John Major's activism in finding a peaceful solution to the Baltic State independence aspirations. His conclusion that after Major's talks with the Soviet Union, there was no need for active Finnish policy towards the Baltic States (Koivisto 1995) generated representation of Finland a passive and neutral state, and Britain as the major western power in European security.

with insights that are valuable for our understanding(s) of the European foreign and security policy/ies.

The findings of the case studies broadly support the claims and the rationale of the Europeanisation literature (Manners and Whitman 2000; Christiansen, Jørgensen et al. 2001; Green Cowles, Caporaso et al. 2001; White 2001; Tiilikainen and Raunio 2003; Tonra 2003). That is, the state level foreign and security policy discourses in these two member states were increasingly shaped by the European Union. The 'presence' of the EU foreign and security policy in this particularly central and sensitive policy field for the state identity (Wallace 1991; Doty 1996; Campbell 1998; George 1998; Wæver 2002) in two different contexts is a considerable finding. Nevertheless, the impact of the Europeanisation in the re-production of these states identities was rather different (Table 5.4). I suggest that this is symptomatic for the context specific character of the Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy. Discussion of some of the key similarities and differences is illustrative.

	Finland	***Britain***
Context of the Europeanisation	Early 1990: The End of the Cold War	Late 1990s: Increasing integration and new security threats in Europe
Rationale of the Europeanisation	Stable and more influential international position	To exercise power and influence
Impact on state identity	Becomes a more stable and influential state	Remains a great power
Position in relation to the EU	Becomes a more central state (Similarity)	Remains a central state (Complementary)
Position in relation to the EU foreign and security policy	Constructive and responsible participant (Complementary)	Britain provides leadership (Complementary)
Position in relation to NATO	Increasing interoperability (Complementary)	Corner stone of British defence (Complementary)
Position in relation to the East	Increasingly alienated (Difference)	Increasingly alienated (Difference)

Table 5.4: Similarities and Differences in the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy in Finland and Britain

In both cases, the re-production of state identity in the realm of foreign and security policy reflected euro-centric understanding of the world and security. In terms of Finland, this is hardly surprising. After all, Finland's

post-war neutrality identity was explicitly related to the balance of power between the two rival superpower blocks in Europe. However, in the British case it is interesting to learn that the traditional foreign and security issues of a great power with a global reach were rather exclusively debated in terms of European security. The official documents and the parliamentary debates generated representation that highlighted Britain's importance in several international organisations as well as its ability to safeguard its global interests militarily. However, in doing so, two institutions were given utmost importance. These were NATO and the European Union.

Within the institutional arrangements related to foreign and security policy, the importance of the European Union augmented in both cases. In Finland, the European Union became the key feature of 'Finnish security' in the post-Cold War world. In Britain, the European Union signified an increasingly influential political actor within which Britain should seek leadership. The case studies also suggested that both states constructed the relationship between NATO and the European Union in similar ways. Although the relationship between the European Union's developing foreign and security policy and NATO was largely seen as complementary, the difference between these organisations was highlighted. In both states, the importance of NATO's military resources was highlighted in terms of its member states defence as well as the crisis management operations in Europe. On the other hand, the representations the European Union emphasised its increasing role in preventive diplomacy and civil and military crisis management. Therefore, the creation of the European Union's Rapid Reaction Force in Helsinki in 1999 did not constitute a 'Euro-Army'. Neither did it propel a common defence of the European Union. Instead, it signified European Union's willingness to take greater responsibility in solving European disputes and conflicts in the field of crisis management.

In the British and Finnish foreign and security policy discourses, broadly similar subjects and objects were articulated. These were states, political communities that desired to become states, and international organisations largely constituted by the states. Significantly, in the official discourses

there was no evidence of the decreasing importance of the states implied in the integration, regionalisation or, indeed, globalisation literatures. Instead, in both contexts, the EU foreign and security policy was constructed to be in the interest of the state in question. In Finland, it was seen as crucial for Finnish security. It provided tools to address the security issues in the post-Cold War world. More generally, Finland's EU membership was seen to consolidate Finland's international position in the context of the large-scale political, economic and social transition. In Britain, the construction of the Europeanisation highlighted Britain's will to stay in power in Europe and beyond. Britain was 'used to power' and it indents to 'stay in power' (Blair 1998). The foreign policy leadership constructed the more engaging policy towards the European Union and the participation in the CFSP and the ESDP as a strategic move to consolidate and further exploit Britain's pivotal position in the world politics.

In sum, in the light of the re-production of state identities the analysis suggested that whilst Britain retained a great power identity, Finland acquired a more influential identity. However, the analysis suggested that retaining and gaining influence in these two contexts was arrived at rather differently. Although the Finnish and British foreign and security policy discourses were converging, they also retained their specific character. That is, given Europeanisation, distinct Finnish and British state identities were re-produced in the realm of foreign and security policy.

In Finland, the EU membership and Finland's participation in all the areas of integration were central for the more influential identity (partly) constituted by the alignment discourse. The general representation of EU membership suggested that it had 'clarified and strengthened Finland's international position' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 10). As an EU member state, Finland gained stability and influence. On the other hand, the membership assigned 'Finland with more responsibility for European security and the future of the whole world community' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 10). In terms of Finnish state identity, by joining the European Union Finland became a greater power.

However, by the late 1990s smallness itself was constructed to indicate influence. As Finnish scholar Joenniemi, hypothesized: 'in an international system where the very idea of sovereignty itself is under challenge and large multilateral institutions – the EU being the most obvious example – are assuming greater importance, small states could become more influential' (Joenniemi 1998: 62; see also, Arter 2000: 678). He added that 'having none of the 'hang-ups' associated with being a large power, small could indeed became a synonym for smart in the post-Cold War era' (Joenniemi 1998: 62; see also, Arter 2000: 678). According to this reasoning, a state's ability to influence its external environment was no longer tied to its size but rather its capacity for innovative thinking. Whilst in the Cold War world Finland's smartness and influence was constrained by the bi-polar world order, in the post-Cold War world the European Union enabled small states' increasing influence on wider international agenda. This partly explains the remarkable speed with which the alignment discourse became hegemonic in Finland. In Finland, the alignment with the European Union quickly replaced neutrality as the 'code word' for independence. Moreover, alignment with the European Union and the participation in the EU foreign and security policy was seen to enlarge rather than endanger Finnish autonomy.

On the other hand, in Britain, the discourse analysis suggested that the European Union and its developing foreign and security policy was central (rather than marginal) for the re-articulation of the British great power identity. Notwithstanding the hegemonic struggle within the great power discourse, the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy was increasingly seen to consolidate British influence in the world. Prime Minister Blair argued that Britain should overcome the 'hang ups' related to its history as a great power and its independent international position. In terms of increasing 'Euro-scepticism' he argued:

> The logical conclusion of the Euro-sceptic approach that says everything that comes out of Europe is bad; that says Europe is something that is done to us, rather than something that we can shape; is to get out of Europe altogether…But it would be a disaster for British jobs, British trade, British influence in the world. Far

> better is to be in there, engage in the arguments, and win the arguments. (Blair 1998)

Accordingly, in the late 1990s and in the early 2000s British state identity was increasingly constructed terms of the ongoing debate concerning the British relationship with the European Union and its developing foreign and security policy. The government attempted to articulate a more complementary relationship with the European Union, the CFSP and the ESDP. On the other hand, the more traditional discourse that highlighted the oppositional aspects of this relationship remained strong in the parliamentary debates. Nevertheless, given the seemingly intense and significant debate related to the EU foreign and security policy, the findings of the discourse analysis revealed a considerable degree of continuity and consensus. That is, the hegemonic discourse was not challenged by the process of Europeanisation. In so doing, the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy discourse in Britain did not imply a dislocation of the hegemonic discourse. Instead, the struggle took place within the traditional discourse.

Conclusion

In terms of the questions raised in this study, the continuing salience of the state and state interests and influence in the Finnish and the British foreign and security policy discourses did not imply an impossibility or undesirability of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy. Rather, these very different states with a distinct historical, cultural and geopolitical background could construct the process of Europeanisation as complementary with their interests. Within the temporal and spatial boundaries of this dissertation, the context specific character of Europeanisation appears to be a strength rather than weakness. That is, the possibility of national variation makes the process more acceptable within the distinct contexts of the European Union. On the other hand, the context specificity also enables divergence. That is, the development of the EU and its foreign and security policy is not necessarily linear process. Rather, its pace and speed is likely to vary over time and space.

Conclusion

The central argument of this dissertation has been that analysis of the production of state identities can add to our understanding of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy. This is because the context specific identities enable and constrain the process of change or transformation embedded in the idea of Europeanisation. The dissertation began with a critique of the dominant cooperation approach of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy, which comprise the majority of accounts tackling European foreign and security policy/ies. Notwithstanding significant variation within realism(s) and neo-liberal institutionalism(s), I argued that the accounts operating within the cooperation approach share significant limitations. In sum, the central problem inherent in these theoretical approaches is state-centrism which, in turn, has led to a narrow conceptualisation of the integration as cooperation between states. For instance, in the 1990s the realist-inspired accounts of European security and conventional Foreign Policy Analysis rendered the development of the CFSP and the ESDP deeply suspect. On the other hand, given the increased interdependence that is underlined by the neo-liberal institutionalists, the key (liberal) theory of European integration – intergovernmentalism – has continued to highlight the role of the major states.

I have suggested that there is nothing inherently wrong in seeking to explain the European foreign and security policy from the state perspective. Any social explanation is likely to be partial and different research agendas contribute to the accumulation of knowledge in the field. However, I have

argued that the cooperation approach is not particularly valuable in explicating the complex social relationships among different levels of governance. Moreover, its overwhelming dominance in the research agendas tackling European foreign and security policy/ies is not desirable in terms of the accumulation of knowledge in this field. Indeed, because of its prevalent position, alternative thinking has been marginalised.

Therefore, this dissertation has embraced the recent engagements of the theories and theorists operating within a more integrationist understanding of the contemporary European foreign and security policy/ies. Specifically, these accounts assume that the development of the EU foreign and security policy have led to the emergence of a distinct European system of foreign and security policy. In this system, the European Union institutions have been given greater role in the formulation of the European foreign and security policy/ies. Whilst the integration theorists have emphasised, for instance, the utility of the concept of spill-over, other scholars have highlighted comparative frameworks and the concept of Europeanisation in accounting for the governance in Europe.

For many, the recent theoretical ferment related to the concept Europeanisation indicates an analytical shift within the European studies. Instead of focusing on the creation and the development of the process of integration itself (bottom-up frame) – for instance, in terms of EU level institution building – Europeanisation literature concentrates on how the EU level politics and policies feed into the member states' domestic political processes (top-down frame). Notwithstanding these approaches' contribution to our understanding, they, however, seem to offer a limited set of tools to inquire into the EU and state level governance. Importantly, the conceptualisation of Europeanisation as a top-down process, fails to account for how the domestic processes feed back to the process of integration. Relatedly, Europeanisation and comparative politics remain rationalism inspired. They largely (although not exclusively) focuses on causal mechanisms of Europeanisation which are seen to be resulting from the increased activity on the EU level.

This dissertation has aimed to explore whether it is possible to conceptualise Europeanisation in a more comprehensive manner highlighting the reciprocal features of the relationship between the EU and member state governance. It has suggested that due to the centrality of the state for the any conceptualisation of foreign and security policy, Europeanisation scholars in this specific field have tended to approach the process more broadly. Instead of quantitatively analysing the 'mechanisms' of Europeanisation they have examined, for example, elite socialisation and cognitive aspects of the process more qualitatively. Drawing on these approaches, this research has explored ways to avoid studying the EU or state levels separately ('bracketing off') for analytical purposes.

To follow a different path this study has found the IR literature on social constructivism and poststructuralism useful. These approaches have explicitly dealt with mutually constitutive social relationships and political agency located in various levels of analysis. In so doing, they have utilised concepts of identity and discourse. Further, the theoretical and methodological debates between and within there approaches are directly related to the analytical puzzles raised in this study. I have argued that the concept of state identity employed by the mainstream social constructivism appears to reproduce several of the problems associated with the cooperation and integration approaches. As Wæver has noted, the problem with these accounts is that they operate within an ontology which assumes the pre-existence of states with a given identity. Whether the identity of the state is seen to reflect international system (Wendt 1999), a particular national culture (Katzenstein, P. J. 1996) or regional systems of governance such as the European Union, these approaches are unable to theorise the process of re-production of state identities (Wæver 2002: 21). Conversely, some of the critical variants of social constructivism and majority of the poststructuralism have embraced a radically different conceptualisation of identity. In these approaches, the process of differentiating the self from others is seen as fundamental to the process of identity production. In other words, establishing a presence for oneself necessarily implies a creation of

other selves. Moreover, the need to differentiate the self from others is a never-ending social process. That is, the identities are continuously re-produced in social and political practices. As such, socially constructed identities are inherently contingent.

In this regard, poststructuralist scholars have suggested that the foreign policy understood as a state based political practice is central for the re-production of the identity of the state. They have re-conceptualised foreign policy as a boundary-producing political practice. As such, it is not a reflection of pre-given essence of a state (self), but as a practice re-inscribing the borders between the self and other, it is also the process by which that state is continually constituted and reconstituted in interaction with others (Doty 1996; Campbell 1998: 69-70). Central for poststructuralist approaches to foreign policy has been the concept of discourse which is not equivalent to language. Discourse is defined as structure and practices. As a structure, discourses are sociocultural resources enabling and constraining construction of meaning. As practice, they are structures of meaning in use (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 28). As such, discourses are constitutive of identities because the meaning of the self and others is produced and re-produced in practices enabled and constrained by the discourse(s).

The re-conceptualisation of foreign policy in the light of a poststructural theory of identity takes us back to the key theme of this dissertation. That is, the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy and the re-production of the state identity. Thus the key *empirical* question raised in this study was, how the increasing Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy discourse translated into the state identities. Because of the commitment to context specificity rather than generality, the analysis focused on two preferably different EU member states, Finland and Britain. In so doing, the key *analytical* puzzle of the dissertation, namely, the relationship between the EU and state level governance, was addressed by comparing and contrasting the Europeanisation of state identity in these two contexts.

Empirical Findings

The case studies suggested that although the Finnish and British foreign and security policies were Europeanised, significant national variation prevailed in the identity production of these states in the realm of foreign and security policy. In Finland, the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy was central for the articulation of a radically different foreign and security policy discourse in the post-Cold War Europe. The new alignment discourse represented a break with the Cold War neutrality discourse and highlighted alignment with the West. Although, the discourse was initially resisted, it became hegemonic by the early 2000s. Accordingly, Finnish state identity was transformed. In Britain, the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy discourse took place in the late 1990s in conjunction with the development of the ESDP. However, in Britain Europeanisation did not translate into a radically different discourse or identity. Rather the re-articulation of the discourse displayed continuity. However, EU foreign and security policy had a central role in the re-articulation of the conventional great power discourse and identity.

Combined, these two findings generated a third empirical finding: that the effects of EU policies had a differential impact on the foreign and security policy discourses and national identities of these member states. The detailed examination of the similarities and differences in the process of Europeanisation of foreign and security policy and in the re-production of state identity in Finland and Britain suggested that both convergence and divergence were possible. In so doing, the degree of indistinctness and elasticity often assigned to the process of Europeanisation(s) appeared to serve the process of integration well. That is, rather than threatening the identity and the very existence of the EU member states, the Europeanisation highlighting variation enabling the re-production of the context specific self and others. On the other hand, while the re-production of the state identities highlighted differences, the process of making and remaking the identities in question was increasingly taking place within the European Union context. This is somewhat expected in the case of Finland due the recent accession to the EU. However, the analysis suggests that

British great power identity was also increasingly tied to the European Union developments.

One of the most remarkable findings of the discourse analysis in the Finnish case was the speed of change. Within less than ten years, Finnish state identity was transformed. This suggests that ostensibly fixed identities can change rapidly and fundamentally over a short period of time. Discourse theory can help us to explain how. The analysis in Chapter 3 suggested that the Finnish discursive context enabled the transformation. That is, the neutrality identity was intrinsically tied to the Cold War bi-polar world and to the Finland's special relationship with the Soviet Union. When the bi-polarity ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, Finnish state identity needed to be re-configured. On the other hand, the examination of neutrality identity elucidated why a particular re-articulation and identity emerged in 1995 and how it became hegemonic by the early 2000s.

The findings of the discourse analysis of the British case suggest that increasing 'euro-talk' does not necessarily translate into transformation of the more Europeanised discourse and identity. Quite the opposite. In the British case, the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy became an important feature in the re-production of the conventional great power identity. Moreover, the increasing debate and growing opposition towards the government's seemingly more integrationist discourse suggested that the traditional identity continues to frame the British policy towards the European Union. Indeed, the importance of the European Union in the re-production of the British great power identity has increased. This dissertation suggests that the context specific discourse analysis provided us with fuller understanding of the Europeanisation. Instead of highlighting further examination of the 'mechanisms' of the Europeanisation, this dissertation calls for further analysis of interpretation of Europeanisation in different contexts.

Analytical Findings

The analytical findings comprised two elements: firstly, that comparative discourse methodology enables us to gain new insights into the process of Europeanisation; and secondly, that Europeanisation should be understood as both a top-down and a bottom-up process, in which state identities are both transformed by EU discourses (differentially depending on prior national identities), and also themselves shape the nature of EU discourses.

Although there is a disagreement amongst the discourse scholars over methodological questions (Milliken 1999: 226-227) this dissertation asserted that attention to method and rigor does not necessarily entail the sort of 'scientism' against which many discourse theorists define themselves (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 28). Instead, I suggest that the discourse analysts' methodological sensitivity is indicative of a self-reflection of discourse theory and method. The methodological reflections on this dissertation suggest that whilst the discourse analytic approaches can contribute to the Europeanisation analysis, Europeanisation literature can contribute to the discourse theorisation of the IR.

Implicitly or explicitly discourse analysts often employ a comparative method. However, as with many more narrowly defined methodological questions, there is very little direct methodological reflection about comparative perspective in a discourse analytic approach (Howarth 2005: 332). Moreover, the emergence of the 'comparative discourse analysis' (Kantola 2004) is a novel, although significant, theoretical development. The comparative element of this study draws on the Europeanisation literature. As a result of this theoretical dialogue between discourse theory and comparative analysis, the dissertation suggests that two key features are imperative for a comparative discourse theory. First, rather than being 'method-driven' comparative discourse theory must be question- and problem-driven. That is, the practice of comparison is relative to the questions raised and problems addressed in the study. For instance, in this study the comparative method was used to explain why Europeanisation give rise to similar and different representation of the world out there.

Second, and in so doing it became clear that comparison must comprise 'thick descriptive interpretations' of the historical context and concrete specificity (Howarth 2005: 332).

The problem-driven comparative approach grounded on the interpretation of the case studies also made a broader methodological contribution. It enabled explication what, if anything, was context specific in a given context. This has particular importance for poststructuralist IR since some of its critics have inferred that discourse analysis does not take us very far because the findings are often so obvious (Doty 1993: 308). However, drawing on Doty's reasoning, my reply is that we often do not have to look very far to find structures enabling and constraining the production of identities. Moreover, discourse analysis allows (rather than forecloses) analysis of less transparent cases. Crucially, it enables us to explain, despite such obviousness, how the commonsensical identities enabling and constraining action were arrived at. Crucially, the comparative element of this study added to this debate. It suggested that what was obvious in Britain was not necessarily obvious in Finland and vice versa. The obviousness of any particular finding or argument appears to be a rather relative phenomenon. To account for this relative character of social reality/ies we should inquire deeper into these common senses shaping our reasoning.

In terms of the contribution of the discourse analytical approach to the Europeanisation literature, discourse theory can deepen our understanding of domestic contexts. It can help us to analyse and to understand more adequately why variation occurs within seemingly similar contexts such as the small member states and the major member states. Specifically, the method applied in this dissertation was valuable to account for the developments in the domestic contexts over time. Analytically, the research outcomes also supported the dissertation's attempt to move beyond the dominant theoretical assumptions based on cooperation and integration approaches. The findings propose that Europeanisation should be understood as a top-down and bottom-up process, in which the identities of the states are shaped by the EU discourses which then feed back to the EU

level (i.e. shapes the EU discourse). As the methodological reflections suggested, the empirical starting point of the analysis – the discursive context of the member state – proved to be fruitful. In so doing, the dissertation suggest that instead of brining the domestic arena back in to the analysis of European integration, we should avoid thinking them as (analytically or ontologically) separate dimensions of the inquiry; rather, they are mutually constitutive. Given the increased scholarly focus on local, regional and global processes which cut across conventional state boundaries, this key analytical finding has broader applicability.

Relatedly, although the focus of this dissertation is on conventional foreign and security policy and the state, the theory and methods of this study overcomes the domestic/international distinction. That is, the approach does not foreclose the analysis of other kind of political communities. Rather, the study recognises the value and importance of the analysis dealing with collective identities of various kinds of political communities such as the European Union. In terms of political analysis, the findings underline the importance to be able to account for increasingly overlapping local, regional and global identities. The poststructural re-conceptualisation of foreign policy embraced in this study and the recognition of Europeanisation as a top-down and bottom-up process calls scholars to engage with the diverse forms of political communities located in various levels of social and political interaction.

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Appendix 1

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